CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION IN RESPONSE TO A COMPLEX EMERGENCY:

JUST ANOTHER DRILL?

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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

"Research into direct military applications does have little or no social relevance and is morally unaccountable". This was the opinion of the research section of the board of the Technical College Twente (now called the University of Twente) in 1972 as published in "Nieuws", the weekly journal of the College in that period. Thirty years later I started my PhD-research at this university on civil-military cooperation, resulting in direct military applications in peace support operations. It illustrates the big changes that have been taking place over these years. In contrast to the focus on the Cold War, the Royal Dutch Military Forces got extensively engaged in peace support operations aiming to stabilise war-stricken countries and support the reconstruction process in these countries. As such I have no doubt that this research is socially relevant and morally accountable.

When finishing my Master thesis I got the opportunity to start a PhD-research on civil-military cooperation supervised by the University of Twente and the Royal Netherlands Military Academy. From the moment I started reading on the subject I was enthusiastic (and I still am) and soon decided to continue.

One of the first things I noticed was the special atmosphere within the military. Many military I met were very enthusiastic and driven by their work. They were very direct and did not hesitate to point out when things went wrong or when I was wrong. As any new person who steps into the world of the military, the use of abbreviations and jargon was difficult. To overcome these difficulties I was handed a glossary in which the 50,000 most frequently used military abbreviations were included. Although some abbreviations had up to ten different explanations, it made life a little easier. During my research period I participated in several military courses and spoke many military, varying from soldiers to generals, which all helped me to find my way in this special organisation.

The world of humanitarians was not less interesting or special. In my research I was able to speak to a broad variety of representatives of humanitarian organisations through telephone, email or face-to-face. Their different opinions and working methods enforced me to become very nuanced and to threat every person or organisation as a unique one.

From the beginning I tried to do research in a mission area as this would, apart from being an exiting experience on itself, enable me to observe civil-military cooperation from close distance and extract much first-hand information. I wrote several letters to the Ministry of Defence to permit me to enter a mission area. One of these letters was just bad timing as it was sent right before the photos of *Abu Graib* prison in Iraq were released. As a consequence no visits of civilians were allowed to the Dutch unit in Al-Muthanna. Having sent my third letter in November 2004 I was approached by lieutenant colonel Jan van der Woerdt to make arrangements to visit Baghlan, a province in the north of Afghanistan. The

Dutch Provincial Reconstruction Team operated in this area and their cooperation with civilian actors was a perfect study object for me.

After postponing the visit several times (this seems to be the rule rather than the exception) my departure was scheduled end of June 2005. During this period I was also appointed as civil-military cooperation (cimic) functional specialist. This enabled me to do a seven-day military course after which I was assigned the rank of major in the Dutch armed forces. This sometimes resulted in awkward situations. The most obvious was the relationship with my father who was in the military for 17 years and finally left duty in the rank of captain (one rank lower than major). Having finished this course on Tuesday I left on the next Friday for Baghlan. In the beginning it felt very strange to walk in military dress and be treated as high-rank officer, though this changed and after returning to the Netherlands I still often searched for my beret when leaving a building. The four weeks I stayed in Baghlan clearly contributed much to my understanding of civil-military cooperation and to the entire quality of the research. It also contributed to my perception of military personnel in general. Working 12 hours a day for six days in a week was no exception.

My visit to Baghlan was an experience I will never forget. Jan van der Woerdt and Peter Kluitmans I would like to thank for giving me the opportunity to make this visit. During my stay I met many great people who supported me in getting all the information. Special thanks to Albert Kuin, head of the cimic branch in Baghlan. Other people from Baghlan I would like to thank are Adriaan van Apeldoorn, Cees Breugelmans, Martijn Elferink, Bert Bruins, Frank Cools, Yvonne Stassen, Martin Boubin, Jan-Willem Sandker, Robert Dankers and Jan van Eijk.

Many other people have contributed to the final product of my PhD-research. First I would like to thank Dr.ir. Sirp de Boer and Prof.dr.ir. Erik Joost de Bruijn, my supervisors from the University of Twente. Sirp had already supervised my Bachelor and Master theses and he had the initial idea of starting a joint PhD-research with the Royal Netherlands Military Academy on the subject of civil-military cooperation. His enthusiasm has been a great stimulation during the entire research and the discussions we held were often very fruitful and helped me a lot to conceptualise the research. During large periods Erik-Joost operated slightly more on the background but his open-mindedness and critical attitude greatly contributed to the research and me as a person. Stephan and Martin, thanks a lot for the laughs we had during our numerous walks. Other persons from Enschede I would like to thank are Julia, Annemieke, Irna, Annemarije, Nico, Margareth, Joy and the many foreign PhD-students from International Management and Technology and Sustainable Development.

This research would not have been possible without the support of the Royal Netherlands Military Academy, both financially and intellectually. There are two people I would like to thank in particular. At first, Dr. Myriame Bollen, whose open and critical views strengthened me to get a grip on the research. I look forward to the future joint projects we

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SUMMARY

In peace support operations military and civilian actors (humanitarian and donor organisations, local population) often find themselves working alongside each other. Although the actors have different objectives, civil-military cooperation can have many mutual benefits. Cooperation can prevent the duplication of efforts and waste of scarce resources, as well as building consent to the presence of a military force and therefore providing a means of protection. From a civil perspective the military can guarantee a climate of security and the skills, knowledge, and assets of the military can play an important role in supporting the work of local parties and the humanitarian organisations.

Civil-military cooperation in peace support operations is essentially improvisational, pragmatic and ad-hoc. As such cooperation evolves over time in response to specific needs in the mission area. Overall, civil-military cooperation depends too much on the personalities of the actors involved rather than on planning and standard operating procedures. As a consequence the efforts are person-dependent and many differences occur within and between rotations and contingents. These differences include priorities, budgets, and involvement of local population. This approach yields inefficient use of limited aid resources, delayed humanitarian relief efforts, inconsistency between rotations and conflicting objectives in the post-conflict environment.

Structured cooperation is expected to lead to efficiency gains and an increased respect for the comparative advantages of civilian and military actors. A promising way forward is to adopt models for cooperation. This offers opportunities to synthesise what has been accomplished in previous operations and foster a theatre specific *modus vivendi* between military formations and the variety of civilian actors. For the actors involved other benefits of adopting models include the development of checklists, an increased understanding of (potential) conflicts in the process of cooperation, and procedures to increase the performance of the cooperation.

This research focuses on civil-military cooperation at a local level and uses a process approach. The central question of the research is:

What process model is appropriate to support the execution of civil-military cooperation at a local level in peace support operations in response to a complex emergency?

This central question is divided into three research questions:

1. *What are the phases in the process of civil-military cooperation?*
2. *What factors influence the process of civil-military cooperation and can enhance the understanding of the phases in this process?*
3. *What constitutes the outcome of civil-military cooperation?*

The selected research strategy consists of literature study and case study research, while ethnography is applied to a limited extent. The first stage of this research is composed of a

literature review on the process of civil-military cooperation. This review includes both literature on civil-military cooperation and cooperative arrangements (strategic alliances, networks and public private partnerships). Based on this review a process model, labelled the process-based partnership model, is developed. This model structures the phases and factors of the process of a civil-military partnership identified from literature. The outcome of the model consists of a performance assessment framework, which constitutes the criteria that determine the outcome of a partnership.

Using multiple holistic case study, the process-based partnership model is compared to empirical data of partnerships between military and civilian actors at a local level. Three cases are included, which all focus on the cooperation between Dutch military entities and civilian actors in peace support operations:

1. The International Security Assistance Force in Kabul, Afghanistan, from February 2003 until January 2004;
2. The Dutch Provincial Reconstruction Team as part of the International Security Assistance Force in Baghlan, Afghanistan, from August 2004 until July 2005;
3. The Dutch Engineering Relief Battalion as part of the Kosovo Force in Kosovo from June 1999 until June 2000.

In the three cases a total of 25 partnerships has been investigated, focusing on the removal of mines and explosives, the construction of schools, fire stations and houses and the training of policemen among others. After analysing the separate cases, a cross case analysis was executed. Based on the process model and confirmed by the three case studies the research concludes that civil-military partnerships pass three successive phases, each consisting of one or more steps. These are presented in the figure 1.

Figure 1: Phases and steps of civil-military partnerships

In each step, the model presents numerous factors that could influence the process of civil-military partnerships. The factors have proven to be very useful in analysing the partnerships because they enlarged the understanding of the separate steps and contributed to the explanation of the performance. This research was unable to determine which factors are necessary conditions for a civil-military partnership to succeed. Nevertheless, there are many similarities between the analysed partnerships. A key observation is that most factors influencing the performance of the partnerships in the case studies are internal rather than external. Despite the complex nature of the operational environment, the extent to which the internal factors are controlled by the partners heavily influences the performance of the partnerships.

From the literature review on civil-military cooperation it remains unclear how the outcome of the process of civil-military cooperation should be assessed. Theories on strategic alliances identify two distinctions that are important to determine the outcome of a cooperation process. The first concerns the partnership locus (performance is the aggregated result for the partners) versus the partner locus (performance is the result of the separate partners). The second distinction concerns descriptive (objective) versus normative (subjective) criteria. These distinctions are used to develop a performance assessment framework. The partner locus identifies the performance for three actor groups: military actor, civilian actor of the assistance community (i.e. humanitarian organisation and donor organisation) and the host nation. A determination of the relative costs measures the performance of the partnership as a whole (partnership locus). The framework is presented in the figure 2.

Figure 2: Performance assessment framework civil-military cooperation

Performance assessment in the 25 civil-military partnerships shows that there are great differences between normative and descriptive performances. Despite the largely positive feelings of the involved actors, several partnerships do not show increased performance on the descriptive criteria.

The explanations for not meeting the descriptive performance are subdivided into three groups. The first group relates to the organisation of civil-military cooperation within military institutions and includes: the lack of unambiguous and useful military guidelines regarding civil-military cooperation; the limited experience and expertise many military have with civil-military cooperation; the lack of knowledge transfer.

The second group concerns the ad-hoc character of many civil-military partnerships and includes: the lack of situational awareness of the actors involved; the limited transfer of contacts with civilian actors between subsequent military rotations; the inaccessibility of information gathered by the military; the limited preparations to transfer tasks and responsibilities after completing the activities.

The third group relates to the involvement of civilian actors in the assistance activities. Partnerships in which humanitarian organisations are involved often lead to increased performance due to their expertise and knowledge, and long-term focus. In many partnerships little attention is paid to the involvement of the local population resulting in decreased sustainability, a lack of cohesion with social structures, a lack of ownership and mismatches between the assistance activities and the actual needs. Following this approach, the local coping capacity is often not fully addressed and western standards are applied in several cases causing difficulties in the transfer of constructions to local villagers and the sustainable use of these constructions.

To address each cause the research formulates several recommendations, including: improvement of military training; promotion of continuity of activities; integration of civil-military cooperation into the overall military mission; realisation of agreements between all participating actors; increased pre-deployment contact and agreement between military and civilian organisations; inclusion of women in higher rank positions; increased involvement of local population and humanitarian organisations throughout the entire process.

SAMENVATTING

In vredesoperaties zijn militaire en civiele actoren (humanitaire en donor organisaties, lokale bevolking) vaak gelijktijdig actief. Hoewel de actoren verschillende doelen hebben, kan civiel-militaire samenwerking verschillende voordelen opleveren. Zo kan samenwerking verspilling van schaarse middelen tegengaan en het draagvlak van de militaire eenheid bij de lokale bevolking vergroten en daardoor dienen als een vorm van bescherming. Vanuit een civiel oogpunt kunnen militairen een veilige situatie bevorderen en kunnen de middelen, kennis en vaardigheden van de militairen een belangrijke rol spelen in het ondersteunen van lokale partijen en humanitaire organisaties.

Civiel-militaire samenwerking in vredesoperaties is grotendeels improviserend, pragmatisch en ad-hoc. In reactie op de specifieke behoeften in een missiegebied ontwikkelt de samenwerking zich in de tijd en is het verloop vaak afhankelijk van persoonlijkheden in plaats van planning en standaard procedures. Als gevolg hiervan treden er veel verschillen op binnen en tussen rotaties en contingenten. Deze verschillen zijn zichtbaar in o.a. prioriteiten, budgetten en de mate waarin de lokale bevolking betrokken wordt. Deze aanpak leidt tot inefficiënte inzet van de beperkte middelen, vertraagde steun aan hulpverlening, inconsistentie tussen rotaties en conflicterende doelen.

Een gestructureerde samenwerking kan bijdragen aan verhoogde efficiëntie en een betere benutting van de wederzijdse kwaliteiten van de actoren. Een veelbelovende aanpak hiertoe is de ontwikkeling van samenwerkingsmodellen. Dit biedt mogelijkheden om lessen die geleerd zijn in voorgaande operaties te integreren en draagt bij aan een operatiespecifieke werkrelatie tussen militaire eenheden en de variëteit aan civiele actoren. Andere voordelen van het gebruik van modellen zijn het ontwikkelen van checklists, een verhoogd begrip van (potentiële) conflicten in het samenwerkingsproces en procedures om de prestatie van de samenwerking te vergroten.

Dit onderzoek richt zich op civiel-militaire samenwerking op lokaal niveau en hanteert een procesaanpak. De centrale vraag van het onderzoek is:

Welk procesmodel is geschikt om de uitvoering van civiel-militaire samenwerking op lokaal niveau in vredesoperaties in reactie op een complexe noodsituatie te ondersteunen?

De centrale vraag is onderverdeeld in drie onderzoeksvragen:
1. *Wat zijn de fasen in het proces van civiel-militaire samenwerking?*
2. *Welke factoren beïnvloeden het proces van civiel-militaire samenwerking en kunnen het begrip van de fasen in dit proces vergroten?*
3. *Wat bepaalt de uitkomst van civiel-militaire samenwerking?*

De geselecteerde onderzoeksstrategie is opgebouwd uit literatuurstudie en case-studie-onderzoek, en in beperkte mate aangevuld met etnografie. Het eerste gedeelte van het onderzoek bestaat uit een literatuurstudie naar civiel-militaire samenwerking en

interorganisationale samenwerkingsverbanden (strategische allianties, netwerken en publiek-private samenwerking). Op basis van deze literatuur is een model ontwikkeld, genaamd het *process-based partnership model*. Dit model structureert de fasen en factoren van een civiel-militair samenwerkingsproces, zoals geïdentificeerd in de literatuur. De uitkomst van het model bestaat uit een prestatiewaarderingsraamwerk, dat de criteria bevat die de uitkomst van een samenwerkingsverband bepalen.

Door gebruik te maken van meervoudig holistisch case-studie-onderzoek wordt het model vergeleken met empirische data van samenwerkingsverbanden tussen militaire en civiele actoren op lokaal niveau. Drie cases zijn opgenomen, die zich alle richten op samenwerking tussen Nederlandse militaire eenheden en civiele actoren in vredesoperaties:

1. De International Security Assistance Force in Kabul, Afghanistan, van februari 2003 tot januari 2004;

2. Het Nederlandse Provinciaal Reconstructie Team als onderdeel van de International Security Assistance Force in Baghlan, Afghanistan, van augustus 2004 tot juli 2005;

3. Het Nederlandse Geniehulpbataljon als onderdeel van de Kosovo Force in Kosovo van juni 1999 tot juni 2000.

In de drie cases zijn in totaal 25 samenwerkingsverbanden onderzocht, die betrekking hebben op o.a. het verwijderen van mijnen en explosieven, de bouw van scholen, brandweerkazernes en huizen en het trainen van de lokale politie. Nadat iedere case afzonderlijk is geanalyseerd is een cross-case analyse uitgevoerd. Gebaseerd op het procesmodel en bevestigd door de drie case studies concludeert het onderzoek dat een civiel-militair samenwerkingsverband drie opeenvolgende fasen doorloopt, ieder bestaand uit één of meerdere stappen. Deze fasen en stappen zijn weergegeven in figuur 3:

Figuur 3: Fasen en stappen in civiel-militair samenwerkingsproces

In iedere stap identificeert het model factoren die een civiel-militair samenwerkingsverband kunnen beïnvloeden. Het is gebleken dat deze factoren erg nuttig zijn in het analyseren van de samenwerkingsverbanden. Ze vergroten het begrip van de verschillende stappen en dragen bij aan de verklaring van de prestatie. Het is in dit onderzoek onmogelijk gebleken om te bepalen welke factoren noodzakelijke condities zijn voor een succesvol civiel-militair samenwerkingsverband. Desondanks zijn er vele overeenkomsten tussen de geanalyseerde samenwerkingsverbanden. Een belangrijke constatering is dat de meeste factoren die de prestatie van de samenwerkingsverbanden in de drie case-studies beïnvloeden intern i.p.v. extern zijn. Ondanks de complexiteit van de omgeving, blijkt de mate waarin de interne factoren beheerst worden een grote invloed op de prestatie te hebben.

Uit het literatuuronderzoek naar civiel-militaire samenwerking bleef onduidelijk hoe de prestatie van een civiel-militair samenwerkingsverband bepaald kon worden. Strategische alliantie literatuur identificeerde twee dimensies die belangrijk zijn om de prestatie van een samenwerkingsverband te bepalen. De eerste dimensie maakt onderscheid tussen het perspectief vanuit het samenwerkingsverband (prestatie is het gezamenlijk resultaat voor de partners) en het perspectief vanuit de partners (prestatie is het resultaat voor de afzonderlijke partners). De tweede dimensie maakt onderscheid tussen descriptieve (objectieve) en normatieve (subjectieve) criteria. Deze dimensies zijn gebruikt als basis om een prestatiewaarderingsraamwerk te ontwikkelen. Het perspectief vanuit de partners identificeert de prestatie voor drie actorgroepen: militaire actor, civiele hulporganisaties (humanitaire en donororganisaties) en het gastland. De prestatie vanuit het perspectief van het samenwerkingsverband wordt bepaald door de relatieve kosten van het samenwerkingsverband. Het raamwerk is weergegeven in figuur 4:

Figuur 4: Prestatiewaarderingsraamwerk voor civiel-militaire samenwerking

Prestatiemeting in de 25 civiel-militaire samenwerkingsverbanden laat zien dat er grote verschillen optreden tussen de normatieve en descriptieve prestatie. Ondanks de merendeels positieve gevoelens van veel betrokken actoren, laten verschillende samenwerkingsverbanden geen verhoogde prestatie zien op de descriptieve criteria.

De verklaringen voor het niet of in mindere mate tegemoet komen aan de descriptieve criteria zijn onderverdeeld in drie groepen. De eerste groep heeft betrekking op de organisatie van civiel-militaire samenwerking binnen militaire instituties en omvat: het gebrek aan eenduidige militaire richtlijnen m.b.t. civiel-militaire samenwerking; de beperkte ervaring en expertise van veel militairen met civiel-militaire samenwerking; het gebrek aan kennisoverdracht.

De tweede groep heeft betrekking op het feit dat civiel-militaire samenwerking vaak ad-hoc is en omvat: het gebrek aan situationele kennis van de betrokken actoren; de beperkte overdracht van contacten met civiele actoren tussen elkaar opvolgende militaire rotaties; de ontoegankelijkheid van door militairen verzamelde informatie; de summiere voorbereidingen om taken en verantwoordelijkheden over te dragen zodra activiteiten afgerond zijn.

De derde groep betreft de betrokkenheid van civiele actoren. Samenwerkingsverbanden waarin humanitaire organisaties betrokken zijn leiden vaak tot een verhoogde prestatie vanwege hun expertise, kennis en lange termijn focus. In veel samenwerkingsverbanden is weinig aandacht besteed aan het betrekken van de lokale bevolking, hetgeen geresulteerd heeft in beperkte duurzaamheid, een gebrek aan inbedding in sociale structuren, een gebrek aan eigendomsgevoel en beperkte aansluiting van de werkzaamheden op de daadwerkelijke behoeften. In lijn met deze aanpak, wordt de lokale capaciteit vaak niet ten volle benut en worden westerse standaarden toegepast, hetgeen leidt tot problemen bij de overdracht van constructies naar de lokale gemeenschap en het duurzame gebruik van deze constructies.

Om deze problemen te adresseren heeft het onderzoek verschillende aanbevelingen geformuleerd. Deze zijn o.a. een verbetering van militaire training; bevordering van continuïteit van werkzaamheden; integratie van civiel-militaire samenwerking in de gehele militaire missie; totstandkoming van overeenkomsten tussen militaire en civiele actoren; opneming van vrouwen in hogere rangen; vergroting van de betrokkenheid van de lokale bevolking en humanitaire organisaties tijdens het gehele proces.

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1 (NL) EngrreliefBn	Dutch Engineering Relief Battalion
ACBAR	Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief
AFNorth	Allied Forces North
AGEF	Arbeitsgruppe Entwicklung und Fachkräfte im Bereich der Migration und der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit
AICC	Afghan Chamber of Commerce
AIMS	Afghanistan Information Management Service
AJP	Allied Joint Publication
AKF	Aga Kahn Foundation
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANCB	Afghan NGOs Coordination Bureau
ANP	Afghan National Police
AoR	Area of Responsibility
ASP	Afghanistan Stabilisation Program
ATA	Afghan Transitional Authority
CCC	Cimic Coordination Centre
CFA	Child Fund Afghanistan
CG	Consultative Group
CGN	Cimic Group North
Cimic	Civil-military cooperation
CJCMOTF	Combined Joint Civil Military Operations Task Force
COMISAF	Commander of the International Security Assistance Force
DCA	Dutch Committee of Afghanistan
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DFID	Department for International Development
DGIS	Directorate-General for International Cooperation
DOC	Defence Operations Centre
DPA	Danish People's Aid
EJV	Equity joint venture
EOD-advisor	Explosive ordnance disposal advisor
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
FFR	Facilitating Fund for Reconstruction
GE PRT	German-led Provincial Reconstruction Team
GO	Governmental Organisation
H&M	Hearts and minds
HRCC	Human Resource Coordination Centre
HQ	Headquarters
ICRC	International Committee for the Red Cross

IDEA	Integrated Development of Entrepreneurial Activities
IDP	Internally displaced person
IFOR	Implementation Force
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent
Intel	Intelligence
IO	International organisation
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
IRC	International Refugee Committee
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
JPOTF	Joint Psychological Operation Task Force
KFOR	Kosovo Force
KfW	Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
KMNB	Kabul Multinational Brigade
KVM	Kosovo Verification Mission
LFA	Logical Framework Analysis
LMT	Liaison and monitoring team
MCIC	Macedonian Center for International Cooperation
MNB	Multi-national Brigade
MoC	Ministry of Construction
MoE	Ministry of Education
MoH	Ministry of Health
MoI	Ministry of Interior
MOLT	Military Observer and Liaison Team
MoR	Ministry of Reconstruction
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MRRD	Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development
MSF	Medicin Sans Frontières
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NL PRT	Dutch-led NATO Provincial Reconstruction Team
NRDC-T	NATO Rapid Deployable Corps – Turkey
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PeK	Pul e Khomri
Polad	Political advisor
PPP	Public private partnership
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
Psy-ops	Psychological operations
RoE	Rules of Engagement

Rusbat	Russian Battalion
SCA	Swedish Committee for Afghanistan
SFIR	Stabilisation Force in Iraq
SFOR	Stabilisation Force
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SME	Small-medium scale enterprise
SSR	Security Sector Reform Program
TCN	Troop Contributing Nation
TF	Task Force
THW	Technische HilfsWerke
TST	Tactical Support Team
UCK	Ushtria Clirimtare E Kosoves
UN	United Nations
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UN-Habitat	United Nations Habitat
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for the Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children Fund
UNICTY	United Nations International Crime Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia
UNMEE	United Nations Mission to Ethiopia and Eritrea
UNMIH	United Nations Mission in Haiti
UNMIK	United Nations Mission in Kosovo
UNOSOM	United Nations Operations in Somalia
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
UXO	Unexploded ordnance
WEU	West European Union
WFP	World Food Program
ZOA	Zuid Oost Azië Vluchtelingenzorg

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND

1.1.1 Setting civil-military cooperation

The end of the Cold War, the removal of regional superpower interests, and the associated ideological pressures allowed new local and regional conflicts to emerge, often characterised by the fragmentation of sovereign states (Wilkinson, 2000). The academic community, humanitarian workers, UN policy staff and military planners refer to these as complex emergencies. A complex emergency is a combination of internal conflict with large-scale displacement of people and fragile or failing economic, political, and social institutions. Other symptoms include non-combatant death, starvation or malnutrition, disease and mental illness, random and systematic violence against non-combatants, infrastructure collapse, widespread lawlessness, and the interruption of food production and trade (Weiss and Collins, 2000).

It is estimated that 55 complex emergencies took place in 1999 (UNICEF, 2000) and future trends indicate the number will continue to increase, particularly in the Sub-Saharan Africa region and significant parts of Southeast Asia (Opdorp, 2005). Most of these complex emergencies take place within a single state. These so-called intrastate conflicts are frequently based on latent disputes between intermingled ethnic groups. Fuelled by the availability of large quantities of modern weaponry, such conflicts are usually conducted by irregular and undisciplined troops often indistinguishable from the people at large. Conflicts between functioning states can generally be treated as disagreements between responsible and unitary actors; in intrastate conflicts there may be no apparent national control or coordinating infrastructure above the local level.

An example of a recent complex emergency is the situation in Sudan. Fighting over political and economic rights of the tribes in the Darfur area began in February 2003 between two rebel groups and the Islamic government of Khartoum. Militias, often referred to as the *Janjaweed*, have attacked villages in Darfur ever since. The Sudanese government was suspected to support these militias, but denied all interference and argued that it only acted against the rebel groups of Darfur. It is estimated that at least 200,000 people have died, more than 1.6 million people have been displaced from their homes, and over 200,000 have fled across the border to Chad (Save Darfur, 2005). Many of these people live in camps lacking adequate food, shelter, sanitation, and health care.

The international community has no universally agreed, multilateral, or interdisciplinary concept of response to complex emergencies (Mackinlay, 1996). Procedures change as the community crosses each new threshold of operational experience.

Civil agencies now constitute the major response element. Human rights groups and diplomatic offices identify the early symptoms of a complex emergency and use a variety of

conflict prevention and peace maintenance strategies. These agencies often attempt resolution some time before the situation attracts the attention of the international media and any form of wider political, emergency, and military response. However, when the situation degenerates and human rights violations increase beyond the immediate capacity of the deployed agencies, and the situation escalates into a full-scale disaster, a wider composite response may be required.

To meet this required response former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali noted in *An Agenda for Peace* of June 1992, that the UN and its security arm have emerged as "a central instrument for the prevention and resolution of conflicts and for the preservation of peace." Based on this Agenda, in recent years the UN has initiated many peace support operations authorised by the Security Council in response to complex emergencies. Examples are UNPROFOR (United Nations Protection Force) in the former Yugoslavia, UNOSOM (United Nations Operations in Somalia) in Somalia and UNMIH (United Nations Mission in Haiti) in Haiti.

Debate is still ongoing in the international academic community about the terminology of peace support operations (Osman, 2002). A military force can adopt two fundamentally different profiles and approaches for peace support operations (Koninklijke Landmacht, 1999). *Peacekeeping* focuses on decreasing or settling an (armed) conflict between or within states through the interference of a third impartial party. Peacekeeping operations are often authorised by an international organisation and have the agreement of the warring factions, at least at a political level. UNMEE (United Nations Mission to Ethiopia and Eritrea) is an example of this.

If consent is not certain and it is possible that certain parties may renege on or ignore the agreements, a combat capable *enforcement* posture is more appropriate. IFOR (Implementation Force) and SFOR (Stabilisation Force) in Bosnia and KFOR (Kosovo Force) in Kosovo are examples.

1.1.1 Actors within civil-military cooperation

A number of actors interact within complex emergencies (Seiple, 1996; Mackinlay, 1996; Bollen, 2002).

Military

The armed forces (i.e., land, naval and air forces) of contributing countries are unique in that the UN or some other international organisation (e.g., NATO, WEU) has authorised them to implement the will of the international community. In addition to these international organisations, governments of host nations or representatives of threatened populations can ask for military assistance in bi-lateral contacts (Bollen, 2002).

Most armed forces should be capable of self-sustained operations in hostile and remote environments. As a result, they can perform a variety of tasks that, though often ancillary to their raison d'être of combat, augment the response group capabilities (Mackinlay, 1996).

The military are not monolithic however, and the use of the word 'military' must be treated with caution (Connaughton, 1996). This is because a military force may take many different forms. Force size, structure, capability, and posture may vary enormously and there are also disparities in military competence and professionalism (Slim, 1996).

Humanitarian organisations

Humanitarian organisations perform a wide range of activities from humanitarian aid, to human rights, the protection of minorities, refugees and displaced persons, legal assistance, medical care, reconstruction, agriculture, education, art, sciences and general project funding (NATO, 2003). Three main groupings of operational agencies make up the international civilian humanitarian sector (NATO, 2003; Slim 1996):

1. International Organisations (IOs); IOs are established by intergovernmental agreements and operate at the international level (e.g., United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), World Food Program (WFP)).

2. Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs); NGO is an official term used in the United Nations Charter (Article 71) to describe a wide range of primarily non-profit organisations motivated by humanitarian and religious values usually independent of government, UN, and commercial sectors (United Nations, 1945). NGOs are legally different from UN agencies and other IOs in that they write their own charter and mission. NGOs may fall into one of the two categories:

   - Mandated; officially recognised by the lead international organisation in a crisis and authorised to work in the affected area.

   - Non-mandated; no official recognition or authorisation and therefore works as a private concern. These organisations could be sub-contracted by an IO or a mandated NGO. In other cases they obtain funds from private enterprises and donors.

3. International Humanitarian Organisations; this group includes organisations such as the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (IFRC). These organisations have mandates to assist and protect victims of conflict.

The humanitarian sector, especially the NGO sector, is extremely diverse and includes thousands of organisations, differentiated by size, maturity, expertise, quality, and mission (Abiew, 2003; Bollen, 2002).

Host nation

In response to complex emergencies, military and humanitarian organisations often find themselves operating in ill-defined surroundings lacking the familiar structures of a functioning state. In some cases, local government has totally collapsed and international response groups face a chaotic and continuously changing environment. The general opinion of both humanitarian and military organisations is that the basis of an international

response must be a needs-driven approach[1] (Rollins, 2001). A 'need' in the context of a complex emergency is defined as a shortcoming in the coping capacity of a host nation to manage the negative impact of a complex emergency (Bollen, 2002). According to Frerks and Hilhorst (1999) and the Sphere Project (2000), a host nation should not be regarded as a black box, but as a complex (and often unknown) set of social and political networks. Thus, responding to a complex emergency is not just fulfilling needs, but for being effective requires knowledge of these networks.

There are several key actors of the host nation with which the military and humanitarian organisations interact (Mackinlay, 1996). First, the host government whose effectiveness is crucial to the long-term success of a peace process, particularly in the restoration of the economy and political systems. Within boundaries inherited from colonial days, many host governments do not represent the multiplicity of ethnic, religious, and cultural groups in a meaningful way. Regardless, most host governments must be taken seriously by all other actors (Minear and Weiss, 1995). Host governments often complain about the lack of rehabilitation of the affected area (Bollen, 2002).

The second key actor is the armed forces who play an important role in the stability and continuity of the government. After a successful peace settlement, it may be necessary to disarm large numbers of irregular fighters and militia troops whose numbers have grown as a consequence of prolonged hostilities and who can jeopardise the peace process.

The third key actor is the local population. Permanent inhabitants who bear the burden of a complex emergency expect to be part of the process that determines their individual and group destinies. Imposing assistance will eventually lead to direct or indirect efforts to undermine even the best-intentioned efforts of the operation (Mackinlay, 1996). Frerks and Hilhorst (1999) stress the importance of not thinking in terms of victims when dealing with the affected population. They argue that it is better to view affected people as social actors with a distinct coping capacity. Households develop a large range of coping practices in response to disasters. Social networks contribute to this capacity and influence humanitarian aid in two ways. First, not all needs have to be provided by relief organisations, because social networks help people to survive. Second, social networks cause a distribution of vulnerability in a differentiated manner. They may be employed to manipulate relief at the expense of other people in need who lack the necessary contacts.

Complex emergencies often cause large numbers of people to be displaced; they are called refugees or internally displaced persons (IDPs). A refugee is a person who fears persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, or political opinion, has fled their home country and is unable or unwilling to return (UNHCR, 1982). An IDP is any person forced to flee their homes suddenly or unexpectedly in large numbers, as a result of armed conflict, internal strife, systematic violations of human rights, or natural or man-made disasters within their own country (Mackinlay, 1996).

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[1] Contrary to a needs-driven approach, a supply-based approach could be applied. Aid is then delivered based on available capacity rather than based on needs.

To these key actors of the host nation, Kaldor (2003) adds "new" nationalist and fundamentalist movements. These include nationalist movements in the Balkans (e.g., UCK in Kosovo) and religious movements in the Middle East and Asia, which aim to capture state power based on identity.

Complex emergencies frequently influence neighbouring countries. When a neighbouring country decides to open its borders for refugees, it is regarded as a host nation (Bollen, 2002).

Donor organisations and media

Governments are by far the greatest source of international response funds. They provide support for the military through their defence budgets and channel "official aid" to a large number of humanitarian organisations through donor organisations (often simply referred to as "the donors"). Examples of these donor organisations are USAID (United States Agency for International Development), DFID (Department for International Development (UK)) and DGIS (Directorate-General for International Cooperation (the Netherlands)).

The media has become an important factor for actors responding to a conflict. For those providing funding it is important to be in a place where one is noticed, sometimes perhaps more important than the operation itself (Eriksson, 1999). For example, during the crisis in the Great Lakes area Kigali and Goma had more than enough aid organisations whereas the refugee camps in Tanzania, under far less media scrutiny, received only a fraction of this attention. In Goma it was much easier to find NGOs interested in operations with a high media profile such as cholera treatment centres or orphanages, than it was to find equally important yet less visible actions aimed at providing lavatories for the area, or burial of the large numbers of dead (Eriksson, 1999).

1.1.2   Motives and definitions of civil-military cooperation

A peace support operation takes place in environments populated by multiple civilian institutions, humanitarian organisations, and a challenging array of issues not precisely 'military' in nature. This has increased the importance of managing the civil-military interface, particularly that between the military and the humanitarian community. This process of management is termed civil-military cooperation (cimic) (Gordon, 2001).

Motives

Cimic has two identities, each with different motives (Gordon, 2001; Studer, 2001; Zandee, 1998).

The *political identity* of cimic can manifest itself at the lowest level as building 'consent' to the presence of a military force and therefore providing a means of protection (Hoshmand,

2005; Gordon, 2001). It can also 'buy' the political loyalty of the civilian population as part of a broader set of government policies. Cimic may also legitimise military deployments and reinforce the idea that violence can be used creatively for humanitarian ends. Ross (2000) and the Canadian Department of National Defence (1998) elaborate on this by saying that cimic is a "force multiplier" that will contribute to mission success by preventing the duplication of efforts and wastage of scarce resources, as well as minimising military interference with NGO work and vice-versa.

The *humanitarian[2] identity* of cimic contains the idea of being a component of the broad strategy for transition to peace. Studer (2001) and Zandee (1999) state that cimic has two motives in humanitarian assistance. First, the military has to guarantee a climate of security. Civil implementation tends to be very difficult otherwise and may even fail completely. Second, the skills, knowledge, and assets of the military can play an important role in supporting the work of local parties and the humanitarian organisations. Without military support, civil implementation in complex situations is basically inconceivable, as underlined many times by the Office of the High Representative as well as by representatives of other international organisations in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Zandee, 1999). Mockaitis (2004) refers to this as cimic being an "aid multiplier".

Zandee (1999) states that cimic has a key role in nearly every aspect of civil implementation, whether the return of refugees and displaced persons, the restoration of law and order, economic reconstruction, rebuilding infrastructure, organising elections, or establishing new institutions.

Definition

As a consequence of the different identities, literature uses two distinct definitions (Gordon, 2001; NATO, 2003). NATO defines cimic as:

The coordination and cooperation in support of the mission between the NATO commander and civil population including national and local authorities as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies (NATO, 2003).

According to this definition, cimic is meant to primarily support the military mission, without much thought for humanitarian objectives. It is mainly in compliance with the political identity as described in the previous section, which focuses on building consent to the presence of the military force, buying the political loyalty of the local population, and aiming to legitimise military deployments.

The definition of Great Britain and the United Nations also stresses the humanitarian identity of cimic. It focuses on an effective response according to agreed objectives in crisis

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[2] Some humanitarian organisations reject the use of the word 'humanitarian' to describe activities not conducted on an impartial basis. Using the word 'humanitarian' to describe activities carried out in the furtherance of a military or political mission is inappropriate in their opinion.

operations and is more focused on a win-win situation for both the military and the humanitarian organisations:

The relationship of interaction, cooperation and coordination, mutual support, joint planning, and constant exchange of information at all levels between military force structures, civilian organisations and agencies, and in-theatre civil influences, which are necessary to achieve an effective response (according to agreed objectives) in crisis operations (Gordon, 2001).

The different definitions for the acronym cimic represent the different visions of the military and civilian actors. The use of the same term for two different visions creates confusion and ambiguity about the intentions and expectations of the respective actors regarding cooperation. Both definitions of cimic are extensively used in the field and selecting one vision as a reference would limit the research to this vision and thereby overlook the other. This research does not take a stance but studies cimic from the perspectives of the different actors.

The acronym cimic is often assumed to relate to NATO's narrow definition of civil-military cooperation only. To avoid prejudices and misperceptions caused by the acronym, this research uses the term *civil-military cooperation* to indicate interaction and cooperation between military and civilian actors.

1.2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE

The military's incorporation of humanitarian assistance as part of its mission has been controversial, both within the military and among external actors (Peabody, 2005). While this softer side of military power is welcomed by many of its recipients, many NGOs have expressed their unease with military being involved in these activities. The dynamics of the civilian-military relationship reflect a host of factors including the structure, culture and skill sets of the actors involved as well as the specific humanitarian needs and the political context of the operation (Hoshmand, 2005; Abiew, 2003; Winslow, 2002; HPN, 2002). Chapter two provides a detailed analysis of these factors.

In most peace support operations, the approach to civil-military cooperation was essentially improvisational, pragmatic and ad-hoc (Currey, 2003; Gordon, 2001; Gourlay, 2000). Meeting on the ground personnel worked out solutions overcoming differences for the common good. As such cooperation evolved over time in response to specific needs on the ground. There is merit and appeal to this approach. Some argue that every crisis is occasion-specific and circumstance-specific and that its unique characteristics mean that strategies and structures for civil-military relations need to reflect the specific circumstances

(Gourlay, 2000). However, at a local level[3] a tremendous responsibility devolved on the battalion commanders and their junior officers in each of these operations as a result of the gap between the assigned mission and the requirement to establish order on the ground. They had to tailor much of their operations to the unexpected challenges they faced, rather than execute the sort of mission they were tasked, organised, and trained to perform (Brocades-Zaalberg, 2005). These commanders had to figure out the appropriate working relationships and match mission needs with capabilities (Currey, 2003). Overall civil-military cooperation depended too much on the personalities involved rather than on planning and standard operating procedures (Brocades-Zaalberg, 2005). As a consequence the efforts were person-dependent and many differences occurred within and between rotations and contingents. These differences included priorities, budgets, and involvement of local population. This approach yields inefficient use of limited aid resources, delayed humanitarian relief efforts, inconsistency between rotations and conflicting objectives in the post-conflict environment (Peabody, 2005; Currey, 2003). Additionally, lessons learned regarding civil-military cooperation were happening on an individual or rotational level, but not at an institutional level. While some rotations learned and applied lessons, others repeated old mistakes (Peabody, 2005). Many persons involved in civil-military cooperation claim they *reinvented the wheel*, as little communication and knowledge transfer took place, either through training courses or through preceding rotations.

Although there is no single solution to improve civil-military cooperation at the local level, the logic of structured cooperation should lead to efficiency gains and greater respect for the comparative advantages of civilian and military actors. A promising way forward is to adopt models for cooperation between the military and the civilian actors (Currey, 2003; Gourlay, 2000). These models can synthesise what has been accomplished in previous operations and can foster a theatre specific *modus vivendi* between military formations and the variety of civilian actors. For actors and their leaders models can contribute to the development of checklists, an increased understanding of (potential) conflicts in the process of cooperation, and elements for procedures to increase the performance of the cooperation. Models can provide guidance about how partners may foster and manage relationships that will achieve favourable outcomes (Tuten and Urban, 2001). They also offer researchers a framework for future empirical studies to confirm or disconfirm the legitimacy of the model.

At a strategic level Baarda (2001) modelled the forms of cooperation that can be fruitful without entailing too many risks for humanitarian independence and impartiality. However, as many responsibilities are delegated to local level cooperation becomes most obvious at this level. While many studies call for strengthening of the interagency process, researchers

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[3] Contrary to supra-national level (NATO) and national level (Dutch government), local level is the level at which the (units of) organisations effectuate activities in a mission area (in theatre).

stress that a model at local level is missing and emphasise its importance (Currey, 2003; Gourlay, 2000). This leads to the objective of this research:

To develop a model that supports the execution of civil-military cooperation at a local level in peace support operations in response to a complex emergency.

1.3 VARIANCE AND PROCESS MODELS

A model is defined as "an external and explicit representation of part of reality as seen by the people who wish to use that model to understand, to change, to manage and to control that part of reality" (Pidd, 1996). Based on Mohr (1982), models are classified into "variance" and "process" models. The fundamental objective of a variance model is to search for causal relationships between potential predictors (independent variables) and outcomes (dependent variables), and to generalise knowledge by predicting patterns of phenomena across situations (Lei, 1994; Newman and Robey, 1992). The methods of a variance model are concerned with identifying predictors and outcomes, testing the empirical association between the two, and inferring a causal relationship at a statistical confidence level (Mackenzie, 2000). The underlying assumptions of variance models are:

- The phenomena of interests are single, tangible, and fragmental and there is a unique, best description of any chosen aspect of the phenomena.
- There exist real, uni-directional cause-effect relationships capable of being identified and tested via hypothetic-deductive logic and analysis.

The role of time in a variance model is static because it assumes that the empirical world is relatively stable, orderly, independent of humans, and largely characterised by knowable, constant relationships.

In contrast to a variance model, a process model assumes the precursor insufficient to "cause" the outcome, but necessary for it to occur. The outcomes are not conceived as variables that can take on a range of values (i.e., varying degrees of a single dimension), but rather as discrete or discontinuous phenomena (i.e., having a qualitatively different "change of state"). Process theories cannot be extended, as variance models can, to explain or predict what happens when there is "more" of a precursor variable (Markus and Robey, 1988). The role of time in a process model is dynamic. It focuses on sequences of events in order to explain how and why particular outcomes are reached.

An overview of the two distinctive models is found in table 1 and figure 5 and contains a summary of comparisons adopted from Markus and Robey (1988) and Newman and Robey (1992).

	Variance model	Process model
Role of time	Static	Longitudinal
Definition	The cause is necessary and sufficient for the outcome	Causation consists of necessary conditions in sequence; chance and random events play a role
Assumptions	Outcome will invariably occur when necessary and sufficient conditions are presents	Outcomes may not occur (even when conditions are present)
Elements	Variables	Discrete outcomes
Logical form	If X, then Y; if more X, then more Y	If not X, then not Y; cannot be extended to "more X" or "more Y"

Table 1: Characteristics of variance theory and process theory (Markus and Robey, 1988)

Figure 5: Variance and Process models (Newman and Robey, 1992)

Variance and process models can be complementary approaches to research (Newman and Robey, 1992). Ideally variance research should establish strong empirical connections between antecedent conditions and later outcomes, while process research should examine the streams of activities that explain these connections.

In civil-military cooperation in the context of this research, the role of time cannot be assumed to be static since a complex emergency is not stable or orderly and cannot be characterised by knowable, constant relationships. By its structure, a variance model assumes that a certain outcome will invariably occur when necessary and sufficient conditions are present (Markus and Robey, 1988). It assumes a real, uni-directional cause-effect relationship. This assumption is as yet very stringent for civil-military cooperation in the context of a complex emergency as this contains many uncertainties and a certain outcome of the response cannot be guaranteed. Put differently, if a behavioural outcome occurs only some of the times when its antecedents are present, then it may not be possible to establish an invariant relationship between the antecedents and outcome, even with generous statistical confidence levels (Markus and Robey, 1988). As Sutherland (1973) has

put it, "not all real-world phenomena will ultimately become deterministic if we spend enough time analysing them". In circumstances like these, process models may enable researchers to find patterns in empirical data that variance models might miss. With respect to partnerships, Lewis (2000) emphasises this by stating that while a variance model of partnerships can explain some aspects of successful partnerships, it is the process view which illustrates more fully the diverse factors which help to determine partnership outcomes. These advantages make the process approach an appropriate application for this research.

1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND TYPES OF KNOWLEDGE

1.4.1 Research questions

Since a process model is the appropriate application, the central research question of this research is formulated:

What process model is appropriate to support the execution of civil-military cooperation at a local level in peace support operations in response to a complex emergency?

To guide the researcher to answer the central research question, three sub research questions are formulated. Since the research applies a process approach it is necessary to obtain knowledge on the phases of the process of civil-military cooperation at local level. Each phase is concerned with the sequence of events in a part of the process. To enhance the understanding of these phases it is important to identify what factors (often based on variance research) influence the course of each of the phases. These factors include the antecedent conditions for the process to start. Finally, it is important to gain knowledge on what constitutes the outcome of a civil-military cooperation process. Elements of the model such as the factors and phases of the process can then be linked to the performance, which can foster the drawing of explanations. Together the answers to these questions make up the process model. This leads to the following three sub research questions:

1. *What are the phases in the process of civil-military cooperation?*
2. *What factors influence the process of civil-military cooperation and can enhance the understanding of the phases in this process?*
3. *What constitutes the outcome of civil-military cooperation?*

1.4.2 Types of knowledge

Verschuren and Doorewaard (2000) identified five types of knowledge: (1) descriptive, (2) explanatory, (3) predictive, (4) evaluative, and (5) prescriptive. They state that these types of knowledge are related to each other. Moving from descriptive to prescriptive the type of

knowledge becomes in general more complex. Due to this increase in complexity a 'lower' type of knowledge can be used to generate a 'higher' type of knowledge.

A process model offers a form of description and explanation of the phenomenon studied (Newman and Robey, 1992). The explanation provided by the process model shows how parties interact, how they collectively agree on future courses of action and how they perceive constraints on their action. This is needed to reveal the reasons for the associations detected by variance studies.

It might be tempting to treat a process model merely as a descriptive and explanatory tool, useful in explaining events after the fact. However, closer examination of the model's structure reveals predictive capability, gained through the greater comprehension it affords of the process under study (Newman and Robey, 1992). By accepting a more limited definition of prediction, one in which the analyst is able to say only that the outcome is likely (but not certain) under some conditions and unlikely under others, process theorists may be able to accumulate and consolidate findings about a relationship (Markus and Robey, 1988).

1.5 RESEARCH STRATEGY

As research can be carried out in many different ways it is essential to determine which strategy suits this type of research best (Kerssens-van Drongelen, 2001). Verschuren and Doorewaard (2000) define a research strategy as the coherent body of decisions about the way in which a research is carried out. Case studies are useful ways to illustrate the use of process models, although alternative research strategies are available (Kawalek and Kueng, 1997; Newman and Robey, 1992). Six main research strategies are considered in this research (e.g., Saunders, et al., 2003; Verschuren and Doorewaard, 2000; Swanborn, 1987): (1) survey, (2) grounded theory, (3) experiment, (4) ethnography, (5) literature study and, (6) case study.

1.5.1 Survey

Survey research is characterised by (1) large numbers of research units, (2) labour extensive data generation, (3) more breadth than depth, (4) a random sample, (5) quantitative data and analysis, and (6) preferably remote, closed data generation (Verschuren and Doorewaard, 2000; Swanborn, 1987). Compared to other research strategies survey research has major limitations regarding depth and knowledge. Depth is limited and knowledge obtained only concerns certain aspects of the research object. This makes the survey strategy in particular appropriate for variance research (Ghauri and Gronhaug, 2005; Swanborn, 1987). Since this research focuses on the process of civil-military cooperation, which incorporates many aspects, this limitation makes the survey strategy inappropriate for this research to apply.

1.5.2   Grounded theory

Grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Strauss and Corbin, 1990) is based on extensive fieldwork to discover what is taking place in practice. In this pre-eminently qualitative research approach, a theory or theoretical concept materialises slowly but surely in the course of a research project (Verschuren and Doorewaard, 2000). The researcher does not start out with a detailed theory that is subsequently tested.

Due to several uncertainties it was initially unclear if extensive fieldwork would be feasible. These included the level of safety in the field, the time and duration of the deployment of military and civilian actors, and the possibility to access all information needed. Additionally, it is important that the researcher has no prior knowledge of the subject in grounded theory, because only then can one get a good understanding of the practical situation without being led astray by incorrect assumptions (Steenhuis, 2000). This was unrealistic since the researcher had experience in some development organisations and several notions of civil-military cooperation in peace support operations. These reasons make the grounded theory strategy inappropriate for this research.

1.5.3   Experiment

An experiment has the following characteristics (Verschuren and Doorewaard, 2000): (1) the formation of (at least) two groups, an experimental group and a control group, (2) a random assignment of participants of research objects to either group, (3) the researcher determines which group is subjected to the intervention and what happens further within the groups, (4) the researcher makes sure that there are as few outside influences as possible, and (5) in addition to an ex-post measurement, an ex-ante measurement is carried out before the intervention takes place.

For an experiment to be successful it is necessary that the intervention is the exclusive reason for the different results obtained from the groups. However, in the given context of this research (peace support operations in response to a complex emergency) it is not possible to control most outside influences. To determine if the intervention is the exclusive reason for a result is thus not possible.

Swanborn (1987) states that the objective of an experiment is to collect and analyse the data regarding the influence of one or more manipulative variables to one or more dependent variables for the benefit of answering explanatory problems. This corresponds with a variance approach rather than a process approach. These reasons make the experiment strategy inappropriate for this research.

1.5.4   Ethnography

The purpose of ethnography is "to interpret the social world the research subjects inhabit in the way in which they interpret it" (Saunders, et al., 2003). To carry out full ethnographic research requires long-term observance of and involvement in the social system that is being studied (Swanborn, 1987). This should then provide the researcher with sufficient

knowledge of this social system or process and include the perspectives of the participants and the interaction between these participants. Ethnography is particularly beneficial if the central question of the research concerns a group or process (Swanborn, 1987). As such ethnography seems a desirable research strategy to apply to this research. However, in the course of this research it turned out to be impossible to closely observe and be involved in both military and civilian organisations to a large extent. This made it impossible to apply ethnography as the main research strategy. In the Baghlan case study (see section 1.6) the researcher was deployed as a military officer, which enabled observation and involvement in the military unit for four weeks. In the words of Saunders, et al. (2003) this enabled the researcher to share experiences by not only observing what is happening, but also feeling it. In summary ethnography is a desirable strategy but only applicable to a limited extent in this research.

1.5.5 Literature study

In literature study by far the most important characteristic is that the material used has been produced entirely by others. This means that the researcher does not conduct any interviews or observe any processes himself (Verschuren and Doorewaard, 2000). Recent years showed many publications on civil-military cooperation (see chapter two). As a research should build on the existing knowledge, it is of great importance to investigate what and how the existing literature on civil-military cooperation can contribute to answering the research questions.

A process model can host a variety of specific theories with different contents or might accommodate multiple theories in the same analysis (Newman and Robey, 1992). A preliminary literature study revealed "by no means does civil-military cooperation constitute an exception with regard to other interorganisational alliances" (Bollen and Beeres, 2002). As a result of structural fundamental differences between the military and their civilian counterparts however, alliances are bound to be fragile. Taken on their own, interdependencies generate too few safeguards to shield collaborators from hidden agendas, self-interest, or their partners' opportunistic behaviour (Bollen and Beeres, 2002). Interorganisational alliances, mostly referred to as cooperative arrangements, have been studied in great detail (e.g., Hoffmann and Schlosser, 2001; Das and Teng, 2003; Gulati, 1998). It is therefore most likely that theories on cooperative arrangements can contribute to answering the research questions.

In summary, literature review on civil-military cooperation and cooperative arrangements is an appropriate strategy to contribute to answering the research questions.

1.5.6 Case study

Case study research consists of a detailed investigation of one or more organisations, or groups within organisations, with a view to providing an analysis of the context and

processes involved in the phenomenon under study (Cassel and Symon, 1994). A case study is characterised by (1) a small number of research units (cases), (2) labour-intensive data generation, (3) more depth than breadth, (4) a selective, strategic sample, (5) qualitative data and research methods, and (6) an open observation on site (Verschuren and Doorewaard, 2000). The strategy distinguishes itself from other research strategies in that it deliberately covers the contextual conditions. As such Yin (1994) defines a case study as an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident. An advantage of the case study strategy is that it offers the possibility to gain an overall picture of the research object. In this respect the case study differs from a survey and an experiment, as with these strategies more knowledge is obtained by focusing on various aspects (Verschuren and Doorewaard, 2000). Additionally, case study research is able to deal with a full variety of methods (both quantitative and qualitative) and evidence such as documents, artefacts, interviews and observations (Cassel and Symon, 1994).

The main criticism of case study research is that the external validity of the results is often under pressure (Gummeson, 1991). If there are fewer cases studied, it can be difficult to declare the results applicable to the whole situation or to similar cases (Verschuren and Doorewaard, 2000).

The emphasis of the case study strategy on the overall picture and the inclusion of contextual conditions make it an appropriate strategy for this research. As such Newman and Robey (1992) state that a process model can provide a theoretical structure for case study research, enabling case studies to support the objectives of normal science, including prediction and generalisation. However, in carrying out case studies the researcher should deal with its criticism.

1.5.7   The selected research strategy

The previous section showed that literature study and case study are appropriate research strategies for this research while ethnography is applicable to a limited extent. Saunders, et al. (2003), state that it is beneficial to apply multiple methods rather than using a single one. Case studies and literature study are complementary to each other to constitute a satisfactory process model. Newman and Robey (1992) state that it is important to ground the model in empirical reality and that case studies are useful in redefining the concepts used. Additionally, it is very well possible to combine case studies and ethnography. Participant observation constitutes the core of ethnography (Gummeson, 1991) and is a widely used technique within case studies (Stake, 1995; Cassel and Symon, 1994).

According to Yin's case study approach (1994), theory formulation is necessary prior to carrying out case studies. Based on the formulated theory, cases are selected and a data collection protocol is designed. Thereafter single or multiple case studies are carried out,

followed by a cross-case analysis and a modification of the formulated theory. Eisenhardt's progressive case study approach (1989) differs from Yin's in that she uses case studies to formulate theory. Having carried out the case studies, hypotheses are shaped and compared with both conflicting and similar literature.

This research applies Yin's approach rather than Eisenhardt's for two reasons. First, since it is likely that theories on cooperative arrangements can contribute to increased understanding of civil-military cooperation it is beneficial to first study these theories before applying them in practice. In this way the researcher is able to use the knowledge on cooperative arrangements directly in the case studies. Since Yin's approach first formulates theory and then applies it to practice, this approach is preferred to Eisenhardt.

Second, according to Kjellen and Soderman (1980) doing case study research requires the researcher to have fundamental knowledge of the subject. Formulating theory before carrying out case studies (Yin's approach) provides the researcher with this required fundamental knowledge of the subject and is therefore preferred to the use of case studies to formulate theory (Eisenhardt's approach). Cassel and Symon (1994) illustrate this by arguing that without a theoretical framework, the researcher is in severe danger of providing description without wider meaning.

Two distinctions have to be made while designing case study research (Yin, 1994). The first is between single and multiple case studies. A multiple case study approach is more robust than a single case study because multiple case studies allow for the observation and analysis of the phenomena in different settings (Yin, 1994). Since each complex emergency and peace support operation takes place in a unique context, the multiple case study approach is favoured to develop a robust model.

The second distinction Yin makes is between holistic and embedded case study. An embedded case study typically focuses on subunits and may involve more than one unit of analysis, whereas a holistic case study involves a single global unit of analysis. Capra (1982) stresses the advantage of holistic research within case studies: "The detailed observations entailed in the case study method enable us to study many different aspects, examine them in relation to each other, view the process within its total environment, and also utilise the researcher's capacity for '*Verstehen*'". The process approach corresponds with a holistic view as it involves a single global unit of analysis (the process), while the variance approach corresponds with an embedded view. This makes a holistic case study the appropriate application for this research.

In summary the strategies used in this research are literature study, multiple holistic case study and to a limited extent ethnography.

1.6   RESEARCH APPROACH

The approach to carry out this research consists of four stages.

1.6.1   Stage one

The first stage is composed of a literature review to the process of civil-military cooperation. This review includes both literature on civil-military cooperation and cooperative arrangements. The literature review on civil-military cooperation includes literature from a military perspective (e.g., military doctrines), from a civilian perspective (e.g., reports of ICRC), and from a neutral perspective (e.g., independent researchers).

With regard to literature on cooperative arrangements, three main fields of research are included: strategic alliances, networks, and public private partnerships. Theories on strategic alliances are studied as these are the main form of cooperative arrangements. Some researchers even argue that virtually all kinds of cooperative arrangements should be called strategic alliances (Lorange and Roos, 1992). Since theories on strategic alliances mainly focus on bilateral relations between firms and many different actors are present in a complex emergency (e.g., NGOs, military, local authorities and the population), using only theories on strategic alliances is too limited. Although many researchers state that their theories on strategic alliances are also valid in the case of multiple actors, theories on networks are included to ensure validity for multi-actor cooperation.

Theories on strategic alliances and networks usually focus on private actors. In a complex emergency both private actors (e.g., NGOs) and public actors (e.g., military and local authorities) interact with each other. Theories on public-private partnerships (PPPs) are therefore included as well.

1.6.2   Stage two

The second stage of the research approach consists of the development of the process model. In this stage the phases and factors derived from the literature review are structured into a model. The outcome of the model is presented by means of a performance assessment framework, which constitutes the criteria that determine the outcome of civil-military cooperation (see section 4.2.7). The criteria are based on the literature review and verified by means of interview with both military and civilian personnel. Next, a case study protocol is developed to apply the model in the practice of civil-military cooperation.

1.6.3   Stage three

The third stage of the research applies the process model to multiple holistic case study. Three cases are included, which focus on the cooperation between the Dutch military entities and civilian actors in peace support operations:

1. International Security Assistance Force in Kabul, Afghanistan, from February 2003 until January 2004;
2. The Dutch Provincial Reconstruction Team as part of the International Security Assistance Force in Baghlan, Afghanistan, from August 2004 until July 2005;
3. The Dutch Engineering Relief Battalion as part of the Kosovo force in Kosovo from June 1999 until June 2000.

Section 4.3 justifies the selection of the cases and presents the case study protocol.

In each case the process model is applied to the cooperation between military and civilian actors at a local level. Both military and civilian actors have been included for the execution of the case studies. There is a slight unbalance in the material that could be studied and processed because the military organisation has extensive reports of their operations accessible to the researcher whereas civilian actors did not have these reports to such an extent (international NGOs) or did not have these at all (local civil actors).

1.6.4   Stage four

After analysing the separate cases, a cross case analysis is carried out. This analysis compares the three cases on the identified performance criteria (see section 4.2.7). The differences and similarities between the cases are then explained through the process of civil-military cooperation. Finally, conclusions are drawn with respect to the need to redefine concepts of the process model (phases, factors, outcome), the contribution to the body of knowledge and the contribution to an increased understanding of civil-military cooperation. Recommendations are made based on these conclusions.

1.7   VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY

To establish the quality of the research and to address the criticism on the case study approach, validity and reliability of the research are of great importance (Ghauri and Gronhau, 2005; Stake, 1995; Yin, 1994; Swanborn, 1987). The following sections address three types of validity (construct validity, internal validity and external validity), and reliability and explain how these are handled in this research.

1.7.1   Construct validity

To increase construct validity, the establishment of correct operational measures being studied, several methods of triangulation are employed in this research. Following Denzin (1984), Stake (1995) identifies four types of triangulation: (1) data source triangulation (multiple data sources), (2) investigator triangulation (multiple investigators), (3) theoretical triangulation (multiple theoretical viewpoints), and (4) methodological triangulation

(multiple methods)[4]. Investigator triangulation was not feasible for this research due to time and financial constraints. Methodological, theoretical, and data source triangulation are applied.

Three methods were used to collect data: interviews, observation, and documentation. The data collected are mostly qualitative but also contain some quantitative elements. Observations were made during the conduction of the case studies. In the Baghlan case study the researcher was deployed as a military officer, which enabled him to become part of the military unit in the field.

Theoretical triangulation is obtained by applying different theoretical perspectives to civil-military cooperation (theories on strategic alliances, networks, and public private partnerships). Studying these perspectives produced many insights in various forms of cooperation. In the case studies these insights are applied to the cooperation between military and civilian actors.

Data source triangulation has resulted from multiple interviews with the same person and interviews with different people about similar subjects. When information from different sources, or collected with different methods, is conflicting, this is pointed out in the case study report and, if necessary a position is taken based on the likelihood of correctness.

1.7.2 Internal validity

Internal validity refers to the extent to which a causal relationship exists between two (or more) variables (Ghauri and Gronhau, 2005). This research has a process approach and as such it assumes an independent variable to be insufficient to "cause" the outcome, but necessary for it to occur. Establishing uni-directional cause-effect relationships is not possible and internal validity is not applicable to this research.

1.7.3 External validity

External validity relates to what extent the findings can be generalised to and across particular persons, settings or times (Ghauri and Gronhau, 2005). It is reached through a valid description of reality in the case studies and a sufficient number of case studies (Mevissen, 2005). To ensure a valid description of reality the following steps are undertaken:

- Data and method triangulation (see construct validity);
- Development of a case study protocol (see section 4.3);
- External control of case studies through key informants.

Gummeson (1991), states that the actual number of cases needed in a specific study is determined by theoretical saturation, reached when the marginal utility of an additional case

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[4] The labelling 'methodological triangulation' is confusing. While discussing methodological triangulation Stake aims at applying multiple methods instead of multiple methodologies.

approaches zero. It can not be determined in advance when theoretical saturation is reached. Swanborn (1996) argues that case selection is influenced by practical reasons such as distance, time, and money. This research is limited by these constraints. Therefore cases should be selected in such a way that saturation is likely to be achieved within the available time and budget. Section 4.3.1 describes the selection of the cases.

1.7.4 Reliability

Reliability refers to demonstrating that the operations of a case study, such as the data-collection procedure, can be repeated leading to the same results. The case study plan in figure 6 provides the basis to increase the reliability (Yin, 1994).

Figure 6: Case study plan (adopted from Yin, 1994)

Three cases have been selected. The justification for the case selection is presented in section 4.3.1. A data collection protocol has been designed to establish that the case studies and their results are verifiable (see section 4.3.2). The protocol contains the procedures and rules followed in carrying out the case studies.

1.8 RESEARCH STRUCTURE

Figure 7 schematically presents the structure of this research.

Figure 7: Research structure

Introduction

CHAPTER 2: CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION

2.1 POLICY AND DOMAIN

Although there is no definitive list in the literature (Curry, 2003), the *tasks* of military forces in humanitarian assistance can be divided into three groups involving different degrees of overlap (Abiew, 2003; Gourlay, 2000; Minear and Guillot, 1996). First, military forces can foster a climate of security for civilian populations and humanitarian organisations. They are clearly effective at guaranteeing security against military opposition and are therefore well suited to bring down the levels of violence between organised military formations and provide occasional back up for policing tasks (Williams, 2005; Hills, 2000). Additionally, military forces can provide protection for the relief effort. Many view the provision of security, allowing relief agencies to conduct their work, as the principal role of the military in humanitarian assistance and one in which there is no overlap between military and civilian competencies (Abiew, 2003; Winslow, 2002; Schenkenberg van Mierop, 2000). Experience from Bosnia-Herzegovina, Rwanda, and the Great Lakes has taught that civilian organisations cannot do their job effectively without military/police operations to provide security (Pugh, 2001).

However, the military are increasingly being asked to undertake humanitarian and development activities. The second group of tasks is composed of activities to support the work of humanitarian organisations. This involves the provision of technical or logistical support such as transport and basic infrastructure work (e.g., water, power, and roads) (Williams, 2005; Zandee, 1999). Bollen (2002), states "civil-military alliances are essentially demand-driven. This means that the duration of the alliance is conditional on the demand for help. It is a characteristic of demand-driven civil-military alliances that its partners collectively agree upon the results of the alliance. For civil-military alliances to be effective there should be a fit between the military support and the demand for help".

Third, the military can provide direct assistance to those in need. These activities are often referred to as civic action. Lessons learned from the operations in the Balkans show that even though a huge number of civilian bodies are present in an area, vacuums do occur in the effort to meet the needs of the local civilian population and the societies in general. This means if for some reason no civilian organisation fills this vacuum, the military will be forced to include the execution of these tasks in order to obtain the necessary stability (Jakobsen, 2002; Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2001; Ramsden, 2000).

To these three Bollen (2002) adds a fourth group of military involvement in humanitarian assistance, namely assistance to the national, regional, and local authorities and the humanitarian organisations on crisis management.

There is consensus between the main actors on the first and second group of tasks. The third and fourth group however, often cause problems (Bollen 2002). Many humanitarian organisations argue that the military trespasses in their domain by carrying out these tasks. They fear that their goals may become secondary to the achievement of military-political motives. They also suspect the military's involvement to stem from a need for a new raison d'être in the post-Cold war era (Bollen, 2002; Eriksson, 2000). As a result, humanitarian organisations are divided regarding the appropriateness of cooperation with the military.

Another important reason for humanitarian organisations to be reluctant about the military's role is that humanitarian assistance is based on four *humanitarian principles* (NATO, 2003; Studer, 2001). These principles are not an end in themselves but a means to reach all victims of natural and man-made disasters, including armed conflicts. Some of them are written in the regulations of the humanitarian organisations (e.g., UN, 2003; DHA, 1994), whereas some others can be found in international humanitarian law instruments[5], in General Assembly resolutions[6] or in the Code of Conduct of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (1994).

The first humanitarian principle is humanity. Under humanitarian law, civilians have a fundamental right to be protected from attack, torture, and other inhuman or degrading treatment. Humanitarian assistance introduces into hostilities respect for life and human dignity. It must not comprise any element that could contribute to the military effort and the distribution of aid must be prompted by the sole criterion of need. Humanitarian assistance can therefore never be imposed by humanitarian movements (Quenivet, 1998).

Impartiality is the second principle. An organisation should not make discrimination as to nationality, race, religious belief, class or political opinions. It endeavours to relieve the suffering of individuals, being guided solely by their needs, and to give utmost priority to the most urgent cases of distress[7] (Weller, 1997). Outside military forces are rarely perceived as impartial in conflicts, compromising the image, and hence the effectiveness, of aid organisations that associate with them (Beauregard, 1998). For example, the presence of NATO troops in Kosovar refugee camps undermined the civilian and humanitarian character of the camps, and camps in northern Albania were attacked by Yugoslav forces as a consequence (Rollins, 2001). In Afghanistan, US military wore civilian clothing while carrying out assessments. One letter from humanitarians noted: "By pretending to be aid workers, armed forces are trying to have it both ways, to benefit from the protections accorded non-combatants [in international humanitarian law] while themselves remaining combatant" (Biddle and Bartolini, 2003).

Independence, the third humanitarian principle, signifies that humanitarian endeavour should not be integrated into a political process or linked with any use of the military

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[5] Article 18§2 of Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions of 1977 or article 70 for examples
[6] Resolutions 43/131, 45/100, 46/182
[7] See article 70 of the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1977

power. It only serves the interests of all victims; organisations should not get involved in political, religious, or ideological controversies (Quenivet, 1998). The military is subordinate to a political authority and is therefore not as independent as NGOs that operate in the same environments (Finch, 2000; International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, 1998).

The last principle, neutrality, is often mentioned in the same breath as impartiality and independence where their application to humanitarian assistance is concerned. Indeed, on occasion the principles are used interchangeably. However, they are somewhat distinct and should be regarded as partially overlapping principles, rather than as synonyms (Weller, 1997). Weller (1997) defines neutrality as: in order to continue to enjoy the confidence of all, the organisation may not take sides in hostilities or engage at any time in controversies of a political, racial, religious, or ideological nature. When the Security Council takes actions in the framework of chapter VII, the UN cannot be considered a neutral party in a conflict (Weller, 1997) since it is able to enforce its will through violent measures.

Gordon (2001), states that one of the largest obstacles in civil-military relationships has been the inability of soldiers to extend their *mandates* to provide humanitarian assistance. Most mandates of peace support operations have been UN Security Council Resolutions and are only in effect for a short time. This makes possible a fairly flexible reaction to a changing situation, as well as corrections to the force composition and its missions. However, the mandate is frequently the result of compromise or ambiguity which leads to differing interpretations by the parties to a conflict and even among elements of the response group (Mackinlay, 1996). In his research Roberts (1996) writes "The vagueness and incompleteness of the aims in some of these interventions is striking. In Northern Iraq, the extent to which the Kurdish autonomy was or was not supported was unclear. In the former Yugoslavia, the mandates of UNPROFOR varied from place to place and from time to time, but were widely viewed by the inhabitants as inadequate. In Somalia, the mandates of the forces intervening under UN auspices were never clear on the key issues of who was in charge of the country's administration".

As a result, the involvement of the military in humanitarian assistance is open to a wide interpretation at lower levels (Damen and Olislagers, 2004). For example, the mandate may include 'the promotion of a stable environment'. This can be achieved through a wide array of activities ranging from building political institutions and providing economic aid to collecting weapons and arresting war criminals. Since a military organisation has limited resources available, the military commander at a tactical level[8] will have to decide to which tasks he will give priority. Although restricted by strategic and operational boundaries (e.g., NATO cimic doctrine AJP-09 (NATO, 2003)) these decisions are often based on the

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[8] There is a difference between business and military levels of management. Contrary to business organisations, the military call the in-between level the operational level while calling the lowest level tactical. This research applies the military levels of management.

commander's own insights and experience and the advice of his staff officers. To facilitate this decision Rietjens et al. (2004) have developed a decision method. Based on military and civil attributes this method enables the commander to prioritise using an extensive scorecard.

Wijk (1998) argues that the formulation of a mandate in a peacekeeping operation is relatively easy compared to a peace enforcement operation. This is because the *use of force* is permitted in peace enforcement operations, which can lead to an undesired escalation of the conflict. The creation, adoption, and observance of Rules of Engagement (RoE) are important with respect to this. These rules strictly govern all instances involving the justifiable use of weapons or force, as well as the restrictions and rules for their use (Demurenko and Nikitin, 1997). The threat or use of force, whether appropriate or not, can single-handedly terminate civil-military cooperation and coordination. In many situations, military have very different attitudes and interpretations regarding the use of force. Certain NGOs grant that the use of force might be a necessary evil in extreme circumstances, as when all means to deliver aid have failed. In his research Beauregard (1998) describes one such example when UNPROFOR and NATO threatened to use force to ensure the delivery of humanitarian supplies to besieged towns and cities in the former Yugoslavia. However, the vast majority of relief workers interviewed during the course of this research adamantly favoured negotiations with the protagonists and favoured the possibility of handing out food packages rather than the use of force in such situations, fearing that NGOs might become targets of retaliation.

Apart from the military's mandate, the NGOs themselves have mandates that differ from each other, which can lead to tensions with the military. Winslow (2002) cites an aid worker who said that "NGOs are a business, each with their own agenda and sometimes their own agenda's don't coincide with other NGO activities".

Minear, et al. (2000), note that there were tensions between the respective missions of military and humanitarian actors in Kosovo. "Reflecting concerns such as security and logistics – political factors appear also to have played a role – KFOR was organized in the Kosovo theatre into five Areas of Responsibility (AoRs). Reflecting its own mission, UNHCR efforts were organized into seven AoRs. The absence of corresponding boundaries complicated matters in the two areas added by UNHCR where large concentrations of refugees and major destruction of infrastructure posed a particular humanitarian challenge. To complicate matters further, other humanitarian organisations had AoRs that differed in one respect or another with those of KFOR and UNHCR, as did UNMIK and OSCE".

2.2 TIME FRAMES

Whereas humanitarian organisations and sometimes development bodies have been in an area for a long time and have often established a contact network and modus operandi, the military are newcomers, albeit newcomers with an enormous influence on the situation[9]. Civil operations, especially those of a development nature, are prepared to stay in the area for a period of five or ten years, whereas the military often have a *time horizon* limited to one or two years. This means that they often fall out of synchronisation with each other, creating different opinions concerning for instance, what is "reasonable" progress during a certain time period (Winslow, 2002; Eriksson, 2000). Moreover, military units have a different principal task. If the situation changes so that they need to concentrate on this, there is a risk that civil projects can be abruptly terminated (Rollins, 2001).

The ideal response in time of the military and the humanitarian organisations to a complex emergency according to Rollins (2000) is illustrated in figure 8. This figure shows the responsibilities of the military for activities in the top half of the figure, while mandated humanitarian organisations such as those examples illustrated, are responsible for activities in the bottom half.

Figure 8: Response in time to a complex emergency (Rollins, 2000)

The brevity of military tours frequently causes great frustration with humanitarian organisations (Mockaitis, 2004; Winslow, 2002). Most NGOs deploy personnel for at least a year, UNHCR for as many as two years in hazardous duty stations (with leave). A military unit usually changes its personnel once every four to six months[10]. One officer gave the

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[9] This is partly a generalisation. When a catastrophe reaches such proportions that international media pays attention to it, there is also an influx of humanitarian organisations, mostly NGOs, who are also newcomers (Eriksson, 2000).

[10] There are longer examples (the Finns have one year and only rotate one third of the unit at a time) as well as shorter times in the area (the Belgians have tried four months without any leave during the tour of duty) (Eriksson, 2000).

following description: "As soon as you have learned enough it is time to return home" (Eriksson, 2000). Because of this fast rotation, there is an absence of systematic, long-term, monitoring, and follow-up projects (Ramsden, 2000), especially if they do not fall within the normal areas of competency for those involved (Eriksson, 2000). This creates a lack of *continuity*.

A short period in an area can have advantages: Each rotation should allow enough time to improve the operation, but not so much that the personnel get stuck in a "seen it all, done it all" attitude. If the transfer functions well, this leads to a continuous improvement of the operation. However, this requires sufficient time for transfer, and the storage of information and intelligence in an accessible database (Eriksson, 2000).

Whitman (2000) poses the question, "What happens if the military leaves?" Issues like this, relating to the *transfer* of tasks and responsibilities, often cause problems in the civil-military relations. To facilitate the transfer Williams (2005) stresses the transition to local capacity and management at the earliest possible moment. He states that it must be the goal of every reconstruction intervention to build capacity and support local control. The outside organisations, military or humanitarian, must never lose sight of the fact that the purpose of external nation assistance is to help the host nation develop its own capabilities and its own public and private institutions. He proposes a template to present aggregate activity levels of local, civilian and military operations in four subsequent phases of the reconstruction process (see figure 9). In this template the size of a grey area refers to the level of activity of an actor; a large area represents a high level of activity.

Phase 1: Planning	Military		Civilian		
Phase 2: Emergency response	Military		Civilian		Local
Phase 3: Subsequent recovery	Military		Civilian	Local	
Phase 4: Local transition	Military	Civilian		Local	

Figure 9: Phases and aggregated level of activity of local, civilian, and military operations (Williams, 2005)

Because of issues related to the time perspective there is a need for a clearly defined end-state (Williams, 2005; Hvidt, 2000) and an exit strategy (Wijk, 1998). This has to prevent the military from a long-term involvement in the crisis, for example a long-term civilian dependence on military resources by the local population, government, or humanitarian organisations (NATO, 2003). However, it remains very difficult to control. In Afghanistan Prime Minister Hamid Karzai has said that the length of stay of the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) would depend upon "…the security situation on the ground, the decisions made by the Loya Jirga after its convening, and the establishment of a

functioning police force. When these are all achieved and the scourge of terrorism is rooted out once and for all, only then their mission would be completed" (Weinberger, 2002).

2.3 STRUCTURES AND CULTURES

The *organisation structures* of military and the humanitarian organisations are for the most part polar opposites (Pugh, 2001; Starr, 2001). Military institutions place a high value on command and control, top-down hierarchical organisational structures, and clear lines of authority, discipline, and accountability (Abiew, 2003; Williams, 2005; Minear, et al., 2000). They place great emphasis on logistics, and substantial resources are dedicated to the acquisition of assets and training of personnel to ensure that they can function independently under the most adverse circumstances (Gourlay, 2000). The military's approach to problem solving is generally directive and coercive (Gourlay, 2000).

The organisation structure of most professional humanitarian organisations is horizontal and fluid, with significant decision-making authority lodged at the site with the most information, usually in the field. Many of these organisations follow a consensus-based approach (Beauregard, 1998). They pay more attention to the process by which they accomplish operations, partly because they attach more importance to long-term impacts (Gourlay, 2000). The reason for this is that a bottom-up perspective is more natural than a top-down perspective in an operation comprising a large number of small organisations in which all of them wish to preserve their autonomy (Eriksson, 2000).

The differences between a bottom-up and a top-down perspective affect the planning of operations. The former places a priority on individuals and local groups while the latter primarily pays attention to national interests. The former is carried out in the form of smaller, local projects, while the latter generally requires larger and more centralised operations (Eriksson, 2000). Because some NGOs and militaries are unfamiliar with each other's organisation structures, they have difficulty establishing a compatible communications link with the appropriate contact or decision-maker (Beauregard, 1998). Jakobsen and Heurlin (2000), state that one chain of command is unrealistic. Some civilian actors such as Red Cross and Medicin Sans Frontières (MSF) would never subject themselves to the same command structure as the military as this would compromise their neutrality.

With continuous and multiple points of interface, military personnel and humanitarians interpret the world through the lens of their own culture. Lack of familiarity with the differences embedded in the *organisation cultures* is a breeding ground for misunderstanding and poor coordination and cooperation (Scheltinga, 2003; Siegel, 2003; Duffy, 2000). In many circumstances the use of a different language and terminology further obscures

understanding, compounded by different interpretations of the same terms of reference (Boer and Schellekens, 2000).

According to Cameron and Quinn's (1999) research on organisation cultures, the culture of the military organisation is classified as a Hierarchy Culture. This culture is goal oriented, rules and regulations run the organisation, and process and scheduling are adhered to the "daily battle rhythm". The work ethic is "work hard and play hard". They have respect for tradition, for physical and mental toughness, and for age. Leaders are taught to be assertive, decisive, tenacious, and confident.

Most humanitarian organisations are classified as a Clan Culture. This culture is more interested in intuitive than in rational knowledge, more concerned with the development of people than with their deployment or utilisation. Hofstetter (2001) described the cultures of the IOs and NGOs as flexible and independent with decentralised authority (Hofstetter, 2001). The organisations have long-term objectives and a good relationship with the local population (Duffy, 2000).

Specific organisational objectives for NGOs are the ability to single focus, their synergistic relationship to other NGOs (not always automatic), their experience and size for quick action, their impartiality and their experience in a function or region. NGOs have flat management structures, spend relatively small amounts on bureaucracy and administration, and are generally staffed by young, energetic, highly committed, and motivated people (Tomlinson, 2000).

As personnel from civilian humanitarian organisations interact more regularly with military personnel, culture clashes become apparent. Cedric Thornberry, former- Head of UNPROFOR's Civil Affairs, explains that the lack of agency cooperation can be largely blamed on a 'two-way lack of familiarity for the attitudinal abyss which separates aid workers from the military' (Siegel, 2003; Duffy, 2000). Aid workers do often dis*trust* the military, and the military is similarly suspicious of aid workers. Such unfamiliarity inevitably encourages the promulgation of ill-informed stereotypes. The military is frequently characterised as an insensitive, ill-informed, controlling, and inflexible war–machine, while personnel of some humanitarian organisations are seen as sandal-wearing, two-faced, undisciplined, and uncoordinated liberals (Duffy, 2000). In their research on Operation Restore Hope in Somalia Miller and Moskos (1995) state that gender, race and military occupation speciality all affect the attitude developed by a soldier. The warrior attitude was more likely to be adopted by men, whites and combat soldiers trained intensively to operate against a foreign enemy. Women, black men, and soldiers in non-combatant roles were more likely to adopt a humanitarian attitude.

In order to reduce inter-group tension between military and humanitarian organisations, Scheltinga (2003) notes that organisations' cultural differences need to be managed. If differences are managed well, then groups will become more acquainted with each other. To manage the differences, Scheltinga (2003) developed a roadmap which begins with an assessment of the differences among the cultures of the interacting actors. Subsequently,

the cultural differences are managed through the creation of awareness of the differences and the similarities. Finally, all the actors must learn to respect each other's behaviour and culture.

For both military and humanitarian organisations, maintaining good relations with the local community is a prerequisite for successful operations. This relationship relies for an important part on the understanding of the *local culture* and respect for cultural traditions. To determine the characteristics of a culture Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1997) identified three components. The first are the artefacts and products which are symbols of a culture and include language, food, buildings, fashion, and arts. The second component is composed of the norms (i.e., the mutual sense a group has of what is "right" and "wrong") and values (i.e., the definition of "good" and "bad") of an individual group. An example would be that relationship building must precede any business transaction in many cultures. The third component consists of the basic assumptions of a group. These are vital to the way those societies function and how most individuals see themselves.

Personnel of both military and humanitarian organisations frequently lack insight into the local culture of the population they are attempting to develop positive community relations with (Duffey, 2000). Formal and informal channels are not created, locals are not consulted and sufficient information is not gathered to guide the formulation of intervention policy and practice. Frequently, only once the military and the humanitarian organisations arrive in the conflict crisis do they realise that society has different conceptions of the conflict and ways of managing it. In her research Duffey (2000) includes an example of the Somali culture. This culture is rooted in oral traditions and poetry and oratory play crucial roles in politics, war, and peace. "Most nomadic Somalis have transistor radios on which they listen to a variety of national and international programmes broadcast in Somali, including the BBC World News. At the beginning, the UN was advised of the importance of effective broadcasting in the presentation of the UN aims and policies and the use of the oratory in counselling for peace. The UN ignored this advice and, instead chose to drop leaflets. Here the bizarre image of American helicopters dropping leaflets couched in pigeon Somali over Mogadishu's primarily oral population fittingly encapsulates the style of an over-grandiose western intervention which is high on technology but low on culturally appropriate human understanding. The first leaflets dropped at the beginning of Operation Restore Hope read 'slave nations have come to help you' (instead of 'United Nations') – possibly a simple translation oversight, but one which had serious repercussions. Eventually, UNITAF's Joint Psychological Operation Task Force (JPOTF) acknowledged the advice. In addition to leaflet drops, the JPOTF broadcast news on military activities, public service announcements and messages of peace in Somali".

2.4 COORDINATION AND COMMUNICATION

Whilst *coordination* is always beneficial in a catastrophe in order to optimise scarce resources, it is even more necessary in complex emergencies where amongst other things, a mixture of political factors, conflicts and extreme vulnerabilities is at play (Transnational Institute, 2001). Military personnel believe fundamentally in the merits of coordinating effort and constantly strive to achieve logical and clear structures to that end. Humanitarian organisations are often driven by the 'humanitarian imperative' and are wary of anything that might limit or otherwise interfere with their freedom of action. This is particularly true of the smaller and newer NGOs, who generally take a minimalist approach to coordination (Laurence, 1999). In this respect Last (2000), states that "Everyone wants co-ordination, but no one wants to be co-ordinated by others". As a result, coordination is frequently absent (Berg and Dabelstein, 2003). In their research Damen and Olislagers (2004) state that the Dutch military engineering built a hospital in Turbe, Bosnia-Herzegovina. After completion, it turned out that the hospital had been financed by three NGOs. Each NGO had paid for the entire hospital, without being aware of the other NGOs financing it. This became clear only after completion of the hospital. To prevent this from happening the vast majority of organisations seem well disposed to the idea of UN coordination even if their priority is internal coordination and coordination with others is time consuming (Pugh, 2001). One Kosovo evaluation found that: "A strong independent coordination body is required to ensure adherence to humanitarian principles and to ensure respect for minimum (and maximum) standards, particularly in highly politicised emergencies" (Valid International, 1999).

Effective *communication* between civil authorities, humanitarian organisations, population, and the military is vital to develop trust and common understanding in the cooperation behaviour of the (unknown) partners (NATO, 2003; Bollen, 2002). There are two basic reasons for working together in respect to information (Eriksson, 2000). The first is that comprehensive intelligence is a precondition for any operation to choose the real problems. An NGO supplying food needs to know which villages and areas are in the greatest need, and those in which the food itself will really get through to the civilian population without becoming part of the war effort[11]. The civilian and military actors need to exchange information about the humanitarian situation and the military and political situations. Different types of actors also have access to different types of information.

The second reason is that exchange of intelligence and information is a security issue. This applies to information about activity on the part of the faction that may cause direct or indirect harm to the civil and/or military operations, and to information relating to the

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[11] "In Rwanda, an NGO wanted to deliver 4,000 litres of diesel fuel, supposedly for fuel water pumps, to the Tutsis. What the NGO did not understand (or did not want to understand) was that this diesel fuel would probably be used for the war effort" (Connaughton, 1996).

activities of one's own side that may affect other peace operations. The latter may comprise information about planned actions (e.g., arrests, selective bombing, observation posts being set up in sensitive areas, supplies of food to a village blockaded by one particular faction), which might lead to reprisals against other operations (Eriksson, 2000). In his research Mockaitis (2004) states "Accurate information on the local situation is vital to the success of both humanitarian and military missions. Such information should be exchanged as freely as possible. However, many IOs and NGOs complain the security briefings often provide them with little useful information, and that when they request more detail, the military responds with: 'That information is classified'. Any military must at times withhold information for security reasons. However, soldiers almost automatically fall back on the "classified" rule, even when the information requested will not compromise security or sources. Soldiers should also understand that although IOs and NGOs desire to assist them, cannot always reveal confidential information. This limitation is especially true for the ICRC, for whom the guarantee of confidentiality gains them access to prisons and detention centres around the world".

Fitz-Gerald and Walthall (2001) state that we need to be clear about what it is we are communicating about, with whom, and how. They stress the importance of realising that dumping information is not communicating. There need to be mechanisms first for collecting information, storing this information, but equally important, for producing useful knowledge from that information. Finally, there must be means of providing that knowledge to those who need it. In other words, the information exchange between the civil and military actors should involve more information processes than just the sharing of information. The internal information management of the two types of actors also influences the actual information exchange process.

The media plays an important role in communication; there is a vital need for enhanced transparency between humanitarian agencies, the military, and the media. The media now provides twenty-four hour information in a much timelier manner than the UN or the military. Those reluctant to embrace the new transparent information environment are left a step behind the media (Fitz-Gerald and Walthall, 2001). The image of a soldier with a child in his arms will attract more sympathy back home than the coverage of most of the military actions he might undertake. This kind of image can generate support in public opinion that can considerably ease possible opposition against overseas military deployment. At a time when the media (the so-called 'CNN-factor') plays a central part in shaping foreign policy, governments can be tempted to encourage the active participation of their soldiers in humanitarian operations (Studer, 2001).

2.5 MEANS

In peace operations different organisations often find themselves competing for *resources* (Winslow, 2002). Mobilising the financial resources needed for an effective international response to complex emergencies has become a costly ordeal (James, 2003). While 20% of UN-requested global assistance for 2002 was requested for Afghanistan, the commitment has been far below that and this shortfall is evident in the field (James, 2003). In Iraq, the donor conference in Madrid secured US$33 billion worth of pledges, far below the 55 billion sought. Donor governments provide the bulk of financial resources, while financial support from non-government sources (corporations, foundations, and the general public) appears to be less than one-sixth of total global funding.

Because most funding is crisis-driven it inhibits long-range planning and undermines the sustainability and effectiveness of programs. Under these arrangements, donors find it difficult to track the impact of successive appeals or to hold providers accountable. Additionally, Eriksson (2000) argues that military units often cost more for a given operation than the equivalent carried out by a civil aid organisation. Siegel (2002) states that "if one pursues the concept of 'total-cost accounting' (trying to capture the cost of the entire system), then the cost of military personnel skyrockets. Total-cost accounting would include the cost of training and education, recruiting, retirement, and all other expenses that are associated with getting a soldier to the front". Some aid personnel believe that if the true costs of harnessing the military for humanitarian work was known, the comparative advantages of aid organisations would be demonstrated beyond dispute (Minear, et al., 2000).

In addition to financial resource mobilisation and management, another critical element of an effective humanitarian response is the mobilisation and deployment of material and human resources (Forman and Parhad, 1997). The military has several virtually unique resources. They can both protect and defend themselves and break down the resistance of others with violence, they have rapid access to strategic and tactical transport resources, they can be self-sufficient for a longer period, and they have specialised aircraft capacities, maritime resources, reconnaissance, intelligence capacities, and an effective communications network (Eriksson, 2000). The logistic network and machinery are extensive and speedy (claiming delivery in about five days from project approval, compared to five months for the EU and UN) (Pugh, 1998). In his research Williams (2005) focuses on the unique capacities of military engineers. He states that "the wide variety of engineer units provides particular technical capabilities that are required to accomplish essential, diversified tasks throughout the depth of the theatre of operations". However, Sharp, et al. (1994) state that the water, health, and infrastructure capabilities of the military are still primarily configured for war-fighting and health agencies have questioned the appropriateness of military medical staff and equipment to deal with the health needs of

large numbers of destitute people (Slim, 1996). Pugh (2001) notes that "military personnel are not ideally suited to humanitarian work; they lack training, expertise, and appropriate policy configurations for building local capacities and accountability to local populations". In this respect Gordon (2001) notes that the challenge for the British military is "to create a greater degree of expertise and institutional memory". Additionally, less developed countries are less able to provide their troops with what is needed for a multinational peacekeeping operation, including appropriate clothing and equipment. In the middle of Croatia's winter, Pakistani troops arrived in summer uniforms. In Bihac, four Bangladeshi soldiers shared a single rifle (Weiss and Collins, 2000).

Despite the great differences between IOs, NGOs, and UN agencies, many frequently lack material resources like transport, accommodation, and communication resources (Cross, 2001). As Williams (2005) puts it bluntly "the United Nations and regional organisations are poorly equipped to deal quickly with emerging crises". In his paper on Afghanistan Schenkenberg Van Mierop (2002) states "there are at least three or four different phone lines in Kabul. These are not compatible and there was no local access to the Internet for the time being. Erickson, the Swedish telecom giant, brought in some 300 mobile phones at the end of January (2002), of which the bulk went to staff of UN agencies. Some 30 of these phones, which do not support data transmission, went to NGOs".

Most of the organisations also face problems in the current recruitment and training of qualified aid personnel (Forman and Parhad, 1997). They argue that personnel are often recruited in a hasty, ad hoc manner for overseas assignments in remote, unfamiliar places to implement programs for which they may lack training. On the contrary many other researchers stress the high level of knowledge and expertise of personnel of humanitarian organisations (Williams, 2005; Bollen, 2002). This particularly refers to the local situation and development issues but also includes general educational level.

One problem in many humanitarian organisations is the absence of local professionals in senior operations positions. While many of the major humanitarian organisations claim to hire over 80% local staff, few of the latter occupy senior policy or management positions. The dominance of Westerners is problematic on a number of fronts: politically and ethically as well as in terms of efficiency and comparative costs (Forman and Parhad, 1997). Local staff bring special skills and strengths to senior positions, including a greater understanding of the particular political and cultural context in which they are operating. Building local capacity in the civil sector also contributes directly to post-emergency reconstruction goals and to long-term sustainability of programs. Expatriates also cost ten to forty times more than locals (Forman and Parhad, 1997).

Technologies are indispensable tools for many essential mission tasks. Modern technologies can extend the range of observation and communication, improve the safety of personnel, and enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the mission (Wheatley and Welch, 1999).

For civil-military cooperation, technologies of both organisations should be compatible. For example, the use of incompatible communications equipment (field phones, satellite phones, short wave radios) was a widespread problem in the former Yugoslavia. Some UN military contingents possessed more technically advanced equipment than that of NGOs or even other military contingents, making communications in the field difficult and often impossible (Beauregard, 1998).

Mosch (1997), states that "technologies are embedded in and carry social values, institutional forms and culture, even as they reflect resource endowments and the organisation of production. Western-equipment-intensive technology was devised primarily to save labour in the face of rising costs: it could hardly be appropriate for districts or regions troubled with a large labour surplus and very low wage rates. Moreover, technology in western countries has grown up over several generations along with a vast array of supporting services, like modern transport and communications". With respect to the interface of international organisations, military or civilian, and the host nation, this stresses the importance of fitting the imported technologies to the environment of the beneficiaries. Rather than importing technology Damen and Olislagers (2004) state that "In Goma, Dutch military engineers employed a local electrician to help repair the power facilities. His experience with the local low-tech, chaotic power infrastructure saved them time".

2.6 CONTINGENCY FACTORS

A widely noted challenge relates to the *proliferation* and heterogeneity of civilian actors involved in recent missions (Abiew, 2003). In most emergencies, the main NGO players number in the tens rather than hundreds. However, in extreme and dramatic complex emergencies, NGOs can reach greater numbers. At the height of the relief operations in Kosovo there were over four hundred NGOs (Fitz-Gerald and Walthall, 2001), and it has been estimated that there were around eight hundred NGOs operating in Haiti at the peak of Operation Uphold Democracy (Mackinlay, 1996). Such NGO overcrowding and overcapacity has the following results (Abiew, 2003; Mackinlay, 1996):

1. It can deter more experienced and expert NGOs from intervening in a situation that they consider as too confused.
2. It increases competition among NGOs and raises the urgency to publicise their relief operations.
3. Coordination becomes extremely difficult and time-consuming.
4. The quality of NGO operations is not easily monitored and regulated.

An area of difficulty encountered by peacekeepers who deal with humanitarian organisations is what might be called their "agenda" (Pollick, 2000). The more reputable groups have straightforward goals and tasks, such as feeding a starving population or

providing medical care to victims of a crisis. Other groups pursue a less clear-cut path. Some NGOs sponsored by church groups, for example, may provide aid only to those people who share their religion. Others may be more concerned with raising money than with helping victims. NGOs of this type may for example, send a team into a crisis situation only long enough to get photographs that can be used in propaganda pamphlets for fund-raising campaigns back home.

The second contingency factor which influences civil-military cooperation is the *operational environment*. Terrain, weather, climate, demographics, culture, politics, threat level, and the existence and state of roads, airports, and port facilities in a host state determine the resources and support that military and humanitarian organisations need to bring with them (Gregorian, 1996). After years of internal conflict, the infrastructure of the host nation will be changed and diminished in effectiveness and facilities. In addition to the visible installations that facilitate communications, trade, and good government, there may be unseen damage that also reduce the speed of long-term rebuilding plans (Mackinlay, 1996).

When the threat level is high, the physical environment is hostile, or the civilian infrastructure undeveloped, the support elements of the military and civilian actors should be proportionally larger (Gregorian, 1996). This results in a greater proportion of personnel involved in sustaining itself as opposed to conducting their other activities, meaning that the overall ability of the actor(s) will drop accordingly.

Traditionally, one of the weaknesses of multilateral operations is that national contingents sometimes check UN or NATO orders with their national governments before proceeding, or worse, act only under orders from home rather than UN or NATO command (Boulden, 1996). Such instances toward the establishment of a *unity of effort* in peace support operations can undermine the UN's or NATO's effectiveness. Landon (1998), states that "during the early IFOR deployment, many nations conducted individual stove-piped surveys and assessments or required tasks. There was no central planning or coordination of data collection with the result that operations and activities were similarly stove-piped in national coordination relied to a great extent on "swivel-chair" interfaces". KFOR troops acting under national instructions had widely differing policies and budgets. Minear, et al. (2000), state that Dutch and German contingents placed high priority on making single rooms in a large number of houses habitable for the winter. This distinguished them from other national contingents and UNHCR, which provided shelter kits to individual homeowners, who then arranged their own repairs. More recently the deployment of ISAF in Kabul showed considerable differences between the 22 national contingents (Damen and Olislagers, 2004). The Germans were focussing on private business enterprises while the Turkish contingent focussed on religious tasks such as the building of mosques and circumcision of young boys.

Figure 10 illustrates some national approaches towards civil-military cooperation. The figure shows that Russia and the US have a very narrow approach towards civil-military cooperation characterised by a limited involvement in humanitarian assistance mainly driven by military motives and focused on force protection. France and the United Kingdom have a broader approach and are more active in assisting humanitarian organisations with direct support. Canada and the Nordic countries have a broad mandate towards civil-military cooperation. Not only do they value civil-military cooperation as a force multiplier, they also emphasise it as an aid multiplier and are often actively involved in humanitarian assistance.

Figure 10: National approaches of civil-military cooperation (Landon and Hayes, 1996)

2.7 CONCLUSION

The conclusions regarding the contribution of the literature review on civil-military cooperation to the development of a process model are threefold. First, many factors are identified that influence the process of civil-military cooperation. As some of these factors are interrelated or partly overlapping, they are grouped into six clusters. For each cluster, table 2 presents the identified factors.

Second, literature on civil-military cooperation paid very little attention to the process of civil-military cooperation itself. No subdivision of the process in phases was identified from the literature.

Finally, literature on civil-military cooperation did not pay much attention to the evaluation of civil-military cooperation and criteria that constitute the outcome of the process. From the review it remains unclear how the outcome of the process of civil-military cooperation can be determined.

	Clusters					
	Policy and domain	Time frames	Structures and cultures	Coordination and communication	Means	Contingency factors
Factors	- Tasks - Humanitarian principles - Mandate - Use of force	- Time horizon - Continuity - Transfer	- Organisation structure - Organisation culture - Local culture - Trust	- Coordination - Communication	- Resources - Technology	- Proliferation of civilian actors - Operational environment - Unity of effort

Table 2: Identified factors influencing civil-military cooperation

Civil-military cooperation

CHAPTER 3: COOPERATIVE ARRANGEMENTS FOR CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION

3.1 STRATEGIC ALLIANCES

3.1.1 Introduction

There is some ambivalence in classifying what types of cooperative arrangements can be termed strategic alliances (Das and Teng, 1998). Researchers that select an inclusive approach maintain that virtually any kind of cooperative arrangement can be identified as a strategic alliance (Borys and Jemison, 1989; Lorange and Roos, 1992). The strategic alliance options by Lorange and Roos (1992) presented in figure 11 illustrate this approach.

| Mergers & acquisitions | Joint ownership | Joint venture | Formal cooperative venture | Informal cooperative venture |

HIERARCHY
Large

MARKET
None

Degree of vertical integration

Figure 11: Strategic alliance options (Lorange and Roos, 1992)

Other researchers have adopted a more restricted view and seek to make a distinction between strategic alliances and other cooperative arrangements (Das and Teng, 1998). Strategic alliances refer only to those deals in which the parent firms are tied to each other in a substantial manner, i.e., long-term interdependence, shared control, and continued contributions by the parents. This restrictive view is presented by Yoshino and Rangan (1995) in figure 12, which illustrates the range of possible interfirm links. The subset encompassing strategic alliances is indicated in grey boxes.

Figure 12: Interfirm links (Yoshino and Rangan, 1995)

This chapter reviews theories on cooperative arrangements to determine whether they provide insights regarding the phases, factors and outcomes of civil-military cooperation. To not disregard some of these insights, this research uses the inclusive rather than the restrictive approach of strategic alliances.

3.1.2   The process of strategic alliance development

Many researchers consider the development of a strategic alliance similar to a relationship between people: two people meet, fall in love, get engaged, and finally grow old together or divorce (e.g. Kanter, 1994). Although no strategic alliance travels the same path, a successful alliance generally unfolds in several overlapping phases (Das and Teng, 1997; Kanter, 1994). The theories which attempt to identify these phases in the development of strategic alliances correspond to a great extent. Although they use different terminology, the identified phases can be grouped under three main headings: a formation phase, an operation phase, and an evolution phase.

Table 3 provides an overview of the theories reviewed which identify phases in the development of strategic alliances. The identified phases of a theory are clustered under the three main headings.

Phases / Theory	Phase 1: Formation phase	Phase 2: Operation phase	Phase 3: Evolution phase
(Child and Faulkner, 1998)	Phase 1: Nature of cooperation Phase 2: Establishing cooperation	Phase 3: Managing cooperation	Phase 4: The maturing relationship
(Das and Teng, 1997)	Phase 1: Considering strategic alliance Phase 2: Selecting alliance partners Phase 3: Negotiating the alliance agreement	Phase 4: Setting up the alliance Phase 5: Operating the alliance	Phase 6: Evaluating alliance performance Phase 7: Modifying the alliance
(Faulkner, 1995)	Phase 1: Formation Phase	Phase 2: Managing phase	Phase 3: Evolution phase
(Hoffmann and Schlosser, 2001)	Phase 1: Strategic analysis and decision to cooperate Phase 2: Search for a partner and partner selection Phase 3: Designing the partnership	Phase 4: Implementation and management of the partnership	Phase 5: Termination of the partnership
(Kanter, 1994)	Phase 1: Selection and courtship	Phase 2: Engagement Phase 3: Housekeeping Phase 4: Learning to collaborate	Phase 5: Change within
(Larson, 1992)	Phase 1: Preconditions for exchange Phase 2: Conditions to build	Phase 3: Integration and Control	
(Lewis, 1990)	Phase 1: Scanning Phase 2: Choosing a partner	Phase 3: Building an alliance	Phase 4: Developing effective relationships
(Lorange and Roos, 1992)	Phase 1: Formation Phase	Phase 2: Implementation phase	Phase 3: Evolution phase
(Mulyowahyudi, 2001)	Phase 1: Formation Phase	Phase 2: Operation phase	Phase 3: Termination phase
(Yoshino and Rangan, 1995)	Phase 1: Rethinking the business Phase 2: Crafting an alliance strategy Phase 3: Structuring an alliance	Phase 4: Evaluating alliances	Phase 4: Evaluating alliances

Table 3: Overview of theories on phases in strategic alliances

Formation phase

The first step is to consider alliances as a strategic option along with other alternatives such as vertical and horizontal integration and market-based transactions (Das and Teng, 1997; Tallman and Shenkar, 1994; Yoshino and Rangan, 1995). To consider this, cooperative strategy should be looked at from a number of different perspectives commonly found in the literature (Child and Faulkner, 1998) because there is no universally accepted theory of cooperation at a meta level acceptable to economists, sociologists, and anthropologists. Literature identifies several strategic option criteria. First, strategic alliances are a feasible choice when both complete internalisation and market transactions are too costly. Second, compared to arm's-length relationships between firms, coalitions can ease transactional or contractual difficulties. Third, a long-term coalition is preferable to arm's-length transactions since it gives each side ongoing incentives to perform. Fourth, coalitions mitigate the risks and lengthen the period before the other party in the transaction may become a competitor. Fifth, a coalition allows the negotiation of terms that limit the activities of the other party, such as defined marketing territories. Sixth, compared to internal development, coalitions are often a more rapid and less costly means of repositioning. Finally, compared to a merger, coalitions are less costly, preserve independence for management teams, and represent a less irreversible commitment when there are uncertainties about the most appropriate partner.

To form a joint venture Kogut (1988) singles out three basic theoretical motivations: (1) that such a form represents the lowest transaction cost alternative, (2) that it enables an improved strategic position to be achieved, and/or (3) that it gives an opportunity for organisational learning. He identifies two alternative views. The first is that joint ventures are a response of leading members of national oligopolies to co-opt foreign entrants. The second is that joint ventures are a means by which large corporations increase their organisational control. According to Faulkner (1995) and Mulyowahyudi (2001) the main motivations to enter an alliance are: resource dependency, spreading financial risk, speed to market, and low costs.

For alliances to form, some type of external driver needs to be present (Faulkner, 1995). The specific external driver will vary from situation to situation. Commonly suggested external driving forces for alliance formation are: (1) turbulence in markets, (2) economies of scale and/or scope, (3) globalisation of the industry, (4) regionalisation of the industry, (5) fast technological change leading to ever increasing investment requirements, (6) shortening product life-cycles and (7) high economic uncertainty.

Internal and external motives are necessary but not always sufficient. Child and Faulkner (1998) argue that ultimately there must also be a political motive for the alliance, perceived by a coalition of the organisation's key decision-makers. Once an organisation has developed the political will to attempt to solve some of its problems through seeking an

alliance partner, a number of steps have to be followed. It first must identify the kind of partner it wants. Based on a description of the own firm's strengths and objectives, a firm has to scan its environment for partners (Lewis, 1990). The purpose is to learn from others' products, marketing resources, technologies, and operating and organisational abilities that could improve the firm's performance.

From the scanning process a firm becomes familiar with potential alliance candidates. Next, an analysis to find the best match suggests priority firms (Lewis, 1990). The choice of a partner must be based on a precise definition of a firm's priority needs and what is most critical to meet them. According to Das and Teng (1997) ideal partners should have complementary resources, compatible objectives, and a certain level of interfirm trust. Moreover, Das and Teng argue that a relatively weak market position and small size should not prevent a firm from being part of an alliance. Faulkner (1995) argues that firms should be approximately balanced in size and strength.

Geringer (1991) states that attempting to identify a universal list of criteria, which firms should employ when seeking a "complementary" partner, is impossible. He distinguishes task- and partner related dimensions of selection criteria. Task-related criteria are associated with the operational skills and resources which a venture requires. These criteria include features such as access to finance, managerial and employee competences, site facilities, technology, marketing and distribution systems, and a favourable institutional environment or a partner's ability to negotiate acceptable regulatory and public policy provisions.

By contrast partner-related criteria are associated with the efficiency and effectiveness of partners' cooperation. These include variables which characterise the partners' national or corporate cultures, their size and structure, the degree of favourable past associations, and compatibility and trust between their top management teams.

After having selected an appropriate partner, an alliance agreement has to be negotiated (Lewis, 1990). To specify contractual clauses in an alliance agreement that bind the partners is an important task (Das and Teng, 1997). In such an alliance agreement several aspects should be emphasised: (1) precise definition of rights and duties, (2) agreement on clear and realistic objectives, (3) implementing plan with fixed milestones and (4) keeping and protecting core competencies. Klein Woolthuis (1999) argues that contracts that tend more towards a commitment contract reflect more trusting relationships, whereas contracts that include more safeguarding arrangements reflect lower trust relationships.

Next the governance structure of the alliance has to be specified (Das and Teng, 1997). Yoshino and Rangan (1995) argue that the structure of an alliance is neither determined by the participant's industry nor the targeted activity. Their research suggests two reasons why the structure of an alliance is important: it provides the setting for ongoing interaction between alliance partners, and partners' strategic and operational objectives, whether stated or hidden, can be achieved only if the alliance structure permits. According to

Faulkner (1995) the main alliance structures are joint ventures, collaborations, and consortia.

Tallman and Shenkar (1994) state that managers must choose between shared equity joint ventures (EJVs) and extended contractual relationships of various types. This is a key decision in that a contractual relationship is specified as to duration and purpose, while an EJV is more likely to be open-ended in both senses. Moreover, an EJV involves creation of a new organisational entity with shared ownership and separate management while contractual joint ventures provide defined relationships without a separate organisational life.

Operation phase

Having completed the formation phase, the next step is to operate the strategic alliance to achieve its objective. Although the literature identifies several important factors in the operation phase (see section 3.1.3), few authors identify sub-phases in this phase of strategic alliance development. Rohel and Truitt (1987) take the view that "stormy open marriages" are often the best form in strategic alliances, but this appears to be a minority opinion (Mulyowahyudi, 2001). More common is the view that such relationships should ensure that the long-term goals of the partners should not be in conflict though this does not mean that they need to be identical.

Kelly, et al. (2002) state that no matter how much attention is paid to the strategic and structural design aspects of the alliance, the actual "take-off" is likely to be a challenging experience for most companies. The managers and staff involved will most likely find themselves in unfamiliar territory in which they have no clear frame of reference. This situation is likely to be complicated by cultural differences, communication barriers, lingering suspicions about partner motives, and latent opposition in the partner companies.

Kanter (1994) stresses three important components in the operation phase. First the partners should incorporate a specific joint activity, a first-step venture or project. Second, a commitment to expand the relationship through side bets such as equity swaps or personnel exchanges should be included. Third, clear signs of continuing independence for all partners should be included.

Evolution phase

Das and Teng (1997), state that after the operation of the strategic alliance performance evaluation is necessary as it provides feedback on the status of the alliance. In strategic alliances however, performance evaluation has been a very controversial issue. Despite a significant amount of research, researchers hardly agree on the measures of alliance performance. While some prefer subjective measures such as perceived satisfaction (Mjoen and Tallman, 1997; Parkhe, 1993), others use objective measures such as profitability and sales growth (Mohr and Spekman, 1994) or revenues and costs (Contractor and Lorange, 1988).

According to Das and Teng (2003), this lack of agreement reflects an underlying conceptual question: what does effective alliance performance mean? They identify two distinct loci of alliance performance: the alliance itself and the partners forming the alliance. When alliances are viewed as separate entities alliance performance is the success of these separate entities in terms of e.g., profitability or growth rate. Joint venture research often adopts this alliance locus (Geringer and Hebert, 1991). On the other hand, because partner firms use alliances to achieve certain strategic objectives, performance ought to be measured in terms of the aggregated results for the partner firms.

In addition to the distinct loci of alliance performance identified by Das and Teng (2003), Faulkner (1995) makes a second distinction in measuring alliance performance: between normative and descriptive evaluation criteria. Normative evaluation criteria, or so-called 'feel good' criteria, are related to the perceived performance of the partnership by each partner. Descriptive evaluation criteria can objectively measure the performance of the partnership and often deal with the extent to which objectives have been achieved.

Lorange and Roos (1992) argue that few strategic alliances if any can be seen in a static position. Rather, they always tend to evolve towards something else. What tends to be important for securing a proper evolution of a strategic alliance so that the parents benefit, has to do with accepting the fact that strategic alliances tend to mature over time and take on a life of their own. Anticipating what might be a likely outcome of a strategic alliance is a key managerial consideration that has to be made before the alliance is entered into.

Kanter (1994) states that the most productive relationships eventually achieve five levels of integration: (1) strategic integration (i.e., continuing contact of top leaders to discuss broad goals or changes in each company), (2) tactical[12] integration (i.e., developing of plans by middle managers for specific projects or joint activities), (3) operational integration (i.e., providing timely access to information, resources or people to accomplish their day-to-day tasks), (4) interpersonal integration (i.e., building interpersonal relationships can help to resolve small conflicts before they escalate) and, (5) cultural integration (i.e., having the communication skills and cultural awareness to bridge cultural differences between the partners).

A sustainable strategic alliance often involves appropriate modifications. There are numerous ways to modify an alliance. Das and Teng (1997) focus on the choice between positive and negative modification. Doz (1996) argues that successful alliances evolve through a sequence of learning – re-evaluation – re-adjustment cycles over time in which the impact of initial conditions quickly fades away.

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[12] In her research Kanter uses the classification of management levels in business contexts (strategic, tactical, and operational) rather than the military management levels (strategic, operational, and tactical).

The termination of an alliance can be categorised into two types, unplanned and planned termination (Mulyowahyudi, 2001). Several reasons are identified, that potentially cause unplanned termination of strategic alliances, such as (Faulkner, 1995; Kanter, 1994):

- The conditions that made the alliance viable in the beginning have changed;
- The alliance is no longer beneficial to all parties;
- Conflicting goals;
- Cultural incompatibility (lack of commitment, trust and understanding cultural differences);
- Lack of synergy.

Planned termination usually occurs after an alliance has achieved the determined goals.

3.1.3 Factors in strategic alliance development

Table 4 presents an overview of the factors derived from a number of theories on strategic alliances. This presentation is done along the phases in the development of a strategic alliance. Three factors (flexibility, strategic fit, and trust) are considered general factors as they occurred in each phase. However, no listing or summary of factors that help influence the success or contribute to the failure of strategic alliances can be considered complete and precise or a prescription for success (Brouthers, et al., 1995). Table 4 presents an overview of the most widespread factors mentioned in the literature on strategic alliances.

Factor	Authors
Formation phase	
Strategic option criteria	(Das and Teng, 1997; Porter and Fuller, 1986)
Motives	(Child and Faulkner, 1998; Faulkner, 1995; Hoffman and Schlosser, 2001; Kogut, 1988; Larson, 1992, Mulyowahyudi, 2001; Porter and Fuller, 1986)
External forces	(Child and Faulkner, 1998; Faulkner, 1995; Mulyowahyudi, 2001)
Partner selection criteria	(Das and Teng, 1997; Faulkner, 1995; Geringer, 1991; Hoffman and Schlosser, 2001; Klein Woolthuis, 1999; Larson, 1992; Lewis, 1990; Mulyowahyudi, 2001; Porter and Fuller, 1986)
Alliance agreement	(Das and Teng, 1997; Hoffman and Schlosser, 2001; Klein Woolthuis, 1999)
Alliance structure	(Child and Faulkner, 1998; Das and Teng, 1997; Hoffman and Schlosser, 2001; Kanter, 1994; Klein Woolthuis, 1999; Lewis, 1990; Mulyowahyudi, 2001; Porter and Fuller, 1986; Tallman and Shenkar, 1994; Yoshino and Rangan, 1995)
Negotiation and valuation	(Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1996; Child and Faulkner, 1998; Das and Teng, 1997; Yoshino and Rangan, 1995)
Protection core competencies	(Hoffman and Schlosser, 2001; Lewis, 1990; Yoshino and Rangan, 1995)
Operation phase	
Coordination	(Hoffman and Schlosser, 2001; Kanter, 1994; Larson, 1992; Yoshino and Rangan, 1995)
Control	(Child and Faulkner, 1998; Das and Teng, 1997; Kanter, 1994; Lorange and Roos, 1992)

Human resource management	(Child and Faulkner, 1998; Das and Teng, 1997, Douma, 1997; Kanter, 1994; Lorange and Roos, 1992)
Organisation culture	(Child and Faulkner, 1998; Das and Teng, 1997, Douma, 1997; Faulkner, 1995; Hoffman and Schlosser, 2001; Kanter, 1994; Lewis, 1990; Lorange and Roos, 1992; Mulyowahyudi, 2001)
Cooperation versus competition	(Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1996; Das and Teng, 1997; Lewis, 1990)
Relations principals and other actors	(Child and Faulkner, 1998)
Operational arrangements	(Douma, 1997; Kanter, 1994; Mulyowahyudi, 2001)
Commitment	(Child and Faulkner, 1998; Faulkner, 1995; Kanter, 1994; Mulyowahyudi, 2001; Yoshino and Rangan, 1995)
Information dissemination	(Faulkner, 1995; Hoffman and Schlosser, 2001)
Dispute resolution mechanisms	(Faulkner, 1995; Lewis, 1990)
Dependence	(Klein Woolthuis, 1999)
Communication	(Kanter, 1994; Lewis, 1990)
Reciprocity	(Larson, 1992)
Opportunism	(Larson, 1992; Klein Woolthuis, 1999)
Planning	(Lewis, 1990; Lorange and Roos, 1992)
Evolution phase	
Evaluation criteria	(Das and Teng, 1997; Das and Teng, 2003; Faulkner, 1995; Mjoen and Tallman, 1997; Parkhe, 1993; Contractor and Lorange, 1988; Mohr and Spekman, 1994)
Organisational learning	(Child and Faulkner, 1998; Doz, 1996; Faulkner, 1995; Hoffman and Schlosser, 2001; Kanter, 1994)
Temporal orientation	(Das and Teng, 1997)
Partner bonding mechanisms	(Faulkner, 1995)
Balanced development	(Faulkner, 1995)
Termination only on approval by all partners	(Hoffman and Schlosser, 2001)
Prepared termination	(Hoffman and Schlosser, 2001)
Alliance network management	(Lewis, 1990; Yoshino and Rangan, 1995)
General factors	
Flexibility	(Child and Faulkner, 1998; Das and Teng, 1997; Doz, 1996; Faulkner, 1995; Mulyowahyudi, 2001)
Strategic fit	(Child and Faulkner, 1998; Douma, 1997; Hoffman and Schlosser, 2001; Lorange and Roos, 1992; Mulyowahyudi, 2001)
Trust	(Child and Faulkner, 1998; Das and Teng, 1997; Doz, 1996; Faulkner, 1995; Hoffman and Schlosser, 2001; Kanter, 1994; Klein Woolthuis, 1999; Larson, 1992; Lewis, 1990)

Table 4: Overview of factors influencing the performance of strategic alliances

The working paper "Co-operative arrangements for civil-military co-operation" (Rietjens, 2003) provides a detailed description of these factors.

3.2 NETWORKS

Every actor has a set of relationships with different counterparts in a network, (e.g., customers, suppliers, complementary producers, and competitors) (Hakansson and Sharma, 1996). The relationships in this set can vary with regard to the duration of the term or the resource required. Some of these relationships fit nicely into the concept of strategic alliances.

The network form is designed to handle tasks and environments that demand flexibility and adaptability (Baker, 1992). A network can construct a unique set of internal and external linkages for each project. It cannot adapt itself by "top-management fiat", but by the interactions of problems, people, and resources.

Several major lines of study which influence the emergence and shape of networks have been identified (Grandori and Soda, 1995). In the economic approach, economies of specialisation, experience, scale, and scope have been indicated as important factors in explaining why a network of separate firms may be superior to an integrated firm. The role of technology, related costs, learning problems, and the reduction of governance costs are stressed.

Organisational theories identify several variables which stimulate the formation of a network: (1) the degree of differentiation between units to be coordinated. Networks seem to be better able to tolerate and profit more from differentiation than hierarchies. (2) The intensity of inter-firm interdependence. (3) The number of units to be coordinated. An increasing number of subunits to be coordinated can pose limits on the size of hierarchies, but through networks firms can expand their activities beyond these limits. (4) The complexity of interdependent activities.

Resource dependency adds the strategic manipulation of transactions to aim at changing the relationship of interdependence to one's own advantage. In the neo-institutional approach dependency does not just refer to the material resources or transactions, but includes the core resource of legitimisation. Being part of a network of multiple firms supports the survival of a single firm.

Three main forms of inter-firm networks are defined (Grandori and Soda, 1995):
* A social network can be defined as a set of nodes (e.g., persons, organisations) linked by a set of social relationships (e.g., friendship, the transfer of funds, overlapping membership) of a specified type (Gulati, 1998).

- Bureaucratic networks are those inter-firm coordination modes formalised in exchange or associational contractual agreements. The formal agreement specifies the organisational relationships between allied partners, not only goods and services exchange terms. The source of enforceability of inter-firm formal organisation is the legal system protecting the parties' reciprocal rights of compliant behaviour. Licensing, franchising, and consortia are typical examples of bureaucratic networks.

- Proprietary networks are based on inter-firm cross-holding of equities and property rights. Organisational economics has maintained that property-based incentives are necessary where uncertainty and opportunism are particular relevant. Joint ventures and capital ventures are typical examples of proprietary networks.

Gulati (1998), states that strategic alliances can be defined and shaped by the social networks within which most firms are embedded. Entering a social network is a new motive in the formation of the alliance. There are two benefits of having a social network: informational advantages and control benefits.

In the operation phase, the position of firms in a social network can enhance trust between firms. Finally, in the evolution phase of the alliance a social network can pursue collective strategies in conjunction with the competitive strategies of their individual members. Alliances embedded in a network seem to perform better or last longer than others.

Hakansson and Sharma (1996) add three aspects within the development of an alliance from a network perspective: unit of analysis, value created by an alliance, and governance form. From a market perspective, the unit of analysis is the dyadic relationship, while from a network perspective the interdependence between the relationships is stressed. The value of an alliance from a network perspective is created by frequent interaction between people on various levels in the alliance partner firms. In this manner a strategic alliance develops into an "independent" organisation. From a market perspective strategic alliances are considered discrete, time-bound, rational structures developed with the purpose of executing a pre-specified task. The governance form from a market perspective emphasises a legal structure to define the contributions and benefits by the alliance partners. From a network perspective the limitations of any legal structure in governing strategic alliances are emphasised. Both perspectives place high value on terms such as reciprocity, fairness, trust, equity between the alliance partners, and commitment made by the partners.

Grandori and Soda (1995) provide a detailed insight into the organisational coordination mechanisms. The following mechanisms are identified: (1) communication, decision and negotiation mechanisms, (2) social coordination and control, (3) integration and linking-pin roles and units, (4) common staff, (5) hierarchy and authority relations, (6) planning and control systems, (7) incentive systems, (8) selection systems, (9) information systems, (10) information systems, and (11) public support and infrastructure. Trust is addressed as a characteristic of an emerging relationship.

Power and centrality play important roles in networks. Brass and Burkhardt (1992) define the power of A over B as the extent to which B is dependent on A. Building on this, they state that power derives from control of relevant resources. Centrality of an actor within a network indicates how "close" an actor is to all other actors in a network. The concept of centrality has been operationalised in a number of ways: first by counting the number of adjacent links to and from an actor, second by summing the lengths of the shortest paths from one actor to all others, and third by calculating the extent to which actors fall between pairs of other actors on the shortest paths connecting them. This third measure represents potential control over others. They argue that centrality is positively and significantly related to power in a network.

Theories of strategic alliances and networks show many similarities. They differ on the unit of analysis, the governance form, and the created value. Additionally, theories on networks emphasise flexibility, the network of an organisation, and its position in this network.

3.3 PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS

Although there is no unified definition of a public private partnership (PPP), all definitions have common features or characteristics (Li and Akintoye, 2003). Peters (1998) identified five characteristics that are involved in most PPPs and that are necessary to their formation and maintenance. First, a PPP involves two or more actors, at least one of which is public and another private. A second defining characteristic of PPPs is that each participant is a principal, which means that each participant is capable of bargaining on its own behalf, rather than having to refer back to other sources of authority. A third characteristic is that PPPs are an enduring relationship among these actors, with some continuing interactions. Fourth, each of the participants brings something to the partnership; for the partnership to be a genuine relationship each will have to transfer some resources to the partnership. Finally, a partnership implies that there is some shared responsibility for outcomes or activities.

In addition to these defining characteristics three features are identified, which distinguish among different types of PPPs (Peters, 1998). First, the actors involved in the PPP. The most basic arrangement is comprised of one public and one private organisation in a simple, mutually supportive relationship. More complex relationships exist when there are multiple actors involved, whether public or private. A second distinguishing feature is the formality of the arrangements involved. While most partnerships have a formal and stable agreement, others have less formal means of achieving the same ends (McQuaid, 2000). Those means may include 'gentlepersons' agreements. Third, there are differences in the purposes of partnerships and in the policies being pursued by the actors.

Public and private actors have different motives for entering a PPP (Rondinelli, 2002; Austin, 2000; Kouwenhoven, 1991). Since public partners often have very limited funds, entering a partnership with private partners can solve these financial limitations. Another motive for a public organisation is to allow it to function more effectively and efficiently through cost savings, economies of scale, and synergies. Although the issue of cost savings arising from PPP is still being debated, many participants agreed that cost reductions are obtainable in addition to gains associated with faster delivery of the project and the transfer of risks to the private sector (Li and Akintoye, 2003). Additional motives for public partners are access to skills, experience, and technology and to facilitate creative and innovative approaches.

The motives for private organisations to enter a PPP are (Kouwenhoven, 1991): new opportunities on a growing market, improvement of relationships with governments, risk reduction in the long term, financial contribution of the public partner, facilitation of restrictions by public law, and the public network.

PPPs come in various sizes and types, making it difficult to group them in a consistent fashion. Depending on the degree of government control and private economic scale, private sector involvement varies from the provision of a service to outright ownership of facilities. Past analyses have recognised five types of private involvement: service contracts, leasing, joint ventures, concessions, and privatisation (see figure 13) (Li and Akintoye, 2003).

Figure 13: PPP models and private sector involvement level (Li and Akintoye, 2003)

A service or alternative contract represents the simplest form of a partnership (Stonehouse and Hudson, 1996). Under this arrangement a government agency contracts with a private firm to provide a specific service for a specified period of time (Rondinelli, 2002). In a lease arrangement the private actor uses public facilities and pays a rental fee to provide service.

Usually the service provider is not responsible for making any new capital investments or for the replacement of the leased assets. In joint venture PPPs the government and private companies assume co-responsibility and co-ownership for the delivery of services. Joint venture PPPs provide a vehicle for 'true' public-private partnerships, in which governments, business, non-government organisations and others can pool their resources and generate a shared 'return' (Li and Akintoye, 2003). The public and private sector partners can either form a new company or assume joint ownership of an existing company which provides a service.

A concession is the most important PPP arrangement for the private sector and contributes to best value service in public services. This arrangement allows a private organisation to construct infrastructure and operate it profitably until a time when it is transferred to state ownership (Rondinelli, 2002). Privatisation involves the sale of a state-owned asset either by auction, public stock offering, private negotiation, or outright grant to a private organisation that assumes operating responsibilities (Li and Akintoye, 2003). This approach involves the complete transfer of equity to the private sector without time limitations.

Contrary to private partnerships where partners are selected according to their market value (e.g., potential or actual competitive advantage, performance), most of the public partners in a public-private partnership are a given part of the equation (Samii, et al., 2002). Kouwenhoven (1991) argues that there should be a network in which the partners can meet each other and identify opportunities for the partnership. In case there is no network, an independent organisation or person should act as facilitator. Several requirements for a good fit between the partners have been identified (Samii, et al., 2002; Kouwenhoven, 1991; Lemstra, 1997):

1. Resource dependency; this is the raison d'être of a partnership according to Samii, et al. (2002). A partnership can provide the resources an actor needs but is unable to generate itself or as Sammii describes it "what can be achieved together cannot be achieved alone".
2. Commitment symmetry; partners' equal commitment, confirmed through adequate allocation of time and resources will guarantee reciprocal appreciation and create opportunities for synergies among the partners.
3. Performance symmetry; this can be achieved if each partner's contribution to the outcome of the initiative is equally valued.
4. Common goal symmetry; to ensure achievement of the partnership objectives, individual goals have to be an output or subset of the overall partnership objective.
5. Cultural appreciation symmetry; it is important for each partner to be able to relate and have equal appreciation for a partnership to work, respect and understanding of the partnership's cultural environment and the partners' cultural differences.

6. The convergence of working cultures; to level out differences in working style and culture it is best to jointly develop a set of working practices and procedures.

Theories on PPPs show many similarities to theories on strategic alliances and networks. In PPPs however, most public partners are a given part of the cooperation rather than selected according to their market value. Additionally, theories on PPPs provide several additional motives for cooperation and forms of arrangements.

3.4 CONCLUSION

This chapter reviewed theories on strategic alliances (section 3.1), networks (section 3.2) and public private partnerships (section 3.3) to determine whether they provide insights regarding the phases, factors and outcomes of civil-military cooperation. The conclusions are threefold. First, the phases in a cooperation process were identified: the formation phase, the operation phase, and the evolution phase. In each of these phases the sequence of activities is identified. In particular, theories on strategic alliances provided detailed insight on these phases.

Second, many factors were identified in theories on cooperative arrangements which influence the process of cooperative arrangements. Most of these factors originate from theories on strategic alliances. Although theories on networks and PPPs showed many similarities with theories on strategic alliances both added new insights to the cooperation process. Networks emphasised the unit of analysis, the governance form, the created value, flexibility, and the network of an organisation, and its position in this network. PPPs provided several additional motives for cooperation and forms of arrangements and regarded most public partners as a given part of the cooperation (rather than that a partner selected according to its market value).

Third, theories on strategic alliances identified two distinctions which are important to determine the outcome of a cooperation process. The first consists of the partnership locus versus the partner locus. The former views performance as the aggregated result for the partner organisations. The latter views it as the result of the separate partners. The second distinction consists of descriptive (objective) versus normative (subjective) criteria.

CHAPTER 4: PROCESS MODEL OF CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION

4.1 THE PROCESS-BASED PARTNERSHIP MODEL

The development of the process model is based on the insights of chapter two (literature review on civil-military cooperation) and chapter three (literature review on cooperative arrangements). The input of the model is the revelation of a complex emergency. A political decision-making process is initiated nationally and internationally in response to this complex emergency. If this results in a mandate which provides a legal basis for deployment and actions, military contingents of different nations are deployed to the host nation of the complex emergency.

Humanitarian organisations attempt to provide assistance (e.g., humanitarian aid, protection of minorities, refugees and displaced persons, medical care and reconstruction) often parallel to the deployment of military forces, based on their own charter and mission. Having arrived in the host nation, all actors as identified in section 1.1.2 operate in the same operational environment. They then have the choice to work separately or to cooperate, which is the starting point of the process model.

In the development of the model, the phases in the development of the partnership are discussed initially. Chapter two did not identify phases in the development of a partnership between military and civilian actors. The phases identified in theories on cooperative arrangements (chapter three) are adopted in the model. These are the formation, operation, and evolution phases.

To make the model operational, the three main phases are divided into six steps. Three steps are identified in the formation phase based on theories on cooperative arrangements. The decision to cooperate or not is made by each of the actors (Yoshino and Rangan, 1995). If an actor concludes that cooperation is promising, the second step consists of the selection of an appropriate partner (Das and Teng, 1997). The third step is to design the partnership (Hoffmann and Schlosser, 2001). This should result in a detailed implementation plan describing inter alia the rights and duties of each partner.

The fourth step, corresponding with the second phase, is the operation of the partnership where the partnership is implemented and the activities carried out.

The third phase of the model is the evolution of the partnership. In theories on cooperative arrangements the evolution phase distinguishes between termination and modification of the partnership (Mulyowahyudi, 2001). Since military forces should not be involved in the crisis for a long term (NATO, 2003), the partnership has to be terminated after completing the implementation plan. If both partners want to continue the relationship, a new implementation plan must be developed. As Whitman (2000) poses the

question, "What happens if the military leaves?" step five of the model consists of the transfer of tasks and responsibilities. The final step of the model is to evaluate the partnership. This results in the final output of the model, the performance of the partnership for each of the participating actors. Figure 14 presents the model, which is labelled the process-based partnership model. In the model inputs and outcomes are indicated with a circle and processes are indicated with a square.

Figure 14: Process-based partnership model

4.2   THE STEPS OF THE PROCESS-BASED PARTNERSHIP MODEL

This section elaborates the steps presented in the model. Each section discusses one step in detail and includes factors, which influence the performance of the partnership. A distinction is made between internal factors posed by the partnership and external factors posed by the context.

4.2.1   Step one: The decision to cooperate

With deployment or involvement in the complex emergency, the first step in the process-based partnership model is for each actor to consider whether or not to cooperate. Based on its mission, mandate, and domain, each actor can execute an internal as well as an external analysis to make this decision (Huyzer, 1990).

The purpose of an internal analysis is to get a clear understanding of the own organisation. Each actor determines it strengths and weaknesses for competitive advantage and organisational vulnerabilities to be corrected (Pearce and Robinson, 2003).

A profound view of the external environment is the purpose of an external analysis. It is important to first get a broad view of the complex emergency. Next, the more direct environment of the actor should be examined, including a needs analysis and an actor analysis. This results in the identification of opportunities and threats of the external environment. Due to the changing nature of a complex emergency, it is important to regularly update the external analysis in each subsequent step of the process.

Based on the internal strengths and weaknesses and the external opportunities and threats, each actor can determine whether or not it should initiate cooperation. Several possible motives for civil-military cooperation have been identified in the previous chapters such as force protection, economies of scale and/or scope, and resource dependency and (Contractor and Lorange, 1988; Gordon, 2001; Porter and Fuller, 1986; Faulkner, 1995).

In the final decision-making process Porter and Fuller (1986) argue that partnerships must always be compared to other forms of transaction (e.g., internal development, merger) to determine if they are the preferred option. If an actor decides to initiate cooperation a strategic plan can be developed where all targets and objectives of the future partnership should be outlined.

The first step is presented in figure 15, including internal and external factors which influence the performance in this step. Inputs and outcomes are indicated with a circle and processes are indicated with a square.

Figure 15: Step one: The decision to cooperate

4.2.2 Step two: Partner selection

Having decided to initiate cooperation, an actor has to select one or more appropriate partners. To select a partner, each actor should make up a list of selection criteria related to both the prospective tasks of the partnership and to the prospective partner (Geringer, 1991).

Six task-related criteria are identified in chapter two and chapter three (e.g., Das and Teng, 1997; Geringer, 1991; Porter and Fuller, 1986): (1) complementary resources, (2) compatible strategies and objectives, (3) added value for the partners, (4) acceptance by the environment, (5) complementary or balanced contribution from the partner, and (6) degree of mutual dependency.

Apart from the actual presence of a potential partner in the operational area, the following partner-related criteria are identified (e.g., Faulkner, 1995; Geringer, 1991; Klein Woolthuis, 1999): (1) personal fit, (2) compatible cultures, (3) prior experiences with and reputation of partner, (4) level of commitment, (5) risk of partner becoming a competitor, (6) compatible organisations, (7) network of partners, (8) flexibility, (9) humanitarian principles, and (10) use of force.

If the prospective partner meets the criteria, both partners can start negotiating the design of the partnership (see step 3). The second step in the development of the partnership is presented in figure 16.

Step two	Internal factors	External factors
Strategic plan Partner selection Shortlist of prospective partners	- Mandate - Task related partner selection criteria - Partner related partner selection criteria	- Proliferation of civilian actors - Unity of approach - Operational environment - External forces

Figure 16: Step two: Partner selection

4.2.3   Step three: Partnership design

The design of the partnership is the last step in the formation phase of the model. Having decided to cooperate, the prospective partners have to negotiate the design of the partnership (Child and Faulkner, 1998) which mainly consists of an agreement, which binds the partners.

In the process of negotiating, flexibility (Das and Teng, 1997) and trust (Larson, 1992) influence the performance of the partnership. In the partnership agreement itself (in military jargon often called Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)) the following aspects should be emphasised (e.g., Das and Teng, 1997; Hoffmann and Schlosser, 2001; Demurenko and Nikitin, 1997): (1) precise definition of rights and duties, (2) agreement on clear and realistic objectives, (3) implementation plan with fixed milestones, (4) keeping and protecting core competencies, (5) preparation of the termination, (6) legality of the partnership, (7) joint value creation, (8) partnership structure, and (9) Rules of Engagement. The third step in the development of the partnership is presented in figure 17.

Step three	Internal factors	External factors
Shortlist of prospective partners Partnership design Partnership agreement (MoU)	- Mandate - Use of force - Preparation of termination - Definition of rights and duties - Keeping and protecting core competencies - Emphasize joint value creation - Implementation plan - Strategic fit - Flexibility - Trust - Legality of partnership - Partnership structure - Rules of Engagement	- Proliferation of civilian actors - Unity of approach - Operational environment - External forces

Figure 17: Step three: Partnership design

4.2.4   Step four: Partnership implementation

In the partnership implementation the partnership is actually showed and many problems emerge. Das and Teng (1997) state that one partner should not pursue predominant managerial control during implementation, because this could discourage the other partner. They stress that more attention should be given to staffing, human resource issues and the blending of different cultures. A partnership needs a certain level of autonomy from its parent organisations in order to make decisions about operational problems (Mulyowahyudi, 2001). It involves maintaining good relations with several principals, and fostering their cooperation (Child and Faulkner, 1998). It also has to take into account a wide range of external groups, some, like a host government, who may be partial to the interests of one partner rather than another.

In addition to evaluating the performance of the partnership (step 6), the status of the partnership has to be evaluated and up-dated during the partnership implementation. This should focus on the delivery process throughout a period of time, assessing the quantity and quality of the partnership outputs and activities. It is often referred to as monitoring. Monitoring should be done to keep implementation on schedule, provide budget control, measure physical achievements, and reduce impediments and problems (Deboeck and Ng. 1980).

Factors influencing the performance of the partnership implementation are presented in figure 18.

Step four	Internal factors		External factors
Partnership agreement (MoU) → Partnership implementation → Partnership outcomes	- Mandate - Use of force - Strategic fit - Trust - Humanitarian principles - Flexibility - Dependence - Planning - Coordination - Competition vs. cooperation - Human resource management - Relation principal and other actors - Dispute resolution mechanisms	- Reciprocity - Organisation culture - Local culture - Organisation structure - Monitoring - Resources - Technology - Information dissemination - Control - Operational arrangements - Commitment - Communication - Opportunism - Continuity	- Proliferation of civilian actors - Unity of approach - Operational environment - External forces

Figure 18: Step four: Partnership implementation

4.2.5   Step five: Transfer of tasks and responsibilities

Mulyowahyudi (2001) categorises the termination of a partnership into two types: planned and unplanned. Several reasons that potentially cause unplanned termination are identified: (1) the conditions that made the partnership viable in the beginning have changed, (2) the partnership is no longer beneficial to all parties, (3) conflicting goals, (4) cultural incompatibility, and (5) lack of synergy. Rollins (2001) adds to this the different principal task military units have compared to civilian actors. If the situation changes so that they need to concentrate on this, there is a risk that civil projects can be abruptly terminated.

Planned termination usually occurs after a partnership has achieved the determined goals outlined in the strategic plans (outcome step one) and the partnership agreement (outcome step three).

Whether planned or unplanned, to prevent the military from a long-term involvement in the crisis (e.g., long-term dependence on military resources by the local population, government, or humanitarian organisations), tasks and responsibilities have to be transferred (NATO, 2003) in the fifth step of the partnership process.

Factors which influence the performance of the partnership in the fifth step are presented in figure 19.

Step five	Internal factors	External factors
Partnership outcomes Transfer of tasks & responsibilities End of partnership	- Mandate - Use of force - Strategic fit - Temporal orientation - Termination only on approval by all partners - Partnership network management - Prepared termination - Trust - Flexibility - Organisational learning - Partner bonding mechanisms - Balanced development	- Proliferation of civilian actors - Unity of approach - Operational environment - External forces

Figure 19: Step five: Transfer of tasks and responsibilities

4.2.6 Step six: Partnership evaluation

Having transferred tasks and responsibilities, it is very important to evaluate the partnership (Das and Teng, 1997). The main reasons are to determine the performance of the partnership and to facilitate the justification of finances to donor organisations, the communication between organisations, the process of lessons learned, and the accountability of the activities (Pijnappel, 2004; Rubin, 1995). The evaluation of the partnership is the last step of the cooperation process.

No evaluation criteria or guidelines were identified from literature study on civil-military cooperation (see chapter two). Theories on cooperative arrangements did identify evaluation criteria, but researchers hardly agreed (see section 3.1.2). Underlying this lack of agreement, Das and Teng (2003) identified two distinct loci of partnership performance: the partnership itself and the partners forming the partnership. The partnership locus is related to the output of the partnership as a whole. The partner locus stresses the fact that the performance of a partnership cannot be evaluated independent of the interests of the constituent partners (see also chapter three).

A second distinction is made in evaluation between normative and descriptive evaluation criteria (Faulkner, 1995). Normative evaluation criteria, so-called 'feel good' criteria, are related to the perceived performance of the partnership by each partner. Descriptive evaluation criteria can objectively measure the performance of the partnership and often deal with the extent to which objectives have been achieved.

The last step in the process of a civil-military partnership is presented in figure 20.

Step six	Internal factors	External factors
End of partnership → Partnership evaluation → Partnership performance	- Partnership related evaluation criteria - Partner related evaluation criteria - Descriptive evaluation criteria - Normative evaluation criteria	- Proliferation of civilian actors - Unity of approach - Operational environment - External forces

Figure 20: Step six: Partnership evaluation

4.2.7 Partnership performance

In civil-military partnerships both military and civilian actors do frequently lack clear objectives (Damen and Olislagers, 2004). In some operations the military objective is to support the civil environment, with the broad implication to approve all assisting activities. In these operations it becomes difficult to decide when the activities should come to an end (Winslow, 2002). Commonly used concepts to objectively measure performance like effectiveness[13] and efficiency[14] do not result in an adequate assessment of the performance since they are directly linked to these objectives.

To be able to assess the performance of the assistance activities, performance criteria are defined in this research (see figure 21). These are identified from a wide range of interviews with military, personnel of humanitarian organisations, representatives of the local population, and supported by literature where possible.

The distinctions between partnership versus partner locus and descriptive versus normative criteria are used to identify the performance criteria. The partner locus identifies the performance for three actor groups: military actor, civilian actor of the assistance community (i.e. humanitarian organisation and donor organisation) and the host nation. For each of these groups it includes the perceived performance of the partnership (normative) and defines several descriptive criteria to objectively measure the performance.

For a military actor two clusters of descriptive criteria are derived from the NATO cimic doctrine (NATO, 2003): support to the force and support to the civil environment[15]. With respect to "support to the force" three subordinate targets have been identified:

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[13] Effectiveness is the extent to which the partnership outcomes contributed to the achievement of the objectives of each partner.

[14] Efficiency is the extent to which the same contribution to the objectives would have been possible with less resources.

[15] A third objective (liaison) is identified in NATO cimic doctrine. However, this objective is regarded as a means (rather than and end) to achieve the objectives "support to the force" and "support to the civil environment".

1. Force protection; the extent to which a partnership contributes to force protection is determined through four criteria. A contribution is made if belligerent groups or key leaders are direct beneficiaries of the assistance activities. Second, the total number of direct and indirect beneficiaries determines the extent of force protection. Facilities like schools or hospitals serve relatively large numbers of people directly (people who are educated in schools or treated in the hospitals) and indirectly (families and friends of the direct beneficiaries), compared to the construction of a single private house. Related to their number is the location of beneficiaries. To increase force protection it is more beneficial to provide assistance to people at strategic locations (close to the military compound, close to important roads) than to focus on people in remote areas. The third criterion is the visibility of the assistance activities. If it is clear that the military actor is involved in the assistance activities, the extent of force protection increases as the local beneficiaries directly associate the military with these activities. To determine the contribution of assistance activities to force protection, the length of the military operation functions as a multiplier. The longer the operation, the less impact the assistance activities will have on the perception of the local population. If the military operation started less than one year ago, the impact of assistance activities is highest. In operations which started one to three years ago, assistance activities have a moderate impact on the force protection and in operations started longer than three years ago, activities only have a limited impact.

2. A safe and secure environment; some assistance activities directly contribute to a safe and secure environment. These include the construction of fire stations and police stations, the disarmament of former combatants, and the de-mining of areas.

3. Situational awareness; situational awareness can be increased through assistance activities. Partnerships, which include coordination and information sharing, are able to provide situational awareness to a larger extent. Partnering an organisation with a large network can also increase situational awareness.

Regarding the military objective "support to the civil environment" three subordinate targets have also been identified. The first target is the extent to which the needs of the civil environment have been addressed. This includes shortcomings in the coping capacities of both the civilian actors of the assistance community and the host nation.

The second target is the sustainability of the assistance activities. This is important as it deals with the extent to which the outcome of a partnership after implementation of the activities remains useful in the long-term. If facilities have been constructed and fail to function within a short period of time, initial objectives are not met and resources are wasted.

Third, as a military actor intends to withdraw as soon as possible, increasing local capacity is very important. Hiring local constructors or employing local people when possible is far more beneficial than a military actor itself carrying out activities as this decreases the

involvement of and dependency on a military actor. Following best practices in development studies Mockaitis (2004) stresses in his research on civil-military cooperation in Kosovo that "It is better to teach people to fish and feed them for a lifetime than to give them a fish and feed them for a day". To provide local people with self-supporting skills is therefore of great benefit to the development process.

The descriptive performance criteria for the civilian actors of the assistance community are fourfold and partly overlap the military criteria with regard to "support to the civil environment". First the extent to which the needs of the humanitarian organisation have been fulfilled; through civil-military partnerships the scale (number of activities on one particular functional area) and/or scope (functional areas on which cooperation takes place) of a humanitarian organisation can be increased. Examples are the use of military transport or engineering capacity or security provided by a military actor.

Visibility of the assistance activities is for many humanitarian organisations a great source of income and considered very important. Visibility increases media attention, which often increases funding for an organisation. In contrast with that, visibility of cooperation or association with military organisations can compromise the humanitarian imperative of humanitarian organisations.

Apart from being important to the military, sustainability of the assistance activities and increase of local capacity have also been identified as descriptive performance criteria for the civilian actors of the assistance community.

For the host nation three performance criteria have been identified: needs of the host nation, sustainability of the assistance activities, and local capacity. These performance criteria contribute to the performance of all three actors.

The performance of the civil-military partnership is also evaluated from a partnership locus. Alike individual objectives of military and civilian actors, common objectives often lack clarity and are therefore inadequate as a basis for assessing the performance. A determination of the relative costs of the assistance activities measures the performance of the partnership as a whole. The criteria to measure the performance of a civil-military partnership are presented in figure 21.

Performance

- **Performance military actor**
  - **Descriptive criteria**
    - Support to the force
      - Force protection
        - Belligerent groups or key leaders are direct beneficiaries of assistance activities.
        - Total number and location of direct and indirect beneficiaries of assistance activities.
        - Visibility of the assistance activities.
        - Length of the military operation.
      - Safe and secure environment — The outcome directly contributes to a safe and secure environment.
      - Situational awareness — Situational awareness is increased.
  - **Normative criteria**
    - Support to the civil environment
      - Needs — Needs of the civil environment have been addressed.
      - Sustainability — The outcome of the assistance activities is sustainable.
      - Local capacity — Local capacity is increased through assistance activities.
    - The performance of the assistance activities is perceived as a success by military actor.

- **Performance civilian actor of assistance community**
  - **Descriptive criteria**
    - Needs — Needs of the civilian actor have been addressed.
    - Sustainability — The outcome of the assistance activities is sustainable.
    - Local capacity — Local capacity is increased through assistance activities.
    - Visibility — Visibility of the assistance activities.
  - **Normative criteria**
    - The performance of the assistance activities is perceived as a success by civilian actor of assistance community.

- **Performance hostion nation**
  - **Descriptive criteria**
    - Needs — Needs of the host nation have been addressed.
    - Sustainability — The outcome of the assistance activities is sustainable.
    - Local capacity — Local capacity is increased through assistance activities.
  - **Normative criteria**
    - The performance of the assistance activities is perceived as a success by host nation.

- **Costs** — The relative costs of assistance activities.

Figure 21: Performance criteria civil-military partnerships

4.3   CASE STUDY PROTOCOL

4.3.1   Case selection

Swanborn (1996) identifies the following methods to select cases:

- No selection (determined by the principal);
- Random;
- Based on practical reasons (distance, time and money);
- With respect to the content;
    1. Homogeneously on the independent variable(s);
    2. Heterogeneously on the independent variable(s);
    3. On the dependent variables;
    4. Phases in the development process.

Swanborn (1996) argues that selection on homogeneous independent variables is the best approach. Selecting on dependent variables and phases in the development process has severe limitations and selecting heterogeneous independent variables is preferred after several cases have already led to a common model.

The case selection in the present study is based on five independent variables expressed below in the formulation of the unit of analysis:

The process of a **partnership** *between a* **Dutch military actor** *and at least one* **civilian actor** *within the framework of a* **peace support operation** *in response to a* **complex emergency**.

All five independent variables are homogeneous, since they impel the case study to comply with these variables, and are thus used as criteria to select the cases. However, since the independent variables are not similar in each case study (i.e., no two complex emergencies are equal), they should also be considered heterogeneous, implying a certain variance in the outcome. To clarify and to define the independent variables, each is discussed. Two selection criteria of a more general nature (period and access to information) are discussed.

Partnership

In this research a partnership is defined as any kind of relationship in which two or more actors combine their resources to increase the development of an area. This research particularly focuses on the process of the partnership, as outlined in the process-based partnership model (see section 4.1 and 4.2).

Dutch military actor

A military force deployed in the host nation of a complex emergency is often multinational. This is emphasised in the Combined Joint Task Force concept currently applied in many operations. To facilitate access to the sources needed for the case studies and to make a

more valid cross-case analysis, this research primarily focuses on Dutch military entities. To broadly confirm the findings of the case studies some partnerships involving foreign military units are also analysed.

Civilian actor

In this research a civilian actor is any actor as defined in section 1.1.2 (humanitarian organisations, host nation actors, donor organisations and the media).

Peace support operation

Debate is still ongoing in the international academic community on the terminology of peace support operations (Osman, 2002). Terms such as peacekeeping, peacemaking, humanitarian intervention, and peace enforcement are often confused. In selecting the case studies, the type of peace support operation is not taken into account. In carrying out a case study, the nature and characteristics of the peace support operation are explicitly dealt with in order to investigate whether and how these influence the cooperation between military and civilian actors.

Complex emergency

According to Douma, et al. (1999), existing typology of conflicts is an issue of debate due to their causes, dynamics, and complexity. Static labelling of conflicts could result in inadequate measures in the field of management or resolution. In their definition of a complex emergency, Damen and Olislagers (2004) integrate all aspects from the most common definitions in literature (Last, 1997; Nastios, 1996; Allen, 1999). This "broad" definition is used in this research:

A complex emergency is a conflict within and across state boundaries, typically characterised by all or some of the following:

a) The conflict is due to political, ideological, ethnical reasons, or unequal distribution of resources;

b) Massive population movements take place, with people escaping violence or searching for food;

c) A dramatically increased risk of interpersonal violence (e.g. rape, murder) and of insecurity;

d) A public health emergency, which may cause epidemics of communicable diseases;

e) Deteriorated or completely collapsed political authority and public services;

f) Macro economic collapse with massive unemployment, destruction of the currency and negative GNP growth.

No specific emphasis is put on one single characteristic in selecting the cases. However, this definition excludes natural disasters (e.g., floods, earthquakes). The nature and characteristics of the complex emergency are explicitly dealt with in carrying out a case study to investigate whether and how these influence the cooperation between military and civilian actors.

Additional selection criteria

Besides the selection criteria which relate to the content, this research uses two additional criteria to select appropriate case studies. The first is the period of the case study. As this research aims at "state of the art", recent experiences and developments within civil-military cooperation are included. Recent case studies provide military and civilian actors the opportunity to have integrated "best practices" of their former operations. Ceteris paribus, the more recent a case study is the more appropriate it is for this research.

The second criterion is access to information. Access differs between the cases due to the classification of documents, the extent of collaboration of involved personnel and organisations, the extent to which fieldwork is feasible, and the availability of documented information sources. Easier access to information sources means a more suitable case study.

Selected cases

Since the Second World War Dutch troops have participated in over 30 peace support operations, from Iraq (both in the first, second, and third Gulf Wars) to Korea (Klep and Gils, 2000). Three cases were selected for this research based on the selection criteria.

The first case is the Dutch Provincial Reconstruction Team in Baghlan province in Afghanistan. This is selected as it is very recent (2004-2005) and provided an operational opportunity to do field-research. The second case selected is the third and fourth rotation of ISAF in Kabul, Afghanistan. Also recent (2003-2004), this case provided sufficient access to information through redeployed military personnel in Münster (Germany) and Budel (the Netherlands). In Kabul cooperation between ISAF and international civilian actors took place on a large scale. This made it fairly easy to contact the civilian actors through telephone, email, or meetings. The third case is the Dutch Engineering Battalion in Kosovo. Although this happened in 1999 and 2000, it provides sufficient access to information through redeployed military personnel in the Netherlands. Similar to the Kabul case, cooperation with international civilian actors took place on a large scale and made it possible to contact these actors and gather sufficient information.

The cases of Stabilisation Force in Iraq (SFIR) from 2003 until 2005 and the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) in 2000 were also considered for this research. However, in both cases it was impossible to carry out fieldwork due to safety reasons (SFIR) or the withdrawal of the Dutch troops (UNMEE). Contrary to the cases in Kabul and Kosovo, the Dutch military of SFIR and UNMEE mostly cooperated with local actors. This made it very difficult to obtain sufficient information from these actors. These reasons made the cases of SFIR and UNMEE inappropriate for this research.

Table 5 presents an overview of the results of the criteria for each of the selected cases.

Nr	Location of complex emergency	Peace support operation	Military actor	Civilian actors	Period	Activities
1	Baghlan – Afghanistan	International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)	Dutch Provincial Reconstruction Team	Halo Trust, local construction companies	August 2004 – July 2005	Various (mine removal, police training, engineering)
2	Kabul - Afghanistan	International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)	ISAF III (led by Germany and the Netherlands) and ISAF IV (led by NATO)	JICA, UNICEF, Die Johanniter and UNAMA	February 2003 – January 2004	Various (engineering, medical, logistics, transportation)
3	Kosovo	Kosovo Force (KFOR)	Dutch Engineering Relief Battalion	USAID, UNICTY, Dorcas, Caritas	June 1999 – June 2000	Engineering and transportation

Table 5: Overview of selected case studies

4.3.2 Data collection protocol

A data collection protocol was designed to guide the researcher in carrying out the case studies, organise the data collection, and ensure that the case studies and their results were verifiable. The protocol consists of (Stake, 1995; Yin, 1994):

1. An overview of the case study project should include project objectives and auspices, case study issues, and relevant readings about the topic being investigated. The overview of the case study is listed in Annex A1.1.

2. Field procedures should include access to the case study "sites", general sources of information, and procedural reminders. The field procedures are listed in Annex A1.2.

3. Case study questions; specific questions that the case study investigator must keep in mind when collecting data. To verify the process-based partnership model in practice a structured interview list with a "fairly open" style is developed. The "open" style means that for most questions no suggestions for answers are given. Respondents are forced to consider their answer, rather than just marking one of the pre-formulated answers. The case study questions are listed in Annex A1.3 and include table shells to present the results.

4. A guide for the case study report should include an outline, a format for the narrative, and a specification of any bibliographical information and other documentation. In Annex A1.4 an outline for the case study report is presented.

CHAPTER 5: THE KABUL CASE

5.1 BACKGROUND OF THE CASE

Afghanistan's recent history is a story of war and civil unrest. The Soviet Union invaded in 1979, but was forced to withdraw 10 years later by anti-Communist *mujahideen* forces supplied and trained by the US, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and others (Travelblog, 2005). The Communist regime in Kabul fought on until it collapsed in 1992. Fighting subsequently erupted among the various *mujahideen* factions, giving rise to a state of warlordism that eventually spawned the Taliban (plural of Talib, meaning religious student).

After changeable military successes and failed negotiations, the Taliban led by mullah Omar, started to control large parts of Afghanistan. In September 1996 the capital of Kabul fell into the Taliban hands and the then president Rabbani and his commander-in-chief Massoud fled the city and withdrew to the northern regions. The ethnic Uzbek warlord Dostum, who resided in north-western Afghanistan, also fled abroad.

The Taliban enforced Sharia, an extremist line of Islamic legislation on the population, including the total segregation of women in Afghan society. They were hospitable to and provided trainings facilities for the terrorist network Al Qaeda. This network was the prime suspect of bomb attacks at the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1267 (October 15, 1999) and 1333 (December 19, 2000) included sanctions on the Taliban but had no real effect on the situation.

Opponents of the Taliban united in the Northern Alliance, a coalition of factions who had previously fought each other. The political leader of the Alliance was Rabbani, the dispelled president. The military leader was general Massoud, who would die in September 2001 after an attack. Russia, Iran, the Central Asian republics, and India were the primary supporters of the Northern Alliance, while Pakistan recognised and supported the Taliban regime.

After the attacks on September 11, 2001 in New York and Washington, the USA began Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). This was after the Taliban did not comply with demands stated in UNSCRs 1368 (September 12, 2001) and 1373 (September 28, 2001). This military operation aimed at military installations of the Taliban and trainings facilities of Al Qaeda. The Northern Alliance used the constant air strikes and achieved large military successes sooner than expected. Already suffering from droughts and destitution, many Afghans fled to the borders. The UN estimated 7.5 million Afghans or one-third of the population, required immediate aid. The heads of all major UN human rights and relief agencies warned of an impending humanitarian crisis of stunning proportions (United Nations, 2001).

Immediately after the start of military operations, the attention of the international community was focused on the future of Afghanistan. The main concern was that a political and security vacuum had to be avoided and that the reconstruction of the country should start as soon as possible. In UNSCR 1378 (November 14, 2001) wide international agreement was expressed on the objective of a representative and stable government and political structure in Afghanistan. Afghan ownership was of crucial importance. To achieve this objective, during the end of November and beginning of December 2001, a large conference in Bonn, Germany was initiated by the UN and was attended by the Northern Alliance, the group of Rome (allied to former king Zahir Shah), the group of Cyprus (Shia and Iran) and the group of Peshawar (Pathan and Pakistan). The main elements of the Bonn agreement were (Dutch Ministry of Defence, 2002):

- The appointment of an interim government;
- Hamid Karzai, Pathan, and no member of the Northern Alliance, would be the prime minister;
- The deployment of a peace support mission, later named International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

ISAF was an UN-mandated operation under UNSCRs 1386 and later 1413 and 1444. The mission of ISAF was to assist the Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA) in maintaining security within the area of greater Kabul so that the ATA as well as the personnel of the UN could operate in a secure environment. This would then enable the ATA to build up security structures in Afghanistan in accordance with the Bonn Agreement and as agreed in the Military Technical Agreement (NATO, 2005).

In addition to ISAF many international and national organisations started or continued to operate in the area of Kabul. These organisations included various UN-agencies, IOs, NGOs and donor organisations among others. In coordination with ATA, the United Nation's Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) was responsible for managing all UN activities.

5.2 THE CASE STUDY DESIGN

During the first year of the deployment of ISAF troops the United Kingdom (ISAF I) and Turkey (ISAF II) were assigned as lead nations. This case study focuses on the two subsequent rotations of ISAF, led by the German-Netherlands Corps (ISAF III: February 2003 – August 2003) and NATO (ISAF IV: August 2003 – January 2004).

To test and validate the process-based partnership model seven partnerships were selected:
1. Information sharing and coordination of activities with the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR);

2. Various activities (coordination of activities, driver training, protection) with UNAMA;
3. Various medical activities (joint checking of patients, delivery of medical supplies) with the German NGO Die Johanniter;
4. Various activities (back to school programmes, de-mining of warehouse location) with United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF);
5. The reconstruction of a local school in Zemma with the Ministry of Education (MoE) and a local contractor;
6. Information sharing and coordination of activities with the Afghan NGOs Coordination Bureau (ANCB);
7. Refurbishment of a fire substation in Pol-e-Charki with the Ministry of Interior (MoI) and a local contractor.

These seven partnerships were investigated in detail and recorded in case reports. An example, which deals with the partnership between ISAF and UNICEF, is presented in Annex 2.

Additionally, eight other partnerships were examined though these were studied in less detail due to a lack of data. These are partnerships between ISAF and:

1. International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) (distribution of donations and training);
2. Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) (water distribution);
3. United Nations High Commissioner for the Refugees (UNHCR) (information sharing and coordination of activities);
4. United Nations Habitat (UN-Habitat) (information sharing);
5. World in Need (distribution of donations);
6. Arbeitsgruppe Entwicklung und Fachkräfte im Bereich der Migration und der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit (AGEF) (education of former *mujahideen* combatants);
7. Local constructors (construction of irrigation channels, kindergartens, schools, fire stations, water pumps and medical facilities);
8. Afghan ministries (reconstruction of the Darulama clinic and reconstruction of Kushal Mena Kindergarten).

The selection of partnerships has been verified by means of interviews to ensure that it represents a valid overview of civil-military partnerships in which ISAF was involved during its third and fourth rotation.

To increase the validity of the case study both methodological and data source triangulation were employed. A general literature study was executed and to obtain detailed information on the partnerships, semi-structured interviews were held with 14 key persons of ISAF and the humanitarian organisations. Key persons of ISAF were based in the Cimic

Coordination Centre (CCC) and the J9 branch of ISAF headquarters (HQ)[16]. These included liaison officers, personnel of the planning and operations branch, and personnel of the project team.

Based on the interviews with military key persons, civilian partners were identified and their key persons interviewed. In four of the seven analysed partnerships, at least one key person of the civilian actor has been contacted and interviewed. Key persons of ACBAR, the Afghan MoE and MoI and the local contractors were, however, for this research inaccessible, due to accountability and communication problems. Various documents with detailed information on the partnerships were studied. These documents included, among others, daily and weekly cimic reports, project information, meeting notes, internal memoranda, and liaison reports. The researcher also attended a two-day ISAF cimic conference on the German-Netherlands Corps in Münster, Germany.

5.3 THE DECISION TO COOPERATE

5.3.1 Internal and external analysis of ISAF

To analyse the external environment and increase the situational awareness, ISAF had several tactical support teams (TSTs) at its disposal (14 during ISAF III and 19 during ISAF IV). Each team consisted of 4-6 men or women; to divide the AoR of ISAF each TST was assigned to a police district. The TST's main task was to obtain information about the ethnic distribution, the build up of the area, education, health, shelter, water, electricity, the food situation and refugees and IDPs (Weijers, 2003a). The information was transferred to the staff of the CCC and was often so detailed that it included weather conditions of particular visits. Next, information on the local situation was gathered through the Afghanistan Information Management Service (AIMS) and several IOs and NGOs.

To structure the information, the TSTs and staff of CCC constantly made assessments of the local situation using the ARRC[17] Cimic Tracking and Reporting System (ARRC, 2003). This system made use of a traffic light (green, yellow, red) to indicate the status of a functional area in a police district. Two main problems occurred in the use of this system. The functional areas on which assessments were made were not at all consistent. In the overall assessment of the CCC during ISAF IV six functional areas were used (CCC, 2004): water, power, health, housing and shelter, education, and food and nutrition. In a presentation of the CCC of ISAF IV five different functional areas were used (Kok, 2003): civil administration, humanitarian affairs, civil infrastructure, economy and commerce, and cultural affairs. During ISAF III and IV, the CCC and many of the TSTs presented their

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[16] J9 is the cimic branch at HQ level of ISAF
[17] Allied Rapid Reaction Corps

assessments in the following functional areas (Weijers, 2003b): food, health, power, shelter and water.

Second, it was often unclear which measures to use to indicate the colour of the traffic light. No objective measures were used, which resulted in subjective and arbitrary judgment of the assessments.

During ISAF IV the CCC made several attempts to develop measures to objectively determine the colour. One was to introduce the Millennium Guidelines of the UN as minimum standards. However, it was argued that using minimum guidelines is not always useful for a military force. If a belligerent person or group has to be favoured to influence his or their attitude towards the military force, minimum standards are probably not sufficient. The final measures used to determine the colour of a functional area in a police district are presented in table 6.

Colour	Final measure
Red	The situation has a negative influence on ISAF assets. Public structure is at break down. Afghan authorities and IO/NGOs are unable to respond. ISAF assets are committed.
Yellow	The situation has no negative effects on ISAF assets. Public structure is partly intact. Afghan authorities are operating and require support by IO/NGOs. ISAF assets may be subject to requests by IO/NGOs for assistance.
Green	The situation has no negative effects on ISAF assets. Public structure is intact. Afghan authorities are operating effectively. ISAF assets are not committed.

Table 6: Final measures of traffic light system (Kok, 2003)

Another useful tool, which was only once used by the CCC to present the local needs, is the Logical Framework Analysis (LFA) (Kok, 2004). Through this method it is possible to structure a group of related problems bottom-up and to discover the cause-effect relations of these problems. As this method is frequently used by humanitarian organisations it could improve communication and coordination on the problems.

For an overview of the civilian actors operating in the AoR, ISAF had several means at its disposal. At the tactical level, TST personnel met frequently with representatives of IOs and NGOs during their activities in the police districts. During weekly cimic coordination meetings of the CCC, each TST presented its activities to the other teams. These meetings were open to the public and were occasionally visited by IOs and NGOs. Next, two to three liaison officers were added to the staff of the CCC to remain in contact with the representatives of the civilian organisations.

At the operational level, ISAF HQ had separate liaison capability within the staff of approximately 25 persons. Most of these officers were responsible for military liaison between ISAF and OEF. The J9 branch of ISAF HQ did not have liaison capability and used both the capability of the CCC and that of the HQ. This resulted in many

misunderstandings and duplication of efforts. To prevent this, the liaison of the CCC participated in the morning briefing of the liaison cell of HQ ISAF. This was also used to coordinate and synchronise the various liaison activities (ISAF, 2004a).

However, it was only in August 2003 that the first cimic liaison plan was written. The objective was to assess the civilian actors in the AoR of ISAF in a structured way. Although contact was frequently made with civilian actors during ISAF I, II, and III, it was often ad-hoc and no permanent liaison relationships were put into place. This resulted in a constant lack of situational awareness regarding which civilian actors were operating in what areas. This is illustrated by the fact that the cimic liaison officers of ISAF IV were given only three contacts by their predecessors of ISAF III (JICA, UNAMA and UNICEF) out of approximately 40-50.

The lack of coordination resulted in considerable duplication of effort by the assistance community and ISAF. For instance, even though Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) had mapped the entire water situation in Kabul recently, the TSTs executed their own detailed water assessment. The ANCB, a coordinating body for Afghan NGOs, was only contacted after approximately 1.5 years of operation. This coordinating body could have been of great value in earlier stages, in particular to increase the coping capacity of the Afghan society.

It was frequently stressed that participating in existing coordination structures such as ACBAR and ANCB, was much more efficient than setting up new ones. This is because many IOs and NGOs lacked the time and personnel to send to all the meetings held and because many of them feared to be associated with the military (CGN, 2004a).

At the end of the period of ISAF IV, cimic liaison activities decreased due to the Christmas period and re-deployment activities. In the first two months of ISAF V, there was almost no cimic liaison due to increased safety regulations, which kept the cimic liaison officers inside their compound.

In addition to the TSTs and the liaison capacity ISAF also had a German cimic platoon and several minor cimic assets of the troop contributing nations (TCNs) at its disposal to fulfil the cimic mission. Within means and capabilities, units of Kabul Multinational Brigade (KMNB) could also be employed in this framework. To coordinate all the cimic resources and activities the CCC had approximately 20 persons at its disposal, including liaison officers, a security officer, information managers, and a project-team. This project-team consisted of a legal advisor and one to three engineers or architects; its main task was to initiate and monitor projects.

The main problem of the CCC was its inability to direct and command the cimic assets of ISAF, including most of the TSTs. Of the 19 TSTs operating during ISAF IV, eight were directed by the CCC, seven were commanded by KMNB, and four were under national command (Italian, Turkish, Spanish, and UK). This division of command made it very

difficult for the CCC to coordinate all the cimic assets. It also led to a situation in which many of the TSTs had their own approach towards cimic.

The Security Sector Reform Program (SSR) encouraged the individual approaches of the TSTs. This national program was made up of five pillars: counter narcotics, judicial reform, disarmament demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), training of the Afghan national army, and training of police forces. One or two nations were responsible for each of these pillars, while ISAF supported the program wherever possible (Kok, 2004). Germany was responsible for training the police forces and directed its cimic assets (one TST and a cimic platoon) to focus on police-related activities such as construction of police stations, while other nations did the same regarding the responsibilities belonging to their pillars.

Financial aspects intensified the lack of a common approach. Most TCNs did provide their national TSTs with a budget. TSTs with large budgets were able to carry out many assistance activities compared to those which only had a small budget. As most of the TSTs were assigned to a police district, this created great inequality between the areas in Kabul, which eventually influenced the local attitude towards ISAF in a negative way.

Many TCNs earmarked their money to specific objectives. For example, the Finnish contingent was only allowed to carry out activities that benefited women and children. Finland, although a non-NATO country, administered the general funds which the European Union had earmarked for assistance activities of ISAF. As this money was not divided through the chain of command of ISAF, this created big disputes. These financial aspects made internal coordination both more necessary and more difficult.

A lack of training of cimic personnel at both HQ-level and TST-level was frequently indicated as another internal weakness of ISAF (CGN, 2004a). Only a limited number of people had participated in a NATO-training course. This again contributed to the various approaches towards cimic within ISAF.

During ISAF IV the division of tasks and responsibilities between HQ J9 and the CCC was often not clear to participants (CGN, 2004a). In the concept of operations, the CCC was put directly under command of the commander of ISAF (COMISAF) (ISAF, 2003a). In practice, the J9 demanded all contacts went through him. Since there was no clear plan what ISAF intended with cimic (the formulation to assist and support the civil bodies is vague), an unintended feeling of competition between the HQ J9 and the CCC arose; the commander of ISAF IV believed that the CCC was ineffective and integrated the CCC in HQ J9. It is remarkable that during ISAF III this rivalry did not occur and tasks and responsibilities were said to be clearly divided. A reason might be that during ISAF III personnel of both HQ J9 and the CCC came from the same corps staff in Münster, Germany. During the one-year preparation they frequently worked together and created a strong bond. During ISAF IV personnel of the CCC was extracted from the Cimic Group North (CGN) in Budel, the Netherlands, while the J9 was from Finland. Moreover, this Fin was already deployed during ISAF III and promoted during ISAF IV as head J9.

Based on these internal and external characteristics there were several motives for ISAF to cooperate with the civilian actors. It was frequently quoted that the main reason for cooperation was simply because it was included in the cimic mission. Other motives raised were:

- Civilian actors provided and facilitated contacts of ISAF with representatives of the local population.
- To legitimise the deployment of ISAF, visible cooperation with civilian actors was highly valued by politicians. An obvious example is the so-called Lighthouse project. To underline the lead-nationship of Germany and the Netherlands during ISAF III a special project was selected to act as a beacon. After a thorough selection process the refurbishment of a maternity clinic (Darulaman Clinic) was chosen as the project, despite the fact that both the CCC and UNAMA were not in favour of this project. This was for obvious reasons, including the lack of experienced and trained personnel to operate the clinic and the lack of medical machines and supplies.
- Civilian actors (ACBAR, ANCB, UNAMA) provided ISAF with knowledge and expertise on the local situation, customs, and humanitarian assistance. For example, due to the bad sewage system in Kabul the groundwater was polluted 10-15 meters deep. If United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) had not drawn ISAF's attention to this, ISAF would have installed regular water pumps in Kabul. Making use of these pumps would have poisoned many inhabitants and severely worsen their attitude towards ISAF.
- Cooperation with and involvement of the Afghan authorities was essential since tasks and responsibilities were often to be transferred to them after finishing assistance activities.
- Cooperation with local construction companies increased the local capacity and stimulated the local economy.
- Since ISAF and the civilian actors were operating in the same areas, prevention of duplication of effort was very important to prevent waste of scarce resources.
- Employment of ISAF personnel; as ISAF faced few injuries and wanted to keep the medical staff in good shape, several medical activities were performed in cooperation with Die Johanniter. This increased the morale of military.

5.3.2   Internal and external analysis of civilian actors

Approximately 650 humanitarian organisations were present in Kabul during the deployments of ISAF III and IV (ISAF, 2003a). These organisations varied from small local organisations such as World in Need to key players in the assistance community such as ICRC, Care, and UN agencies. Some international organisations like UNICEF, had the possession of many materials and goods, large financial means, and a large staff capacity. Others, like Die Johanniter, had a small staff and did not have extensive means and

capabilities. Many of the international NGOs present in Afghanistan had been working in the country for more than a decade either through directly implementing programmes or contracting work out to local partners (Schenkenberg van Mierop, 2002). However, unlike ISAF most of the organisations were focused on one functional area (e.g. UN-Habitat focused on housing and shelter problems, Die Johanniter and ICRC focused on medical problems).

To coordinate and manage the efforts of the assistance community, several organisations and structures were active in Kabul. UNAMA was tasked to fulfil the UN's obligations in Afghanistan outlined by the Bonn Agreement and to manage UN humanitarian activities in coordination with the Afghan authorities.

Consultative Groups (CGs) were established to facilitate substantive interaction between government, donors, UN agencies, and NGOs. Each CG focused on one of the 12 national programme areas highlighted in the National Development Framework (e.g. refugee and IDP return, education, health and nutrition) (AREU, 2004) and each was chaired by a different Afghan ministry.

In addition to UNAMA and the CGs, organisations like ACBAR and ANCB functioned as coordinating bodies for the humanitarian organisations. ACBAR mainly intended to coordinate the activities of international organisations, whereas ANCB only focused on Afghan organisations. The strength of bodies like ANCB and ACBAR was their extensive network of humanitarian organisations, knowledge and expertise on development issues, and knowledge of local customs. Through their function as coordination bodies however, both ANCB and ACBAR were unable to task their member organisations.

Due to the great variety of humanitarian organisations it is difficult to generalise between them. With regard to cooperation with ISAF, the larger organisations generally regarded the humanitarian principles at an operational level as strict guidelines (ACBAR, 2002). Rather than blocking any form of interaction however, most of these organisations valued information sharing and coordination with ISAF (Kok, 2004).

With regard to information sharing, especially in the earlier stages of the military operation, the assistance community did not have sufficient capacity to assess the local needs and the security situation. As a result they frequently made use of the information gathered by the TSTs of ISAF. In later stages the capacity of the assistance community increased, inter alia through AIMS. The aim of this project was to build information management capacity in government and deliver information management services to organisations across Afghanistan (AIMS, 2005). Unlike the CGs and ISAF, AIMS clustered its information in 15 different functional areas.

For humanitarian organisations, the aim of coordination was mainly to prevent duplication of humanitarian effort and avoid *doing harm* to the local population through the cimic

activities of ISAF. For example, the distribution of goods to the local population by ISAF troops was considered a severe threat to the "Cash for Work Programs" of UNAMA and several NGOs (ISAF, 2002). It could happen that in one area people were employed by UNAMA and the NGOs to carry out works, while in the same area other people were freely given clothes, food, or other goods.

At a tactical level many people tended to be pragmatic about the humanitarian principles and several motives were identified with respect to cooperation with ISAF:

- Direct or indirect security provided by ISAF troops; examples included mine clearance, extra patrolling, and direct protection of individuals.

- Manpower, transport capacity and technical knowledge within ISAF; several humanitarian organisations including UNICEF made use of the transport capacity of ISAF, while others made use of the manpower and technical knowledge of ISAF, such as drivers of UNAMA trained by ISAF.

- Goods and materials donated to ISAF troops; many countries donated goods through their contingents of ISAF. To distribute these to the local population the knowledge, expertise and distribution channels of humanitarian organisations were frequently used.

- Financial means within ISAF; through national governments, the European commission, and private donors in the TCN, ISAF had financial means at its disposal (Weijers, 2003b).

Few Afghan organisations were active in the area of Greater Kabul. Since the international assistance community had a large presence, these organisations focused more on areas outside Kabul. However, it was sometimes difficult to tell the difference between an Afghan NGO and a contractor. Several local contractors claimed to be an NGO to avoid paying tax (ISAF, 2003b). ACBAR, ANCB, and UNAMA investigated this to get clarity. In addition to these local contractors, non-Afghan companies, particularly Turkish, Iranian, Chinese, and Pakistani were also operating in the area of Kabul (Lister and Karaev, 2004). Fierce competition took place between these companies to get reconstruction contracts.

5.3.3   The decision to cooperate and strategic plan of ISAF

ISAF used several checklists in assistance activities that directly benefited the local population (ISAF, 2003c). These usually consisted of:

- Military criteria (e.g. will the project support the commander's mission; will the project stimulate the flow of information required to support current/future military operations?);

- Feasibility criteria (are all necessary skills and manpower available; what is the duration of the project?);

- Concerns (e.g. will the project require future force maintenance?).

If an assistance activity complied with several of these criteria (it was unclear which conditions were necessary to comply with and which were only desirable), ISAF often took the initiative to begin the activity. The approach of ISAF III was to pursue cooperation with humanitarian organisations, which could fulfil (part of) the activities (Weijers, 2003a). If no organisation was found, the project was tendered through the project-team of the CCC. During ISAF IV the main approach was to directly tender the project to local contractors though this enhanced the direct involvement of and increased the dependency on ISAF troops.

Based on its supply, ISAF also took the initiative to support humanitarian organisations. Since ISAF faced few injuries, they wanted to perform medical activities to keep the doctors practicing. Die Johanniter was approached to jointly treat local patients.

In their partnership UNAMA strongly urged ISAF not to get heavily engaged in the winterisation program focused on providing shelter to people to survive the winter colds. It was argued that the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) would act responsibly and pro-actively. ISAF took these concerns seriously and only provided security support (ISAF, 2003d).

In other cases such as the back to school programme of UNICEF, humanitarian organisations took the initiative and approached ISAF to request support in fulfilling the needs of the local population.

In addition to the activities from which the local population directly benefited, civil-military cooperation took place regarding the coordination of assistance activities, information sharing, and fulfilling each other's direct needs (training by ISAF personnel to personnel of a humanitarian organisation or vice versa, protection by ISAF). For these activities ISAF used the criteria in the checklists, although not explicitly.

Having decided to cooperate, ISAF often did not set any particular targets or objectives. However, in its concept of operation at the operational level ISAF had formulated guidelines (ISAF, 2003a). These consisted of (1) cimic end state, (2) cimic mission, (3) cimic centres of gravity, and (4) cimic priorities (see table 7).

In the cimic centres of gravity, the general NATO cimic objectives (i.e. liaison, support to the civil environment, and support to the force) are clearly recognisable. Of these centres of gravity, force protection was often the main driver (ISAF, 2003a). Perceiving this as winning the hearts and minds of the local population however, is too simplistic. According to ISAF personnel involved it should be seen as influencing the perception of the local population. This involves influencing certain persons or groups in the AoR of ISAF, who are or might become a serious threat to the overall mission and does not necessarily imply assistance to the local population. For example, during ISAF III a detailed plan was made to develop a recreation area just north of Kabul. It was believed that through this

development, people could experience the advantages of the more safe and secure environment provided by ISAF. Since most people could remember the former recreation area, this was thought to positively influence the attitude towards ISAF. While certain police districts faced far more serious problems (e.g. lack of sufficient medical facilities), ISAF concentrated part of its assets on the recreation area.

The cimic priorities in the concept of operations were derived from the National Development Framework established by the ATA. However, it is unclear why exactly these priorities were selected and why the content differs from the 12 priority areas used by the National Development Framework. Also, the cimic priorities did not completely correspond with the functional areas used in the assessments of ISAF which made it difficult to determine the status quo of a priority.

Cimic end state	The cimic end state will be reached when the Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA) or official government authorities, supported by UNAMA and other IOs/GO/NGOs, are able to function effectively without COMISAF's support, and regional stability is restored.
Cimic mission	To conduct cimic activities in order to assist ISAF in strengthening the overall security situation in Kabul and surroundings (ISAF's AoR), by assisting/supporting the civil bodies in the improvement of quality of life for the population. Thus promoting the overall stabilisation process in Afghanistan and increasing the authority of the TA necessary to conduct the constitutional Loya Jirga in Dec 2003.
Cimic centres of gravity	- Close and robust liaison to all key civil actors in the AoR; - Support the process of economic and nation recovery in close coordination with UNAMA; - Close liaison with CJCMOTF (i.e. Combined Joint Civil Military Operations Task Force, which is part of OEF); - Force protection.
Cimic priorities	- Water - Health - Education - Support to returnees - Support to policy and security - Development of emergency service

Table 7: Cimic guidelines for ISAF

5.3.4 The decision to cooperate and strategic plans of civilian actors

For the assistance community the decision to cooperate with ISAF was made in various ways. Smaller organisations, like Die Johanniter did have to ask permission of the head office in their home country. Larger organisations like UNICEF already had the authority to make the decision.

Analogous to the variety of civilian actors, the objectives and targets set also differed. For example, one of the objectives of UNAMA was to strengthen Afghan institutions and build

the capacity of the Afghan Administration at all levels, including the development of institutions of good governance, law and order, and security. Local contractors normally focused on maximising profits. In addition to general objectives, many humanitarian organisations were focused on media attention. In the case of UNAMA this was to create public awareness of the national and international population while other organisations needed the media attention to increase funding.

Although the humanitarian organisations did not set objectives or targets on the level of a partnership, conditions for cooperation were often formulated. These conditions were usually derived from the Oslo Guidelines (United Nations, 1994) or the code of conduct of the ICRC (ICRC, 1994). In most cases this implied that all assistance activities were to be carried out according to the humanitarian principles and included conditions on the use of force protection by ISAF troops and wearing military dress.

5.4 PARTNER SELECTION

Based on the overview of civilian actors, ISAF undertook several actions in its search for appropriate organisations to cooperate with. Most involved both formal and informal talks by personnel of the CCC, TSTs and J9 HQ with representatives of humanitarian organisations.

Next, existing coordination structures such as ACBAR, ANCB and the CGs, proved to be good places to meet with both international (ACBAR) and national (ANCB) NGOs. Before August 2003 the liaison officers of ISAF were not allowed at the meetings of ACBAR primarily because some organisations were fiercely against any association with ISAF. However, through mediation of the Area Coordinator of UNAMA and because the female liaison officer of the CCC of ISAF IV got on very well with the director of ACBAR, ISAF was finally allowed to attend the meetings. Both ACBAR and ANCB and several of the larger organisations such as UNAMA, were used to verify humanitarian organisations on inter alia reliability and professionalism.

In addition to these rather formal ways of searching for partners, ISAF held several parties to meet NGOs. Through this way direct personal contact was made. Due to the unstructured nature of assessing the external environment (see section 5.3), several NGOs were also met coincidentally (e.g. JICA).

To determine whether a humanitarian organisation was an appropriate partner, some staff members of the CCC used as the main criterion: "personnel of the organisations should not be creeps or criminals". Although this was not generally used, it demonstrates that very little attention was paid to explicit partner selection. Implicitly the following task-related criteria were used to select an appropriate partner:

- Having compatible strategies and objectives was regarded as very important by ISAF. Since ISAF operated under a UN-mandate it supported UNAMA and the other UN-agencies. The location of the assistance activities also played an important role. A prospective partner should be operating in the police district of Kabul in which the activities would take place.

- Complementary resources; the resources of humanitarian organisations (e.g. knowledge and expertise) were to be complementary to ISAF's resources.

- Added value for ISAF; cooperation with large key players did have much more added value than small organisations since cooperation could take place on a larger scale and on a greater variety of activities.

Several criteria were also identified in relation to the partner:

- Network of the partner organisation; organisations like ACBAR, ANCB and UNAMA had many contacts with other humanitarian organisations. Cooperation with these organisations was preferred since it provided easy access to other organisations.

- Personal fit; personnel of ISAF very much liked the emergency officers of UNICEF and World in Need. One field officer of UNAMA was former military, which also strengthened the personal fit. Moreover, gender played an important role in the personal fit. The female liaison officer of the CCC was well trusted by the director of ACBAR and the representatives of several smaller women's organisations.

- Compatibility of cultures; both the director of ACBAR and the liaison officer of the CCC were Dutch, as well as the representatives of Zuid Oost Azië Vluchtelingenzorg (ZOA) and the chief of the CCC. Language and cultural background clearly facilitated the cooperation.

- Prior experiences and reputation of the partner; well-known organisations like UNICEF and ICRC were without a doubt considered good partners. Having finished a partnership, partners often decided to initiate new activities together (e.g. partnerships with UNICEF, UNAMA and Die Johanniter).

- Nationality; Afghan organisations were preferred to increase the local coping capacity; cooperation with Afghan organisations was likely to empower local leadership. For example, supporting a local organisation in the distribution of goods increased the trust of the local population in this particular organisation, contributing to the overall trust in the development process of Afghanistan.

- Reliability; humanitarian organisations who did not comply with agreements or appointments were regarded as unsuitable.

To tender construction activities, ISAF used several criteria to select an appropriate company. Based on their reputation and prior experience, the CCC had a list of approximately 25 preferred suppliers. These companies were known through small

construction activities on and around the compounds of ISAF, earlier involvement in projects, and contacts with IOs and NGOs. There was also a black list of unreliable contractors.

To start new construction activities five to six approved companies were invited to attend a meeting at the construction site. Often one or two new companies were also invited to join the bidding process. At the site contractors were given construction drawings by a CCC engineer and were allowed to bid. The CCC engineer then selected a contractor. The main criteria were time, quality, and cost but the project-team of the CCC also used two additional criteria:

- Level of English; to facilitate communication the contractor's English skills were important. Working with translators would increase the loss of information in the communication process, in particular during quality control. Afghans who had worked abroad, mostly in the Middle East, were preferred, since they spoke fluent English.

- Local capacity; to develop the local coping capacity Afghan companies were preferred to foreign ones (mainly Turkish, Chinese, Iranian and Pakistani companies).

No partner selection process was established regarding the Afghan authorities. The Afghan authorities responsible for operational construction management (e.g., MoE for schools, Ministry of Health (MoH) for medical facilities) were contacted to various extents. In the preparation of the fire substation in Pol-e-Charki, extensive talks were held with the MoI, who were responsible for the fire stations in Afghanistan. These talks dealt with the requirements of the construction and the future division of tasks and responsibilities among other things (e.g., the MoI would pay the salaries of the fire fighters). In other examples, such as the reconstruction of several schools, very little contact was made with the MoE.

Despite some military who felt that only ISAF should determine with whom they were doing business, humanitarian organisations also used partner selection criteria. In relation to the tasks to be carried out, complementary resources (e.g., security, transport capacity) and compatible strategies and objectives were frequently mentioned. With respect to the latter, the fact that ISAF was UN-mandated made cooperation considerably easier for humanitarian organisations as it implied broad international consensus and legitimisation. Additionally, contrary to OEF units who had to carry out direct combat activities, ISAF troops were primarily responsible for a safe and secure environment. This positively influenced the attitude of many humanitarian organisations towards ISAF. However, activities of ISAF aimed at force protection were not compatible with the objectives of the humanitarian organisations.

In relation to the partner itself several additional criteria were used by the representatives of the humanitarian organisations:

- Cultural compatibility; as the emergency officer of UNICEF said "UNICEF did not have a Finnish officer and therefore we did not cooperate with the Finnish contingent of ISAF".
- Personal fit; see partner-related criteria ISAF.
- Humanitarian principles; activities of many humanitarian organisations were only to be carried out according to humanitarian principles.
- Prior experiences with and reputation of partner; past cooperation often led to the initiation of additional activities.
- Flexibility; ISAF was perceived as very flexible by many organisations.
- Use of force; ISAF personnel in general and the CCC in particular did not use a high degree of force.
- Added value; cooperation with ISAF increased the scope (functional areas on which cooperation takes place) and the scale (number of activities on one particular functional area) of the humanitarian organisation.

5.5 PARTNERSHIP DESIGN

In the partnerships between ISAF and humanitarian organisations, verbal or gentleman's agreements were the norm. Based on mutual trust, these agreements included the definition of rights and duties (e.g., ISAF was not allowed to carry weapons on the premises of many humanitarian organisations) and details of the implementation such as planning. These agreements also dealt with the activities of each actor in the partnership, for example which actor would share its information at what time. During ISAF III, absence of a written contract was never perceived as a problem.

Both interviewees of humanitarian organisations and ISAF mentioned several drawbacks at the prospect of a written contract. In general, the situation was normally too uncertain to rely on a contract. Second, the military could not guarantee involvement in humanitarian activities for a specified period. If the situation changed they would be forced to focus on other activities. Finally, the risk of legal claims was also raised as an important drawback.
During ISAF IV the lack of formal arrangements was considered a problem by military personnel. In the partnership with ANCB the intention of the CCC was to make a contract through a MoU. However, although NATO cimic doctrine supports the settlement of institutional arrangements, HQ J9 blocked the MoU with ANCB for unknown reasons.
In the partnership with UNAMA, it was agreed that ISAF would provide rapid emergency response support in case of a major natural disaster. However, due to an imminent rotation of ISAF, its representatives were not willing to sign a MoU with UNAMA at that moment.

It was said that "the willingness to assist in case of emergency however exists" (ISAF, 2003e). In subsequent rotations of ISAF no follow-up was given to establish such a MoU.

Interviewees pointed out that, although a MoU does not have any judicial status, it can increase clarity and transparency of the partnership through agreement on clear and realistic objectives, keeping and protecting core competencies, definition of rights and duties, and an implementation plan (CGN, 2004a).

In addition to these advantages, one cimic liaison officer of ISAF IV made an interesting point (ISAF, 2004b). She argued that through formalising a relationship (e.g., MoU, Letter of Intent or Terms of Reference) the continuity or rather the lack of it, can be addressed. Since most military units rotate once every four or six months and personnel of humanitarian organisations come and go, it is very difficult to build a sustainable relationship between a military force and a humanitarian organisation. Drawing up a MoU can facilitate the transfer from one rotation or person to another and the partnership will become less person-bonded and ad-hoc. This diminishes loss of scarce resources and waste of effort. It is not uncommon that organisations present themselves to each other dozens of times, simply because they are unaware of former cooperation activities or attempts.

Regarding local contractors, ISAF made use of detailed contracts (ISAF, 2003f). These included the instalments of the contract, a description of the project, price and payment, taxes and duties, and inspections and supervision among other stipulations. Most of these contracts, such as the Pol-e-Charki fire substation and the school in Zemma, also included a warranty which stated: "The contractor hereby guarantees that all goods delivered or works and services performed under this contract shall be exempt from defect of design, workmanship or materials for a period of 12 months starting from the day when the work has been approved to be completed."

Warranties like this proved beneficial. As one of the interviewees stated, the Spanish military in Kabul built a school whose roof collapsed and lacked the budget to do the necessary repairs, resulting in a school without a roof. If a local contractor had built the school, he would have been responsible for delivering a proper school building and would have had to repair the roof.

Regarding the beneficiaries of the assistance activities ISAF sometimes made arrangements with the Afghan authorities, which were responsible after completion of the activities. In the case of the refurbishment of the Pol-e-Charki fire substation it was agreed that the MoI would take care of (Majasaari, 2003):

1. Connecting the fire station to a water source, a deep well, or pipelines to a nearby source.
2. Connecting electricity from outside; all cables within the building were to be included in the project.

3. Connecting phone lines from outside; all cables within the building were to be included in the project.
4. Paying fire fighter's salaries as soon as the fire station was in operation.
5. Guaranteeing use of the building as a fire station upon completion.

In other assistance activities less or no upfront arrangements at all were made with the local authorities.

In addition to the involvement of Afghan authorities, many humanitarian organisations regarded the direct involvement of the local population in the design phase as very beneficial (Das, 2002). So-called grass-root contracts could enumerate the expectations, roles, rights, and responsibilities of local communities. They could positively contribute to the participation of women and other vulnerable segments of the population; communities would have better faith in the transitional administration and greater confidence in the country's future (Das, 2002). Involving a mayor or leading person in the assistance activities also strengthened his or her position. In return he or she was more willing to do something in return.

Regarding assistance activities in which no IO or NGO participated, ISAF normally contacted the local beneficiaries and its leaders. Consultation of these persons did not lead to written contracts before the implementation started, but arrangements were entirely based on trust. In the Afghan culture, people do not rely on written contracts but trusted each other's word (Johnson and Leslie, 2004).

Normally, no specific organisation was put into place to prepare implementation of the partnership such as in joint ventures between business organisations. The main reason was the independence both ISAF and civilian partners wanted to keep.

Important factors in the partnership design were:

- Standards; in most projects local standards were used with regard to the quality of constructions, water, and medical facilities among other things. In response, cimic liaison officers of ISAF III stressed that "Afghans do not need Perrier from their taps". However, German cimic platoon in particular frequently used German standards in the construction of police stations in Kabul.

- Legal possession of the land; a Finish battalion built an orphanage in Kabul. Shortly after completion, the legitimate owner of the land claimed it as his property. He then used the orphanage as a house. Verifying the legal possession of the land upfront could also prevent different organisations from working on the same project or addressing identical problems.

- Preparation of termination; in most partnerships no financial means were allocated for future maintenance and operational activities because it would suggest further involvement and therefore responsibilities of ISAF. Several military in ISAF believed

that through reconstruction of a school, enough enthusiasm was created among students, parents, and teachers sufficient to operate the school afterwards. Since unemployment in Kabul was very high, it seemed wishful thinking that people would get involved in the operation of facilities without a salary.

- Coping capacity; contractors were often obliged to hire a large percentage of Afghan employees, thereby increasing the local capacity.

- Resources; resources were normally acquired in Kabul. However, in several cases ISAF obtained resources from their home countries. Old school furniture of a Dutch school was flown to Kabul to supply Afghan schools. The costs of transport totalled €400,000 when the furniture could have been produced locally for a tenth of these costs.

5.6 PARTNERSHIP IMPLEMENTATION

The actors were involved in the actual implementation of the assistance activities in several ways. The first cluster of activities was coordination between ISAF and the humanitarian organisations. Through coordination, assistance activities were synchronised and duplication of effort was prevented (e.g., the construction of multiple sub fire stations in a small region). It also gave humanitarian organisations the opportunity to prevent ISAF's cimic activities from *doing harm* to the local population (see section 5.3.2). ISAF valued in particular coordination with main organisations such as the UN-agencies (e.g., UNAMA, UNICEF, UNHCR), the coordinating bodies (e.g., ACBAR, ANCB) and large IOs (e.g., IOM) and NGOs (e.g., AIMS).

The second cluster of activities regarded information sharing. ISAF had a large capacity at its disposal to gather information. This was of great use to the assistance community especially in the earlier stages of the operation. ISAF shared information that included assessments of the local situation, maps of Kabul, information about OEF, and security information. Many humanitarian organisations freely shared their information with ISAF regarding development issues, local customs, and manners.

Third, activities supporting each other's direct needs were frequently observed. Both ISAF and the humanitarian organisations supported each other, indirectly addressing the needs of the local population. ISAF's support for humanitarian organisations consisted of security-related support (e.g., de-mining an UNICEF warehouse site and planning the evacuation of civilian staff in case of an emergency through the Emergency Planning Group). Support not directly related to security included training for 45 drivers from different organisations (e.g., UNHCR, IOM, Care International) among other things.

Humanitarian organisations also frequently supported ISAF in its direct needs. Delegates of ICRC provided training for the TSTs on the Law of Armed Conflict, UNAMA facilitated the acceptance of ISAF into ACBAR's coordination board, and ANCB mediated between ISAF and Afghan NGOs.

The fourth cluster of activities concerned support to address the needs of the local population. Both ISAF and the humanitarian organisations supported each other in directly addressing the needs of the local population. In back to school programmes, ISAF supported UNICEF with transport capacity. In cooperation with AGEF, demobilised soldiers were hired by a contractor and trained at construction sites supervised by ISAF (ISAF, 2003g).

Humanitarian organisations supported ISAF in the distribution of goods (e.g., World in Need). In addition to the previously mentioned negative interference with the Cash for Work Programs, distribution in cooperation with humanitarian organisations often provided ISAF with more insight regarding the beneficiaries. However, the difficulty of gaining insights into Afghan social relations is stressed by Johnson and Leslie (2004): "the Afghan custom for a widow is to be remarried to a close relative of her late husband, or simply taken in by relatives. They are therefore not in need of food assistance simply because of a loss of a husband. But twenty years of war and associated relief efforts have taught Afghans that the way to obtain relief is to define yourself into whatever category is currently receiving the goods. So if the international community was to give food to 'widows', Afghans were quite prepared to define their social categories (though not their practice) accordingly."

While the humanitarian organisation identified the group of beneficiaries, ISAF transported the goods. This openly showed the involvement of ISAF in assistance activities, which they believed increased force protection. An advantage of including Afghan organisations in distribution activities was that it would empower local leadership.

It was frequently observed that goods were directly donated to an orphanage and high school close to the presidential palace, without the involvement of humanitarian organisations. This was because international delegations were confronted with these two places and wanted *to do good*. The CCC tried to coordinate all the donations for two reasons, which were given to ISAF. Some police districts were flooded with donations, while others did not receive much. Neglecting these could increase anger towards ISAF troops in the latter districts. Second, in support of ISAF's mission, goods were sometimes distributed to belligerent groups or key leaders to increase force protection. This was condemned by humanitarian organisations.

In directly addressing the needs of the local population, ISAF initiated many reconstruction activities itself (i.e., civic action). These so-called "projects", were initiated by the TSTs or the CCC and normally carried out by local contractors. During execution, the TSTs and the project-team regularly monitored the activities of the local constructors. The projects included the reconstruction of medical clinics, fire stations, schools, kindergartens, and irrigation works. Often no humanitarian organisation was involved because they regarded

other activities as more beneficial or because they were not approached by ISAF. Figure 22 shows the total number of projects carried out from January 2002 until July 2003.

Total number of projects from January 2002 until July 2003

Category	Value
Finished	271
Ongoing	34
Postponed	61
Planned	51
Cancelled	49

Figure 22: Total number of projects (Weijers, 2003c)

The numbers in figure 22 have to be considered with care. Due to the lack of direction the staff of the CCC could provide, many projects were initiated through the TSTs. During ISAF IV it turned out that many more projects had been carried out than had been reported to the CCC.

Several projects directly included the local population as the work force (e.g., excavation of irrigation channels). The project-team then contacted a local leader and provided him with tools, materials, and money to employ local people. These people earned approximately 2US$ per day, which was regarded as a considerable wage. This also empowered local leadership, as the people depended on their leaders for payment, tools, and materials. It is unclear whether these projects were included in figure 22.

Apart from contracting out activities, ISAF itself had limited implementing capacity. This consisted of means and resources of the TCNs, commanded through the KMNB or individual nations. The most obvious of these resources was the German cimic platoon. This unit was directly involved in several construction activities (Darulaman clinic, police stations). Many humanitarian organisations regarded the German cimic platoon as a competitor with themselves and the local constructors. In any case, this unit was not increasing the local coping capacity. It was often argued that the German cimic platoon applied western methods and standards in their construction activities and was blamed for lacking sufficient knowledge on development issues and the local situation and customs.

5.7 THE TRANSFER OF TASKS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

In activities regarding coordination, information sharing, and support to each other's direct needs (cluster 1-3), the transfer of tasks and responsibilities were not regarded as an important issue. However, in most assistance activities from which the local population directly benefited, the transfer was seen as an important step in the cooperation process.

The largest part of these activities consisted of projects in which ISAF contracted activities to local constructors. Upon completion many of the projects still had large requirements in order to become and remain fully operational. Medical clinics needed employees, some of which had to be highly educated and trained. Due to the lack of educated people, people were removed from one area to another, creating gaps in some places. Clinics also needed the appropriate machines, medical supplies to treat patients, and funds for maintenance. Similarly, buildings such as fire stations, schools, police stations, and kindergartens had several requirements to be fully operational.

In general ISAF did not pay attention to these issues. Often there were no arrangements made regarding eventual operation in the partnership design. This resulted in schools with too few teachers and a lack of education material. Several months after completion these schools were not used as such, but served as shelter for families.

In other projects explicit attention was paid to the function of the construction. In the partnership design of the Pol-e-Charki fire substation clear arrangements were made with the MoI regarding the transfer of tasks and responsibilities (Majasaari, 2003). However, despite the upfront agreements the MoI did not provide water, electricity or telephone connections and could therefore not function. In addition the chief of Pol-e-Charki fire substation complained about the contractor. Boilers were broken, toilet and water taps leaked, and paint flaked off. Approximately three months after the initial handover the problems were still not addressed. ISAF then decided to start a second project through competitive bidding to address these problems which took an extra two months (Niiranen, 2003).

Due to these events, the CCC put more emphasis on assistance activities which did not require extensive attention after completion during ISAF IV. As an example, the pictures in figure 23 were frequently used by military personnel to indicate the differences between long-term and high demand activities and short-term and less demanding activities. The picture at the left shows the Darulaman clinic, which needed extensive follow-up by educated personnel and high-quality medical equipment. The picture at the right shows a stairway to facilitate walking during or after heavy rainfall which did not need any follow up (Kok, 2004).

The respondents frequently observed that the local population acted very dependent. A military respondent stressed, "As water pumps were built, they needed diesel to be used.

While many people possessed diesel no one was prepared to give up some to make the pump run". It was therefore important for ISAF to ensure that the assistance activities did not need any follow-up so that people would not become dependent on ISAF.

Figure 23: Long-term high demand activities versus short-term less demanding activities

In partnerships where ISAF and humanitarian organisations jointly addressed the needs of the local population (e.g., back to school program with UNICEF, medical treatment with Die Johanniter, and distribution of water with JICA) the transfer of tasks and responsibilities was regarded as very important. Normally, few problems came about due to the simple nature of activities.

To deal with transfer problems, respondents stressed that Afghan ministries and the direct beneficiaries should be involved in partnership design. In meetings with liaison officers of ISAF, the representative of the Afghan Ministry of Reconstruction (MoR) also urged for early involvement. However, as seen in the construction of the Pol-e-Charki fire substation, these statements have to be taken with care. One liaison officer remarked, "Various ministers I met could only talk about the lack of money and donors and never talked about their own responsibility" (CGN, 2004a).

In accordance with the measure of early involvement, the issue was raised that the construction of new schools or medical clinics should keep pace with the building of local capacity. If one or the other is further ahead resources are wasted. Respondents pointed out that it was of great importance to assist Afghan ministries in building local capacity such as training of teachers, and opposing corruption.

Next, including humanitarian organisations at an early stage could address problems in the transfer of tasks and responsibilities. Since these organisations are often in the area for a longer time, guaranteeing the sustainability of assistance activities is also in their interest.

Apart from a humanitarian perspective, the failure to transfer tasks and responsibilities was also thought to negatively influence the mission of ISAF. If the local population observed or perceived that the assistance activities did not contribute to the development of the area,

their attitude towards ISAF troops could change in a negative way. Belligerent groups or leaders were then thought to use this changed attitude to hinder the troops.

5.8 PARTNERSHIP EVALUATION

Few evaluations were held in partnerships in which ISAF cooperated with a humanitarian organisation. Those held were often internal meetings or chats. Most military and civilian respondents stressed the importance of an evaluation. They emphasised the need of feedback to the initial objectives (e.g., what did the partnership contribute to the extent of force protection). The emergency officers of UNICEF stressed the importance of joint evaluations by military and civilian actors, which could then preferably be coordinated by UNAMA.

Activities, which ISAF contracted to local contractors, contained brief evaluations (ISAF, 2003h). After completion, an engineer of the CCC project team carried out this evaluation. However, these evaluations primarily focused on technical aspects (Bergenstjerna, 2003), while many other aspects such as contribution to protection of the force were not considered.

5.9 PARTNERSHIP PERFORMANCE

Assessing partnership performance with the criteria, set in figure 21, leads to the following findings.
Most projects, which ISAF contracted to a local constructor, contributed little to support the force. Belligerent groups or key leaders were rarely taken into account, many activities did not directly contribute to a safe and secure environment, and situational awareness was often not increased through the activities. Most assistance activities were for the benefit of the community generally reaching a large number of direct and indirect beneficiaries.
With respect to the support of the civil environment, many projects filled a gap and addressed the needs of the local population. Since most of the activities were contracted to local people, local capacity did largely increase though the sustainability of the projects was inadequate. Many facilities could not properly function, since they lacked teachers and educational material (schools) or medical supplies and funds for maintenance (clinics). In late 2003 CCC staff visited several facilities built under supervision of ISAF. It turned out that approximately 40% of these facilities no longer functioned.

Despite this rather negative performance, the personnel involved often perceived them as successful. Some CCC staff of ISAF III and IV criticised the projects, but during their stay in Kabul were either not aware of the negative performance or were unable to change it.

The partnerships with humanitarian organisations contributed to a limited extent to the military mission of ISAF. Some partnerships such as with UNAMA and ANCB provided ISAF with increased situational awareness, but none deliberately included belligerent groups or key leaders or contributed to a safe and secure environment.

The various partnerships greatly differed with regard to the total number of people reached. Delivery of materials in the UNICEF back to school programme included approximately 160 schools, thereby reaching nearly 13,000 teachers and 230,000 students with minimal effort. On the contrary medical activities in cooperation with Die Johanniter only reached a small number of people.

All the partnerships with humanitarian organisations supported the civil environment through information sharing, coordination, and support to the direct needs of the humanitarian organisations. Although the medical activities of Die Johanniter were based on the supply of ISAF, it did increase the scale of that organisation and contributed to its mission. An increase of both scale and scope was also the case in the partnerships with UNAMA and UNICEF. With the exception of the partnerships in which ISAF cooperated with Afghan organisations such as ANCB and World in Need, few contributed to increasing the local capacity.

Delivery trips of the back to school programme drew a lot of attention for civilian actors since these were followed by some local and international media, including TV-stations.

Despite differences in performance, all partnerships with humanitarian organisations investigated were regarded as successful by both ISAF and the humanitarian organisations.

Costs of partnerships were usually low. In most construction activities, local contractors and personnel were employed. Information sharing and coordination were low cost activities, normally with high benefits (e.g., avoidance of duplication of effort). Activities in which large capacity of ISAF was involved (such as the German cimic platoon) were quite expensive since they took the place of local contractors and personnel. Siegel (2002) stressed the fact that the yearly price of a US soldier in Afghanistan when both direct and indirect expenses are included is approximately US$215,000 whereas humanitarians usually cost a tenth of this.

5.10 DISCUSSION

In the civil-military partnerships analysed in Kabul both military and civilian actors went through each of the six steps identified in the process-based partnership model either

explicitly or implicitly. Insights in their decision processes were obtained based on internal and external analyses of the respective actors.

A common problem in this early stage of the cooperation process was the unstructured manner of information gathering and processing. For many actors this resulted in a lack of situational awareness leading to ad-hoc decisions and a great duplication of effort. This corresponds to James (2003), who argues that "there was a common feeling among Afghans in many areas of 'assessment fatigue' when village elders grew tired of questions from outsiders and wanted to see results".

ISAF had various motives for initiating cooperation with civilian organisations. Apart from being included in the cimic mission, these included the provision of local knowledge and information by civilian actors (e.g., ACBAR, ANCB, UNAMA), prevention of duplication of effort, and the increase of local capacity. Motives of civilian organisations for cooperation with ISAF included the direct and indirect security provided by ISAF troops, manpower, transport capacity, technical knowledge within ISAF, and the prevention of duplication of effort.

Few actors developed a plan before cooperation in which clear individual targets were included. Often little relationship was found between with the activities performed by ISAF and objectives set in ISAF's concept of operation. For example, most activities appeared to contribute only marginally to the force protection (one of the cimic centres of gravity). Formulating a plan with clear targets for each partnership could clarify the contribution to the higher objectives and preserve ISAF from distracting goals.

From the motives to cooperate, both military and civilian actors undertook several actions to search for appropriate organisations. Most involved talks between ISAF personnel and representatives of humanitarian organisations. Existing coordination structures such as ACBAR, ANCB and the CGs, turned out to be good places to meet both international and national NGOs. Often the actors implicitly used criteria to select a partner. For all actors in a civil-military partnership complementary resources were the most important criterion. Additionally, military forces and humanitarian organisations used several partner-related criteria to inform their decisions. Of these criteria, personal fit was the decisive one.

At a strategic level Stockton (2002) argues "in a complex multi-agency international assistance operation, coordination is only possible between those entities, which share common strategic objectives. …To begin with, a clear separation should be made between one coordination process specifically created for humanitarian agencies that are obliged to be neutral by mandate or choice, and another for those which are willing and able to support the political/peace-building strategy".

To facilitate the selection of Afghan constructors, the Afghan Chamber of Commerce (AICC) is planning to establish an association of Afghan builders (Lister and Karaev, 2004).

The next step in the process was design of the partnership. Usually, verbal agreements were made between ISAF and humanitarian organisations addressing the definition of rights and duties and details of the implementation. It appeared that a MoU could increase clarity in these upfront agreements. Drawing up a MoU could also facilitate the transfer from one rotation or person to another. The partnership would thus become less person-bonded and ad-hoc, which would in turn diminish the spoiling of resources and wasted efforts.

The use of standards was frequently an important issue in the partnership design. It was often mentioned that local Afghan standards were to be used. However, as Lister and Karaev (2004) argue "at the moment, there are no quality regulations for any aspect of the construction industry. This is recognised as a problem - low quality materials are used in sub-standard construction by unqualified people operating in an unsafe working environment… Some of the resulting buildings are likely to be hazardous, especially since Afghanistan is prone to earthquakes." To indiscriminately apply local standards would not be appropriate. To address this problem the Afghan Ministry of Construction (MoC) is currently establishing a Department of Standards and Metrology (Lister and Karaev, 2004).

During partnership implementation many problems became obvious, from the different AoRs included in the respective mandates to communication problems due to a lack of mobile telephones. Local capacity was used to a great extent in the activities, in particular construction activities, contracted by ISAF where local communities or local contractors were the preferred implementing partner. Military respondents argued that local NGOs, often those attached to ANCB, found it extremely difficult to get funds for projects. Some respondents held the opinion that international humanitarian organisations that administered most of the finances, were very reluctant to contract activities to local organisations.

Depending on the sort of activities, tasks and responsibilities were transferred after completion. In particular in assistance activities, where the local population directly benefited, the transfer was seen as an important step in the cooperation process. Ensuring a proper follow-up of the activities contributes to the sustainability of the assistance activities and the long-term development of Afghanistan.

Even though many respondents stressed the importance of an evaluation, it was rarely realised. On a seminar of the NATO Rapid Deployable Corps – Turkey (NRDC-T) on "Cimic during ISAF" it was concluded that "CIMIC projects, which met the expectations of the population, contributed extensively to the Force Protection of all the players. Medical support to the local population was an excellent way of building confidence in Afghanistan. The projects should be based on the assessment of the humanitarian situation and local needs" (NRDC-T, 2004). However, carrying out activities to improve force protection would require a safety analysis. As this was rarely done, one can dispute what the real contributions to force protection were and how these were measured, without

having a point of calibration. Moreover, carrying out activities to increase force protection is likely to be less successful considering the military started early 2002.

With regard to the process model, several differences are noted between ISAF III, led by the German-Netherlands Corps and ISAF IV, led by NATO:

- Relationship between HQ J9 and CCC; during ISAF IV the division of tasks and responsibilities between HQ J9 and the CCC was often not clear to the involved parties, while during ISAF III no significant problems were met.
- ISAF IV valued formal agreements with humanitarian organisations such as MoUs, whereas ISAF III stressed the disadvantages of formal agreements.
- During ISAF IV the CCC emphasised assistance activities that did not require extensive attention after completion. Short-term and less demanding activities were preferred to long-term and highly demanding activities.
- The approach of ISAF III was to pursue cooperation with humanitarian organisations, which could fulfil (part of) the activities. If no organisation was found, the project was tendered through the project-team of the CCC. During ISAF IV the main approach was to directly tender the project to local constructors.

Personnel of ISAF made few distinctions between humanitarian organisations. UN agencies such as UNHCR and UNICEF were often labelled NGOs, leading to incorrect assumptions and expectations. Stockton (2002) argues that "a "one size fits all" approach to NGO coordination either fills up rooms with agency representatives deploying no significant strategic assets, or excludes some of the largest, best informed and most influential assistance actors completely".

5.11 CONCLUSION

The process model as it is presented is considered to be appropriate since it is able to describe and explain the cooperation process between military and civilian actors at the local level. It was established that civil-military partnerships go through six successive steps. First each actor decides whether or not cooperation should be pursued. Next, an appropriate partner is searched for. The third step contains the agreements made upfront. These include clear and realistic objectives, an implementation plan, and the definition of rights and duties. In the fourth step the partnership is implemented and actual activities are carried out. After completion of the activities step five deals with the transfer of tasks and responsibilities. The final step determines the performance of the partnership through an evaluation.

Applying the model to the cooperation between ISAF and civilian actors in Kabul leads to the following conclusions:

- The external analysis of most actors was done in an unstructured way, resulting in great duplication of effort and waste of scarce resources. An exception to this was the shelter assessment with UN-Habitat.

- The functional areas in which ISAF made assessments (food, water, health, power, and shelter) did not correspond with the cimic priorities (water, health, education, support to returnees, support to policy and security, and development of emergency services). This resulted in a mismatch between the supplied and requested information and made it difficult to determine the status of a priority.

- The functional areas of ISAF differed from areas in which the assistance community assessed the area of Kabul, making it unnecessarily difficult to compare and exchange information.

- Since no partnerships between ISAF and civilian organisations were formalised they all remained ad-hoc and person-bonded which led to the waste of many resources.

- Local capacity was used to fulfil many of the assistance activities to a large extent, thereby stimulating the Afghan economy.

- Most activities carried out or supported by ISAF units contributed little to the objective of force protection.

- Many activities proved to be unsustainable. After completion, many facilities were unable to function properly as materials, trained employees, and funds for maintenance were not arranged. A main reason for the lack of sustainability was the absence of upfront arrangements. Even clear upfront arrangements did not guarantee a smooth transition as was proven in the fire substation in Pol-e-Charki. However, completely omitting these arrangements and only trusting enthusiastic persons will definitely decrease the chances of successful transition.

- There is a great difference between perceived and real performance. While almost all activities were perceived as highly successful by the participants, judging them on the performance criteria often shows a rather negative outcome.

- Lack of common approach to cimic. Due to a lack of common (NATO) training, different personal capabilities, different budgets, and a lack of direction there was no common approach to cimic within ISAF.

The Kabul case

CHAPTER 6: THE BAGHLAN CASE

6.1 BACKGROUND OF THE CASE

Following the Coalition's intervention in Afghanistan, Western leaders promised the Afghan people, (most notably spelt out by British Prime Minister Tony Blair), that the international community would "not walk away" from its responsibilities regarding the country's rehabilitation and future stability this time (Stapleton, 2003). Contrary to the expectations of the Afghan people and repeated requests from the transitional government's leaders, moves to expand ISAF beyond Kabul failed. As a consequence, aid agencies wanted to stay in the capital because of ISAF protection, meaning that Afghan citizens had a better chance of receiving assistance if they were in Kabul rather than away in the provinces (Hoshmand, 2005). This triggered a massive influx of internally displaced persons into the capital city, along with refugees returning from surrounding countries. Overcrowding occurred as a result, creating sanitation issues and rising prices among other problems.

In June 2003 the President of the International Rescue Committee and the Secretary General of Care International wrote to the secretary general of NATO, Lord Robertson, to inform him that "80 NGOs have come together to ask your attention to an urgent matter: the expansion of ISAF beyond Kabul in Afghanistan under NATO's leadership" (ISAF, 2003i). Late in 2003 NATO decided to expand the ISAF area of operations and was authorised to do this by UNSCR 1510. The expansion took place through the deployment of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) a concept launched by the US in November 2002. The overall concept was to use small joint civil-military teams to expand legitimacy of the central government to the regions and enhance security by supporting the security sector reform and facilitating the reconstruction process (Jakobsen, 2005). The first official PRT was established by the US in February 2003 in Gardez Province. In subsequent months, additional teams began in other provinces and by October 2004, a total of 14 PRTs were managed by the US-led Combined Forces Command Afghanistan conducting OEF. Expansion of ISAF was slow, primarily due to reluctance by NATO troop- and resource-contributing nations to provide the necessary logistics capabilities and troops to enable ISAF to expand (Save the children, 2004). By October 2004 ISAF had five PRTs in Afghanistan: British PRTs in Mazar-e-Sharif and Maimana, German PRTs (GE PRT) in Kunduz and Feyzabad, and a Dutch PRT in Baghlan (Jakobsen, 2005).

The different approaches of the PRTs, both within NATO PRTs and between PRTs of OEF and NATO, are currently under discussion. Many contributing countries have developed their own distinct models to shape the deployment of a PRT. This case study primarily focuses on the Dutch-led NATO PRT (NL PRT) in Baghlan province (see figure 24).

Figure 24: Afghanistan and approximate location of Baghlan province

In September 2004 the Netherlands succeeded Germany as lead nation of the NATO PRT in Baghlan. To promote a smooth transfer the Netherlands deployed its personnel in July 2004 to carry out a reconnaissance mission. The main force was deployed in September 2004. In addition to NL PRT several international and national organisations operated in Baghlan province. These organisations included various UN-agencies, IOs, NGOs and donor organisations.

6.2 THE CASE STUDY DESIGN

The following partnerships were selected to test and validate the process-based partnership:
1. Poultry production with Afghan authorities and the international NGO Dutch Committee of Afghanistan (DCA);
2. Various hearts and minds (H&M) projects with local contractors and authorities (the construction of river works, radio and television mast, mosques and wells, and distribution of goods);
3. Police training courses with the highway and provincial police corps of Baghlan province;

4. Removal of explosives and ammunition with the international NGO Halo Trust;
5. The construction of micro hydro power plants with the local authorities and a local contractor;
6. Various activities within the framework of Facilitating Fund for Reconstruction (FFR) with international NGOs (literacy training with Child Fund Afghanistan (CFA) and school, road, and bridge construction with Aga Kahn Foundation (AKF));
7. Provision of radio communication equipment to the district governors of Baghlan province.

These seven partnerships were each investigated studied in great detail and recorded in case reports. Additionally, six other partnerships were examined though these were studied in less detail due to a lack of data. These included the improvement of the local fire department, capacity building of civil servants, the establishment of a Disaster Response Committee, malaria prevention, assistance to an orphanage, and integrated development of entrepreneurial activities (IDEA). The selection of partnerships was verified by interviews to ensure a valid overview of the civil-military partnerships in which NL PRT was involved.

To increase the validity of the case study, both methodological and data source triangulation were employed. A general literature study was done and three interviews were held with former personnel of NL PRT (the commander of first rotation, a political advisor (polad), and the head of cimic section). In June and July 2005 a four-week visit was made to Baghlan. Several actions were taken to obtain detailed information on the partnerships. During the stay on the compound semi-structured interviews were held with 25 persons of NL PRT, including the mission team commanders, cimic personnel, and the polad. Regarding the partnership on poultry production a participatory meeting with personnel of NL PRT and local farmers was attended. The researcher took part in six missions of the mission teams where many activities were directly observed including various H&M projects (the construction of mosques, river works, and the distribution of medical supplies), the removal of explosives and ammunition and over 60 meetings with local contractors, local authorities, police commanders, humanitarian organisations (local women's organisations, Halo Trust, Kunduz River Basin Programme), small entrepreneurs, refugees, and local villagers. It was not possible to interview representatives of AKF, CFA and DCA though since detailed documentation was available about their activities, this was not perceived as harmful to this case study. In addition to the interviews and direct observations, documents were studied including daily and weekly cimic reports, project information, meeting minutes, internal memoranda, and liaison reports.

Apart from NL PRT and civilian actors in Baghlan province, two individuals of the German PRT (the head of cimic branch and the head of the civil mission of GE PRT) as well as a liaison officer of the cimic branch of ISAF HQ were interviewed. This produced insight on the German approach and the steering of the PRTs by ISAF HQ.

Before visiting Afghanistan, a basic military course was followed, resulting in deployment as a major in the Dutch armed forces. Wearing military dress may have influenced the outcome of some of the interviews with military and civilian personnel, as indicated in several studies (Hoshmand, 2005; Bollen, 2002). The influence of this phenomenon is considered limited as the researcher employed several triangulation techniques.

Members of the cimic branch checked the results and personnel of the Defence Operation Centre (DOC) reviewed the case study report to verify the findings of the case study. In September 2005 the researcher attended a conference on PRTs in Afghanistan. The outcomes of this conference were in accordance with the findings of this case study.

6.3 THE DECISION TO COOPERATE

6.3.1 Internal and external analysis of NL PRT

The main force of NL PRT consisted of approximately 130 persons. As part of ISAF expansion stage one[18], its mission was to "to assist and facilitate local authorities to create a safe and secure environment in order to enable the government, international and non-governmental organisations (IOs/NGOs) to carry out reconstruction activities" (Bok and Stassen, 2005). The main capacity of NL PRT consisted of three mission teams, known as Military Observer and Liaison Teams (MOLTs) during the first months of the deployment. Each team was composed of a commander (major), a deputy commander (lieutenant), four men force protection, an interpreter, and a medic. Depending on the type of mission a team was complemented by personnel of psychological operations (psy-ops), intelligence (intel), civil-military cooperation (cimic) or police liaison (Dutch Ministry of Defence, 2005a). Apart from medics, no women were included in the mission teams. Many military believed that female officers would not be taken seriously in the masculine society of Afghanistan. The female polad did strongly disagree when the integration of a female officer in the mission teams for the fourth rotation was rejected. Her view was that integrating females in the mission team would make it much easier for Afghan women to become involved in the reconstruction process and would lead to a far more sustainable peace.

The mission teams had a great variety of tasks. The first was to stay in contact with and assist the local authorities such as governors, mullahs (religious leaders) and maliks (village elders). Second, the mission teams were to get a clear overview of the external situation in Baghlan province. This included finding out about the needs of the local population and

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[18] Established after the Istanbul Summit in June 2004, the NATO expansion plan, divided Afghanistan into four zones: north, west, east, and south. In principle ISAF was to deploy PRTs in a counter-clockwise fashion, beginning in the north (i.e. expansion stage 1).

which actor was doing what and where. It also included the collection of intelligence and to show the presence of force in the province.

To execute these tasks each mission team was assigned to one of the 14 districts of Baghlan province. Most missions lasted one-day, but two-day or sometimes three-day missions were made to more remote areas. A mission usually incorporated a visit to the district governor and the head of police where daily business was discussed, which covered the general situation in the district (e.g. flooding, refugees), the safety situation, and the upcoming provincial elections to be held in September 2005. Apart from these key persons, the mission teams also visited small villages or towns to obtain a general inventory of the needs of the local population and show the presence of NL PRT.

Many assessments were made by the mission teams to inventory the needs of the districts though they were frequently not structured, ill prepared up-front and did not use a clear format. In addition many of the questions were not open but hinted at specified answers. Although NATO provided detailed guidelines for area assessments (ISAF, 2004e), including village assessments (ISAF, 2004d), NL PRT made no use of these formats. Personnel of NL PRT did sometimes criticise these methods. After visiting the same kebab restaurant twice in one morning, a corporal of the force protection raised his doubts about the usefulness of these visits. The mission team commander however, countered that this was showing the presence of NL PRT.

The cimic branch of NL PRT was unable to contribute to a more structured approach of the assessments due to the fact that this branch only consisted of two to three staff members per rotation. During the three rotations these people were with some exceptions, inexperienced and lacked the required knowledge.

During the third rotation the needs of poultry production were determined through participatory meetings with the heads of the Department of Agriculture and some village elders, which led to a more demand-driven approach.

In addition to its own assessment capacity, NL PRT made use of some documents of GE PRT, which was responsible for the Baghlan province until September 2004. Apart from these, hardly any use was made of resources from other organisations such as UNAMA, the World Bank, or UNICEF. This contributed to the unfamiliarity of NL PRT with larger frameworks and projects on international, national, and provincial levels.

Apart from gathering information on the external situation, structuring and processing this data turned out to be a considerable problem. The mission teams and different branches gathered large amounts of information each day. The information was accessible through the "mission tasker and findings" of the mission teams. These reports included the findings of the mission of one of the teams in detail and resulted in many files, sorted on date and district, in which the findings were presented. This made it impossible to quickly get an overview of a specific need in an area.

The structure provided by NATO, the NATO cimic area tracking and reporting system (ARRC, 2003), was not used sometimes only because people were unaware of it. At other times people did not like this system or criticised it for being too subjective[19]. As a result, several database systems were developed and used by personnel of NL PRT. Because of the individual development, they were often inaccessible to others making it very difficult to transfer information. Moreover, NL PRT had several parallel databases, one for cimic, one for intel, and one for psy-ops, resulting in duplication of effort and lack of integration between the branches.

As no uniform structure was in place, personnel of NL PRT started to interpret the information through different and often personal standards. This again contributed to the lack of usefulness of the information gathered for NL PRT and for other actors in Baghlan province. At the time of investigation a new programme (iBase) was introduced. This system should be able to integrate all external information relevant to NL PRT (i.e., cimic, intel, psy-ops). However, developing clear and equal standards and assessment methods is essential to unify the input of the program.

This led to a disorganised situation in which there was a great lack of situational awareness, giving undue weight to the most recent information. In reaction to this phenomenon, an assessment team was deployed late in 2004. The assignment of this team was "to carry out a CIMIC assessment on the functional areas: culture, economy and commerce, civil infrastructure, governance and humanitarian affairs. The team should also include a representative of IDEA and a specialist on hydro power plants. This assessment should present an overview of the actual situation on the functional areas, which organisations and countries carry out activities and which central programs are carried out in Baghlan province. In the actual assessment, use is to be made of existing data of GE-PRT, UNAMA, Dutch embassy and personnel of NL-PRT" (CGN, 2005a).

The final report made by this team consisted of a detailed description of the five functional areas as defined in their assignment. For several reasons personnel of NL PRT considered the assessment of little use because:

1. The assessment provided a detailed list of potential projects rather than a thorough insight into the needs and priorities of the local population.
2. No stakeholder analysis was performed. Despite this assessment it was still unclear which other organisations were operating in Baghlan province on what programs and with what means.
3. Different outlines were used in the assessments of the functional areas that made it very difficult to mutually compare them.

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[19] For a more detailed description of the NATO cimic area tracking and reporting system see the case study on civil-military cooperation in Kabul.

4. It was not clear how the projects fit in the overall situation both civil (Afghanistan's National Priorities Programs (The Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan, 2004)) and military (ISAF).
5. Since some members of the assessment team were specialists rather than generalists, the direction and outcome of the assessment was directed towards these specialties (e.g., hydro power plants).
6. The assessment was made in Dutch, which made it impossible to communicate with other actors.

Despite these problems, the inter-departmental conference cimic[20] allocated €500,000 to carry out several longer-term reconstruction projects based on this assessment. The strong call by local authorities for visible results contributed to this. In this regard NL PRT was often compared to its predecessor, GE PRT, which spent millions of dollars on assistance activities in Baghlan province.

During the third rotation, functional specialists (reserve personnel with specific civil expertise) were added to NL PRT to manage several longer-term reconstruction projects. These consisted of the increase of poultry production through primary schools, the construction of micro hydro power plants, civil administration training, and the provision of radio communication equipment for the district governors.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs allocated an additional €4.5 million to these finances. Through the FFR, the polad of NL PRT was delegated to spend this fund. FFR was primarily meant to facilitate the operation of NL PRT but expenditures were to be approved according to guidelines of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This created tension as these guidelines were based on development issues rather than military considerations (e.g. before approval all expenditures went through lengthy processes to ensure accountability and long-term sustainability).

Despite the considerable amount of data collected on the external environment and allocation of funds to several projects, NL PRT had little insight into other actors operating in Baghlan province. NL PRT made lists of the most important persons in each district (e.g., police commanders, maliks, and mullahs). As these persons frequently changed and the mission teams were unable to reach all areas, it was difficult to keep these lists updated. NL PRT did not know which construction companies were operating in Baghlan province. No overview was available that included the capacity, reputation, portfolio, or earlier experiences regarding these companies. Also no unit prices concerning wood or ground works were available within NL PRT. In its assessment Cimic Group North (CGN), recommended making a shortlist of reliable construction companies (CGN, 2005b), but no follow-up was given.

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[20] A conference between the Dutch Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Foreign Aid on cimic

In June 2005, 10 months after NL PRT's actual deployment, no uniform overview of humanitarian organisations was available. Several different lists of organisations were made, but often these did not include capacities, points of contacts, objectives, activities, focus areas, or local NGOs. Due to this lack of awareness, the program manager of IDEA, the functional specialists charged with the longer-term reconstruction projects, the cimic branch, the mission teams, and the polad all made an analysis of available actors. This led to great duplication of efforts and a waste of resources. In recent years for example, AKF had constructed approximately 300 micro hydro power plants in rural areas in Afghanistan. Within a year after completion, half were no longer functioning properly. When NL PRT set up a project for similar constructions in Baghlan province, it was unaware of these negative experiences.

This lack of awareness was partly due to the absence of NL PRT in most coordination structures. The polad often attended the monthly general coordination meeting of organisations operating in Baghlan province. Apart from that, hardly anyone from NL PRT participated in the monthly sectoral coordination meetings on inter alia education, agriculture, water, sanitation, and infrastructure. Moreover, no cimic branch personnel functioned as liaison with humanitarian organisations. This resulted in the ignorance of NL PRT with activities of NGOs in the province and national organisations such as ACBAR (coordinating organisation of international NGOs), ANCB (coordinating organisation of Afghan NGOs), and UNAMA.

The role of the polad, a delegate of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was often confusing to military personnel. Positioned next to the commander in the organic structure of NL PRT, the polad was responsible for political advice and FFR expenditures. During the first eight months of NL PRT deployment however, the polad also fulfilled most responsibilities regarding the coordination and cooperation with humanitarian organisations. While the mission teams identified the needs of the local population, the polad initiated coordination and cooperation with humanitarian organisations in the area. As a civilian, the polad was perceived as more neutral and independent than military personnel of NL PRT, which clearly facilitated interactions with humanitarian organisations. The extensive polad's network was considered useful for follow-up of the needs. Moreover, the polad had considerable expertise on developing issues.

As a result, the cimic branch, normally considered as an interface between NL PRT and the civilian actors in Baghlan province, had a very limited network of civil contacts. When a new polad was assigned to NL PRT in March 2005 she kept to her assignment as political advisor of NL PRT more strictly and focused less on coordination and cooperation with humanitarian organisations with regard to assistance activities. Until July 2005 however, this was not clear to some of the (deputy) commanders of the mission teams. In their meetings with the local authorities they promised to pass their requests on to the appropriate humanitarian organisations. In the daily debriefing meetings of NL PRT these

(deputy) commanders mentioned the requests of the local authorities and assumed that the polad would pass these on to the humanitarian organisations. As the polad was not officially responsible for this, she often did not pass these on which led to a lack of follow up and many unfulfilled expectations by the local authorities.

The lack of integration of NL PRT units was displayed more often. The intel branch and the cimic branch hardly coordinated and communicated activities mutually. The cimic branch did not use the information of the intel branch to direct its activities considering locations or target groups.

Many problems NL PRT faced were caused or increased by the level of experience and knowledge of its personnel. As coordinating unit of the Dutch military forces, the first three rotations of NL PRT were composed of the Royal Dutch Air force. They supplied a large share of NL PRT personnel of which few had experience with land-based peace support operations. Several (deputy) mission team commanders functioned in the Netherlands as air-traffic controllers or as patriot fire unit commanders. Prior to deployment they went through a five-week training course to get prepared for their "new" jobs.

Just like the mission team commanders, most personnel of the cimic branch, including the functional specialists, lacked experience and sufficient knowledge. With some exceptions, they were unaware of developing issues, military guidelines regarding cimic (e.g. AJP-09, Annex W), and the concept of operations of NL PRT. The functional specialists and IDEA programme manager were in general very skilled in their fields (electricity, civil administration, and small-medium scale enterprises (SMEs)). However, most copied their western methods and approaches to the Afghan situation. The functional specialist responsible for poultry production had worked in developing countries for many years and had broad knowledge and experience about developing issues. The commanders of the cimic branch could not direct their people unambiguously, which often resulted in differences in the approach and execution of the activities. Moreover, within NL PRT it resulted in a lack of understanding about what cimic was and how it was put into action.

Regarding the police training, NL PRT had two course instructors at its disposal. However, the training course was still to be designed in Afghanistan to a large extent and both instructors were not skilled in course design. Since they received little support from personnel in the Netherlands, they had difficulties fulfilling their jobs.

Based on these internal and external characteristics there were several motives for NL PRT to cooperate with the civilian actors:

- NL PRT had very limited implementing capacity. For example Baghlan province was littered with explosives and ammunition. As NL PRT had only one advisor on explosive ordnance disposal (EOD-advisor) and regulations required that a minimum

of two specialised persons was required for the removal of these items, cooperation was inevitable.

- Civilian actors (Halo Trust, AKF, DCA) provided NL PRT with knowledge and expertise about the local situation, customs, and humanitarian assistance. For example, Halo Trust provided NL PRT with information on the safety situation with regard to explosives and ammunition.
- Cooperation with the local population was essential since tasks and responsibilities were often transferred to them after completion of the assistance activities. To increase sustainability, it was necessary to involve the local population in the partnership. This was in particularly visible in the partnerships with DCA, AKF and CFA.
- Cooperation with local construction companies increased the local capacity and stimulated the local economy.

6.3.2   Internal and external analysis of civilian actors

The government of Afghanistan ran 13 National Priority Programs, which were the cornerstone of the reconstruction in Afghanistan (The Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan, 2004). These programs focused on a variety of issues, including transport (National Transport Program), security and governance (Afghanistan Stabilisation Program (ASP)) and energy (National Irrigation and Power Program). A ministry led each program and the total budget for the funding year 1383 (March 2004 – March 2005) was approximately 2 billion dollars.

Despite these national programs and budgets, relatively few international humanitarian organisations were active in Baghlan province mainly due to two reasons. Although Baghlan was one of the safest and most stable provinces in Afghanistan, many international organisations perceived it as too dangerous to operate in. Second, the province was relatively well developed compared to other areas. The focus of many organisations was therefore not on Baghlan province. However, these reasons are paradoxical since less developed regions in Afghanistan are often less stable and no attractive alternative for many organisations.

The international organisations active in Baghlan included AKF, Acted, Swedish Committee for Afghanistan (SCA), CFA, UNICEF, UNHCR, and Halo Trust. Many had very limited capacity, often completely absorbed by the programs they were carrying out. In most organisations the largest share of personnel consisted of Afghan employees, which not only directly contributed to local communities through employment creation and skills development but also increased the local network and knowledge on local customs and needs. Many of these organisations (AKF, Halo Trust) had broad experience with assistance activities in Afghanistan.

Monthly coordination meetings took place to coordinate and manage efforts of the assistance community in the province. These consisted of one general coordination meeting attended by all UN agencies, the international organisations, and a focal point

from the government. Next, sectoral meetings focused on specific areas including agriculture, human rights, and education. Frequently these coordination meetings were either postponed or not considered useful, as only a few organisations were present.

With regard to cooperation with NL PRT, at an operational level the international organisations generally regarded the humanitarian principles as strict guidelines. Their attitude was recorded in a policy brief of ACBAR (2003), which stated that if PRTs work in close physical proximity to NGOs, communities would no longer distinguish between military- and civilian-implemented assistance. The blurring of roles may have a significant negative impact on the relationship of NGOs with the communities they serve. They also may pose security risks if civilian humanitarians are perceived as collaborating with an unwanted military force and channelling intelligence to it.

At a tactical level these principles were also considered important though often a more pragmatic approach was taken and several motives were identified with respect to cooperation with NL PRT:

- Large assessment capacity of NL PRT; Halo Trust in particular made frequent use of the information on ammunition and explosives collected by the mission teams.

- Financial means within NL PRT; the three main sources of funding were the FFR (€4.5 million), the longer-term reconstruction projects (€500,000), and H&M projects (€50,000 per rotation). These funds were the main reason for AKF, CFA and DCA to cooperate with NL PRT.

- Technical knowledge of NL PRT; the knowledge of several specialists from NL PRT was frequently used in the partnership with humanitarian organisations. This included the knowledge of the EOD-advisor in the partnerships with Halo Trust and the knowledge of the cimic functional specialist in the partnership with DCA on poultry production.

- Direct or indirect security provided by NL PRT troops; examples included the development of the Disaster Response Committee for Baghlan Province and extra patrolling.

Apart from the international organisations, several local NGOs were active in Baghlan province. It was, however, very difficult to analyse the capacities and capabilities of these organisations. This was complicated by the fact that many local contractors claimed to be an NGO to avoid paying tax. Many of these organisations lacked experience and knowledge and were unable to write project proposals according to the requirements some personnel of NL PRT used (Apeldoorn, 2005).

In addition to the international and local organisations, a large share of the civilian actors in Baghlan province was from the local population. The coping capacity of local communities played an important role in the reconstruction process as they frequently contributed to the

assistance activities. This capacity primarily consisted of labour and local resources, including small financial means. Involving the local population was very important to ensure sustainability. This could increase clarity about the exact needs of the local population and their sense of ownership as well as embed the activities in the social structures.

6.3.3 The decision to cooperate and strategic plan of NL PRT

Since the Netherlands was the lead nation of the PRT in Baghlan province, NL PRT received national guidelines for the execution of its task (Dutch Ministry of Defence, 2005a). Included in the concept of operations, the guidelines were determined through DOC in close consultation with the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In general, NL PRT had to facilitate the Security Sector Reform (SSR), the Bonn Process, the expansion of the presence and influence of the government of Afghanistan, and the reconstruction process within means and capabilities. Annex G of the concept of operations dealt with the specific guidelines regarding civil-military cooperation (see table 8).

ISAF provided guidelines in addition to the national ones to promote a uniform approach of the PRTs in Afghanistan. At strategic and operational levels NATO developed its plans through the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and the Allied Forces North (AFNorth), which functioned as NATO's operational HQ for ISAF. With respect to civil-military cooperation, guidelines were based on AJP-09 (NATO, 2003) and recorded in annex W to Oplan 10302 (SHAPE, 2004) (see table 8). Next, ISAF HQ translated this into another annex (Annex Q to OPOORD 001-04) (ISAF, 2004c) to provide guidance for civil-military cooperation within the AoRs of its PRTs in Afghanistan (see table 8).

Figure 25 schematically presents the military guidelines to NL PRT with respect to civil-military cooperation.

Figure 25: Military guidelines to NL PRT with respect to civil-military cooperation

Table 8 presents the end states, key tasks, missions and lines of activity priorities, which were included in these separate annexes.

	Annex W (AFNorth)	Annex Q (ISAF HQ)	Annex G (DOC)
Cimic end state	This will be reached when the terms of the 2001 Bonn Agreement have been met and a secure environment exists for civil administrations. The transfer of ISAF responsibilities to the appropriate civil organisations should have taken place thereby allowing the withdrawal of ISAF forces.	Not included	Not included
Cimic mission	To support the Joint Force Commander by maintaining his relationship with the civil environment, by conducting cimic activities, making cimic assessments and minimising impediments to the military mission.	The intent of cimic activities in the AoR of the PRTs must be to maximise support to the ISAF mission and desired end state. This is achieved by undertaking continuous cooperation, coordination and liaison with in-theatre IOs, NGOs, donors and Afghan authorities at the respective levels.	Civil-military cooperation and the execution of different kind of projects support the mission, increase the support within the local population and contribute to the safety of the personnel.
Cimic key tasks	1. Liaison 2. Support to the force 3. Support to the civil environment	1. Liaison 2. Support to the force 3. Support to the civil environment	1. Liaison 2. Civil assessments 3. Projects (H&M projects, longer-term reconstruction projects, FFR projects)
Cimic lines of activity	1. Humanitarian support 2. Public safety 3. Civil administration 4. Infrastructure repair 5. Economy and commerce 6. Democratisation	1. Civil liaison, assessment to local communities 2. Provincial and district infrastructure 3. Civil liaison, support to IOs/NGOs 4. Basic education 5. Social infrastructure, roads, water and power 6. Public health	1. Liaison with local authorities and IOs/NGOs 2. Judgement, initiation and execution of H&M projects and longer-term reconstruction projects 3. Facilitation of FFR projects

Table 8: Cimic guidelines for NL PRT

Table 8 shows that ISAF and DOC did not formulate specific cimic end states. This made it impossible to determine when the mission was completed and capacity could be redeployed. Second, the cimic missions and key tasks in the annexes were quite similar; all emphasised the support to the force. Third, cimic lines of activity differed between the annexes. There was little overlap between the activities set by AFNorth and ISAF HQ. The activities set by DOC were general and did not set priorities in functional areas. Finally, the three guidelines used different formats and included different elements, which made them difficult to compare.

To decide which activities were to be performed, personnel of NL PRT frequently did not take the guidelines of NATO and the DOC into account because the guidelines were considered too general to be of any use in the field, contained discrepancies, and many people did not or only partly knew of the existence of the guidelines.

The head of the cimic branch of DOC maintained frequent contact with cimic officers of NL PRT either through visits to Baghlan, email, or telephone to provide additional guidance. In contrast with this, there was almost no contact between the cimic branch of ISAF HQ and that of NL PRT. This difference between additional guidance of DOC and ISAF HQ was caused by the fact that NL PRT was primarily accountable to DOC. Second, the personal fit between the cimic officers in NL PRT and the head of the cimic branch of DOC was much stronger compared to the cimic officers at ISAF HQ.

To decide which H&M projects were undertaken, the cimic branch of NL PRT developed a set of compensatory and non-compensatory criteria, presented in table 9.

Compensatory criteria	Non-compensatory criteria
It is in the interest of the community	Different ethnicities
It should have a high number of beneficiaries	Arrangements through NGOs
The project should be visible	Careful division through the province of Baghlan
Quick to realise	
Relative low costs (no long-term maintenance, etc.)	
It should have positive consequences	
Project should be unique	
High need	
The persons with requests should have a reasonable thought through plan	
One should have attempted to access all other official ways. Preferably with documentation (controllable)	
Projects should be divided over the entire province	

Table 9: Criteria for H&M projects (NL PRT, 2005g)

Many of these criteria are vague. For example, what exactly are "positive consequences" and consequences for whom? When is something considered a "high need" and by whose

standards? When is a project "unique"? The criterion "projects should be divided over the entire province" even contradicts many military cimic guidelines since assistance activities were to be directed towards certain groups to influence their perception towards NL PRT, rather than equally spread over Baghlan province.

A focus on mosques was considered very effective in general. NL PRT believed contributing to these facilities would win the hearts and minds of the many religious people of Afghanistan. However, because the criteria of table 9 were open to many interpretations, many people were led by personal emotions, often referred to as the *feel-good trap*. A striking example was the military transport of one local family from Baghlan to the central military hospital in Kabul to examine the serious disease of their two children. This activity did not apply to most of the criteria (in the interest of community, high number of beneficiaries), but was based primarily on personal emotions.

During the first rotation NL PRT developed orderly strategic plans for its H&M projects, including objectives, risks and costs (Dutch Ministry of Defence, 2005b). This approach was not followed in subsequent rotations of NL PRT and frequently there were no strategic plans drafted.

With respect to long-term reconstruction, projects priorities were set in February 2005. A note from the Dutch Chief of Staff (Dutch Ministry of Defence, 2005c) formulated three priority areas: (1) civil administration, (2) employment creation, and (3) civil infrastructure. Based on the assessment of CGN (CGN, 2005a) the Dutch Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence agreed on the execution of seven projects and developed strategic plans for each. As these priority areas were quite broad, the selection of the projects was based on a consensus between both ministries. While the Ministry of Defence attended to the military interests (e.g., projects should directly benefit the operation of NL PRT), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs principally focused on the development of Baghlan province. These differences became especially visible in the terms of the projects. From a military perspective the projects were to be finished preferably long before September 2006, the date at which NL PRT was to hand over responsibility of Baghlan province to the military force of another country. NL PRT could then still benefit from its efforts. From a development perspective, some of the projects would not be completed till past this date in order to increase sustainability (e.g., the long-term supervision of primary schools in poultry production).

The strategic plans included beneficiaries, project risks, and costs (NL PRT, 2005b). However, most did not address the embeddedness of the project in larger civil programs (e.g., National Priority Programs) and did not contain clear objectives. With regard to the construction of the micro hydro power plants, different objectives were set in different documents: (1) improvement of safety, (2) improvement of development and (3) improvement of SMEs. Apart from the variety of objectives, one can question their validity. As far as safety improvements, NL PRT believed that electrical light would

increase the perception of safety in villages and communities. This is very doubtful since the project did not focus on street lighting and there was not a high crime rate in these communities during evenings and nights. As far as the second objective, electrical light would increase the possibilities of education of children on the one hand but on the other, it would provide access to television. However, there were no television networks or opportunities for satellite television in the target communities. Moreover, because the network frequency of the power plants was not stable, it was not possible to use this power for televisions or computers.

Most decisions with regard to FFR were made by the polad. To minimise control efforts, only large projects were executed. The priority setting of these projects was unclear. Decisions were based on the same priority areas as in the longer-term reconstruction projects (i.e., civil administration, employment creation, and civil infrastructure). Again it was fairly simple to gather any project within these priority areas and decisions were thus based entirely on personal opinions. This is illustrated by the fact that the first polad of NL PRT was emphatically against education, while the second polad emphasised it. All activities within the framework of FFR were long-term, focused on the development of Baghlan and were to be authorised by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

In addition to the H&M projects, the longer-term reconstruction projects, and the FFR activities, several other activities were performed in cooperation with civilian actors. Training of the police trainers directly contributed to the assistance of the government of Afghanistan and Germany as lead nation of the police sector reform. The need for police training was expressed by the trainer to trainee ratio. While this was 1:5 for the Afghan National Army (ANA) it was 1:358 for the Afghan National Police (ANP) (ISAF, 2005). The objectives of this partnership were to train policemen on the streets in basic skills and replace their metal truncheons with EU certified ones. Through the use of a metal truncheon and excessive use of violence, current actions of the police caused many injuries of the local population and resulted in contempt and fear of the police.

Cooperation with Halo Trust focused on ammunition and explosives removal directly contributing to a safe and secure environment. This partnership also contributed to the DDR process as it focused on the collection of weapons and ammunitions from inter alia warlords in Baghlan province.

IDEA activities were intended to facilitate employment through the development of SMEs, which then would contribute to the overall stability of the area. Despite its expertise and knowledge of entrepreneurship, the IDEA program manager was unfamiliar with Afghanistan and military guidelines. This made it often unclear how the activities contributed to the mission of NL PRT.

6.3.4   The decision to cooperate and strategic plans of civilian actors

For humanitarian organisations, the decision to cooperate with NL PRT was made in various ways. Due to previous cooperation with ISAF troops, cooperation with NL PRT was initiated through the provincial coordinator of Halo Trust. No clear targets were set by Halo Trust other than to maximise the removal of ammunition and explosives in Baghlan.

Most other humanitarian organisations that cooperated with NL PRT often did set more detailed objectives and targets. For example the general objective of CFA was "to create an environment of hope and respect for children in need in which they have opportunities to achieve their full potential, and provide children, families and communities with practical tools for positive change". With respect to the cooperation with NL PRT, this was translated into a detailed project plan to support literacy training in the province (CFA, 2005).

DCA's objectives were "to protect the remaining livestock and increase livestock production, in particular through training, extension and the delivery of animal health services at village level". Because DCA was not present in Baghlan province, NL PRT communicated with the head office in the Netherlands and decisions whether or not to cooperate were made at the head office.

Several humanitarian organisations set conditions for cooperation with NL PRT. These were normally derived from the Oslo Guidelines (United Nations, 1994) or the code of conduct of the ICRC (ICRC, 1994). In most cases this implied that all assistance activities were to be carried out according to humanitarian principles. It also included conditions on the use of force protection by NL PRT troops and wearing military dress.

Local contractors and authorities normally focused on maximising the benefits. With respect to local contractors, these benefits were purely financial. For local authorities these consisted of personal benefits and general profits for the local population. If NL PRT or the humanitarian organisations did not consult the local population, they were very often not involved in the decisions by the local authorities. This increased the level of self-enrichment of the authorities. Sometimes multiple local representatives were involved as a response. No strategic plans were developed with objectives and targets.

6.4   PARTNER SELECTION

NL PRT personnel involved in assistance activities in cooperation with civilian actors often carried out the search and selection of appropriate partners individually. These included functional specialists, the program manager of IDEA, personnel of the cimic branch, the polad, the minister, and the military police. Since little assistance came from the staff of NL PRT (cimic branch), there was a great duplication of effort and many people ran into the same problems in the selection process.

Based on the brief information of organisations operating in Baghlan province, potential partner organisations were identified and visited. Some personnel ran into potential partner organisations accidentally on a mission. Others had an extensive personal network they used in the search (e.g., functional specialist on poultry production). With regard to the FFR projects, the polad made use of general coordination meetings, contacts of ACBAR, the network of the Dutch embassy, and his/her own personal network. However, as it was difficult and time-consuming for each individual to get a good overview of potential partner organisations, frequently organisations were overlooked or discovered in a later stage of the assistance activities.

To determine whether a humanitarian organisation was an appropriate partner, different people from NL PRT often implicitly used several criteria. The following task-related criteria were used:

- Complementary resources; the resources of humanitarian organisations (e.g., capacity, knowledge and expertise) were to be complementary to the resources of NL PRT.
- Added value for NL PRT (based on time, quality, costs, and service); in the framework of FFR, larger projects were favoured as this would minimise the amount of control. Large organisations were preferred because they were able to carry out the activities. To ensure the quality of FFR projects, NL PRT only cooperated with organisations approved by ACBAR. These were only international humanitarian organisations (not local parties since they were not approved by ACBAR). To remove ammunition and explosives, NL PRT only cooperated with Halo Trust because this organisation was considered to work very safely. Local organisations involved in the removal were not considered as partners as several accidents had occurred involving these organisations.
- Compatible strategies and objectives; the humanitarian organisations and NL PRT essentially had different mandates. Through the execution of assistance activities, humanitarian organisations contributed to the development of Baghlan province and were complementary to the mandate of NL PRT. Non-compatible strategies and objectives between NL PRT and humanitarian organisations included the time schedule (short-term focus of NL PRT versus long term focus of humanitarian organisations) and target groups (the target groups of NL PRT were sometimes belligerent with regard to cimic).

In addition several criteria were identified in relation to the partner:

- Nationality; Afghan organisations were preferred as they could contribute to the capacity building of Afghanistan.
- Personal fit; the functional specialist and the director of DCA were long-term acquaintances, which increased their personal bond.

- Prior experiences with and reputation of the partner; the functional specialist of NL PRT was familiar with the work and projects of DCA. Previous cooperation of several members of NL PRT with Halo Trust in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In addition Halo Trust had a reputation to work very safely.

- Compatible cultures; despite the different organisation cultures, both the director of DCA and personnel of NL PRT being Dutch was valued as important.

- Network; both AKF and CFA had a large network. Cooperation was preferred as they provided easy access to other organisations.

- Flexibility; the flexibility of Halo Trust was considered very important.

Regarding most construction activities only two local contractors were part of the selection process of NL PRT. Both companies were known through their construction activities at the NL PRT compound. If NL PRT needed construction capacity, one of these companies was directly approached and contracted to carry out the activities (e.g., dam construction, school construction). For the construction of the micro hydro plants, one of the longer-term reconstruction projects of NL PRT, another contractor, Razak, was selected. The selection of a contractor was based on:

- Added value for NL PRT (based on time, quality, costs and service); as very few contractors were approached there was little competition, leading to relatively high prices.

- Complementary resources; the construction companies had capacity (e.g., personnel, machines, technical knowledge) at their disposal.

- Personal fit; personnel of NL PRT trusted the two general contractors and Razak to a large extent.

- Prior experiences with and reputation of partner; assigned by Habitat, District governors and private firms, Razak had produced several of these micro hydro power plants. These plants were generally plants of 20 KW, while the plants for NL PRT were 50 KW.

By involving only a few contractors in the selection process, NL PRT did not create significant competition. As a result NL PRT often paid relatively high prices for construction activities. For example, while personnel of the cimic branch during the second rotation were satisfied with the arrangements of bulldozers for US$50 per hour, a local interpreter of NL PRT arranged the same bulldozer within 10 minutes for only US$20 per hour. In addition to increased competition, involving more contractors encourages more efficient work and spreads the benefits through the population (Kremers, 2003).

At the time of investigation NL PRT was preparing a list of local construction companies and tendering was to be done according to Dutch procedures. However, at the moment

nobody knew what this exactly implied, as little knowledge of tendering processes was available within NL PRT.

NL PRT often paid little attention to the selection of the local actors. Having identified the assistance activities, NL PRT did not identify the stakeholders of its assistance activities. Frequently only some local authorities (e.g., the district governor, mullah) were consulted before the activities were initiated. No structured stakeholder identification and analysis (e.g., through meta-analysis) was done. In case of school reconstruction the stakeholders could have included the district governor, head of the school, the teachers, and the parents of schoolchildren. To increase commitment and a sense of ownership it is very important to involve these stakeholders in an early stage. This was quite apparent in the construction of the micro hydro power plants. Since very few potential sites were identified by NL PRT, the Afghan authorities were often "taken for granted". When the district governors indicated that they would like a power plant, this was easily approved. The demand for electricity of the communities was often not taken into account in the selection. An exception to this was the district of Déhe-Salah. The target community in this district already had a small generator paid for by the shopkeepers (NL PRT, 2005f). However, making use of a meta-plan analysis or other participatory techniques could have provided insights into the local electricity demand (e.g. quantity, purposes). As a result, communities did not feel responsible after the construction and did not want to contribute to the cable network to connect the power plants to their communities.

Exceptions to this approach were the partnership with DCA regarding poultry production and the partnerships within the framework of FFR. In the partnership on literacy training, CFA selected target communities through careful assessment of the vulnerability level of the community, the level of resources available, and local knowledge and information from other agencies, most notably UNHCR and UNAMA (CFA, 2005).

The local civil actors did not use explicit criteria in the selection of a partner other than the amount and quality of the assistance. Many of them urged NL PRT to contribute to the development of Baghlan province.

The presence and appearance of NL PRT made it easy for humanitarian organisations to identify it as a potential partner. In relation to the tasks to be carried out, humanitarian organisations used three selection criteria: complementary resources (e.g., security, finances and assessment capacity), added value (e.g., increase of scale and scope of humanitarian organisation) and compatible strategies and objectives. With respect to this last criterion, the fact that ISAF (and thus NL PRT) had an UN-mandate, made cooperation much easier. Second, contrary to the units of OEF, which had to carry out direct combat activities, NL PRT was tasked to assist the Afghan government and UNAMA. This positively influenced the attitude of many humanitarian organisations towards NL PRT (Save the Children, 2004). Third, the strategies and objectives of NL PRT to create a safe

and secure environment (e.g., removal of ammunition and explosives with Halo Trust) were compatible to those of most NGOs. Strategies and objectives of NL PRT to carry out assistance activities were often less compatible and not complementary to humanitarian organisations. As a result several humanitarian organisations saw NL PRT as a competitor. However, cooperation was considered if humanitarian organisations could directly benefit from the involvement of NL PRT (e.g. through funding). These partnerships still often contained non-compatible strategies and objectives such as the duration of the activities (i.e. short-term versus long-term) or the target groups.

In relation to the partner itself the representatives of the humanitarian organisations used several additional criteria:

- Humanitarian principles; most humanitarian organisations wished to be perceived as neutral and independent. Cooperation with NL PRT could possibly threaten this.
- Network of partners; NL PRT was embedded in the ISAF structure.
- Personal fit; personnel of NL PRT were well received by the supervisors of Halo Trust and DCA.
- Compatible cultures; despite the different organisation cultures, both the director of DCA and NL PRT personnel being Dutch was important. This was also the case in the relationship between NL PRT and the Dutch manager of the Kunduz River Basin Programme.
- Prior experiences with and reputation of the partner; DCA was familiar with the reputation of the functional specialist of NL PRT, rather than with NL PRT. Several members of NL PRT had cooperated with Halo Trust in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
- Risk of partner becoming a competitor; as NL PRT was active with assistance activities, humanitarian organisations sometimes perceived NL PRT as a competitor.
- Flexibility; NL PRT was seen as very flexible by many organisations.
- Use of force; personnel of NL PRT did not use a high degree of force.

6.5 PARTNERSHIP DESIGN

In most partnerships between NL PRT and humanitarian organisations (e.g., DCA, AKF and CFA) much attention was paid to partnership design. Detailed project plans were made, frequently through logical framework analyses (AKF, 2005; CFA, 2005; NL PRT, 2005c). These contained an overview of the implementation of the partnership including objectives, rights and duties of the actors, objective verifiable indicators, sources of verification, and preparations for termination of the partnership. As many tasks and responsibilities were transferred to the communities after completion, preparing the partnership for termination directly related to the involvement of these communities. In

the partnership with AKF "a significant amount of community mobilisation will be required before starting these projects and during the implementation of the projects. Extensive discussion will be held with local communities regarding these projects. Local community bodies elected by consensus will be set up for each of these projects to be involved in planning, implementing and taking care of future operations and maintenance of these projects. To manage these social mobilisation tasks AKF has budgeted for two Social Organisers during the first year of the project and in the second year there will be one person to carry out this task" (AKF, 2005). Regarding the literacy classes in the partnership with CFA, "the community is responsible for providing a location where the literacy classes take place, for identifying the teachers and for providing community support for the literacy program" (CFA, 2005).

The project plans, including logical framework analyses, formed the basis for the contracts signed by NL PRT and the humanitarian organisations. For the contracts in FFR partnerships a format of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs was used (Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005). At the time of investigation, the DCA poultry production contract was going to be included in a larger agreement with NL PRT and was also based on this format.

In the partnership between NL PRT and Halo Trust no written contract or MoU was signed. Working agreements were verbal and based on trust. They included the definition of rights and duties (e.g., NL PRT did not pay for the activities of Halo Trust as these activities were labelled as humanitarian) and details of the implementation. These agreements also dealt with the activities of each actor in the partnership, for example which actor would share its information when. The main reason that personnel did not value a written contract was that few resources were allocated upfront and there was a strategic fit between the two organisations. In other partnerships, NL PRT and the humanitarian organisations had far more non-complementary objectives, such as targets groups and terms of the partnership.

In partnerships in which no international humanitarian organisations were involved (construction of micro hydro power plants, police training, most H&M projects, radio communication equipment) little attention was paid to partnership design. In the design phase of the police training, the police commanders of the highway and provincial police in Baghlan were rarely consulted by NL PRT. As a result NL PRT planned to use a Dutch textual reader on police training, translated into Dari. However, soon after the contract was signed between the commander of NL PRT and the commanders of the highway and provincial police (NL PRT, 2005d), it appeared that half of the trainees were illiterate. To properly train the policemen it was necessary that the trainees were able to read and write. As this would be a lengthy process, the reader was completely adjusted and tailor-made to

the level of the trainees, thereby degrading the level of the training course. Involving and consulting the local police in the partnership design could have prevented this.

In the partnership on micro hydro power plants a contract was prepared between NL PRT and district governors of Banu, Dehe-Salah and Pole-Hesar (NL PRT, 2005e). These were the districts in which the first three power plants were built. The contract included a description of the district governors' obligations (e.g., construction of the transformer house), the planning of the activities and dispute resolution mechanisms. The district governor of Pole-Hesar did not sign because he believed he could not fulfil the obligations of the contract. If he had signed and in a later stage could not fulfil the conditions he believed to lose his credibility (NL PRT, 2005f). Despite the refusal of the governor, NL PRT decided to start the implementation in Pole-Hesar.

In many H&M projects contracts were concluded with the local representatives (e.g., mullah, shora) and the local contractors. These varied from small notes to more detailed contracts. However, many representatives did not value these written contracts but attached much more value to the verbal agreements made with NL PRT personnel. Second, the contracts were often only made in English, making them unreadable for most local representatives. In several H&M projects local communities were obliged to contribute finances or manpower (e.g., river works in Karte Etefaq) which increased the sense of ownership by the local communities.

NL PRT made use of standard contracts with respect to local contractors (NL PRT, 2005c). After completion, this was translated in Dari and included instalments of the contract, a description of the project, price, payment, taxes, and duties (NL PRT, 2005c). However, these contracts were often very unclear about construction specifications. In the contract on micro-hydro power plants the local contractor was obliged to construct "a good working hydro station". What exactly is a good working hydro station and by whose standards? As these issues were not defined it was difficult for NL PRT to enforce the contract. In addition, no warranties were included related to unforeseen costs or future maintenance.

In many partnership designs, disputes about the legal possession of land took place. Because Baghlan province did not have a land register, it was difficult to settle ownership disputes. Before beginning, NL PRT wanted to clarify the legitimate owner of the land. If this was not possible, local authorities gave permission for construction.

In all partnerships the approach of NL PRT was to maximise use of local personnel, local contractors, local standards, and local resources. This contributed to the creation of local employment, skills development, stimulation of the local economy, and sustainability. As one exception, NL PRT applied Dutch standards regarding the employment of underage workers (under 18 years). This demonstrated the ambivalent position in which NL PRT

was often situated. While it was allowed to employ personnel over 16 years old in Baghlan, and often under 16, Dutch law prohibited hiring personnel under the age of 18.

6.6 PARTNERSHIP IMPLEMENTATION

The actors were involved in several ways in the implementation of assistance activities. The first cluster of activities consisted of coordination and information sharing between NL PRT and civilian actors. At different levels there was extensive liaison between NL PRT and the local authorities. The mission teams generally liaised with the district governors and village elders, personnel of the military police with the highway and provincial police, the commander of NL PRT and the polad with the provincial governor, and the commander of the force protection of NL PRT with the ANA. Through liaison actors coordinated and shared information regarding issues such as the security situation or the progress of assistance activities.

Coordination and information sharing between NL PRT and humanitarian organisations was limited. Sometimes personnel of NL PRT consulted humanitarian organisations for specific information related to projects (e.g., consultation of the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) on instruction material for poultry production). Humanitarian organisations approached NL PRT concerning safety information on the safety situation. However, these activities were often incidental and no continuous sharing took place for several reasons. First, most humanitarian organisations were totally occupied by their own projects and did not need the assessment capacity of NL PRT. Second, many organisations believed that NL PRT information was biased and not useful for humanitarian purposes. Third, if humanitarian organisations requested information it was often not accessible because of the lack of structure in the assessments of NL PRT, the classification of many reports, and the use of Dutch as the main language. Fourth, since NL PRT did not have civil-military liaison officers and was often absent at the coordination meetings of Baghlan province, there was no platform to exchange and share information on fixed times with fixed persons. This led to a lack of coordination of activities between NL PRT and the humanitarian organisations. As a result NL PRT was often unaware of the activities or plans of humanitarian organisations in Baghlan province and did not use the knowledge and experience of these organisations. For example, to prevent the quarter Karte Etefaq from flooding, NL PRT had contracted a local contractor to build a dam. However, within weeks this dam was devastated by the strong current. Although this was larger than the annual floods, upfront coordination with humanitarian organisations specialised in water management (e.g., Kunduz River Basin Program) could have prevented this failure.

The second cluster of activities consisted of assistance activities of NL PRT in cooperation with humanitarian organisations. Several of these partnerships were within the framework

of FFR. At the time of investigation these had only progressed to the partnership design and none had begun implementation. As agreed in the partnership designs, most activities would be performed by humanitarian organisations. Within two years AKF would construct several schools, bridges, a road, and a water pipe scheme. In Pul e Khomri (PeK) CFA would do nine months of literacy training for 500 young men and women. Partnerships with Acted on the construction of wells and DCA on agriculture were also in progress. Both AKF and Acted were reluctant to have NL PRT personnel monitor the progress. They believed being associated with NL PRT compromised the neutral and independent positions of their organisations. NL PRT did not agree, because it wanted to demonstrate its involvement. At the time of investigation it was not clear how this would be solved.

Ammunition and weapons were localised in the partnership with Halo Trust through the local contacts of Halo Trust and the mission teams of NL PRT. Next, reconnaissance was done to determine the exact amount and type of ammunition or weapons. Normally a Halo Trust team then removed the ammunition or weapons, sometimes accompanied by the EOD advisor of NL PRT. It was often transported to Karkar barracks near the compound of NL PRT where it was temporarily stored. Halo Trust and NL PRT then destroyed the ammunition, weapons, or explosives.

At the time of investigation, several other activities in cooperation with humanitarian organisations were prepared, but not yet implemented. A contract was to be signed between NL PRT and DCA on poultry production. During the third rotation of NL PRT a Disaster Response Committee was developed. In an emergency such as an earthquake this committee was responsible for an orderly course of the evacuation of all organisations. NL PRT was the focal point for the international community, while the Afghan Red Crescent Society was the focal point for the national community.

The third cluster of activities consisted of direct assistance activities of NL PRT to the local population and authorities without the involvement of humanitarian organisations. At first, several of the longer-term reconstruction projects were part of this cluster, including the construction of micro hydro power plants and the provision of radio communication equipment to district governors.

In the construction of the micro hydro power plants, a local contractor built the hydro station, consisting of a blade wheel, generator, transformer, connections and distribution station. NL PRT paid the local contractor in several instalments. However, 80% of the payments were done without having physically checked the power plants. This was caused by among other reasons, floods that made the road inaccessible. According to the functional specialist (electrical engineer) of the cimic branch of NL PRT it was likely that the plants only produced a fraction (10-15 KW) of the agreed 50 KW. This could be ascribed to the contractor Razak or the fact that no sufficient amount of water would be available in dry periods to produce the requested power. Having already paid the vast

amount of money, it was very difficult for NL PRT to reclaim some of this. Moreover, it was agreed that the district governors constructed and paid for the transformer house, electrical wires, transmission, and the channels of the water. Late July 2005, practically no activities for which they were responsible were finalised. In meetings with NL PRT, the district governors urged for additional support regarding the cable network and connection points to the electrical system. This applied to both the two district governors who had signed the contract and the district governor of Pole-Hesar, who had not.

In the project on radio and communication equipment, the CIS[21] branch of NL PRT was responsible for the selection and purchase of materials. Through consultation with the cimic branch, high-tech communication equipment was purchased in the Netherlands. Purchasing locally was considered to be too lengthy or an inferior solution. However, for long periods NL PRT failed to recognise other programmes intending to improve communication between local authorities such as the programme of the World Bank (World Bank, 2005), the police sector, and private initiatives in the Nahrin district (where a mobile network was developed). Ensuring compatibility with these developments was important to facilitate communication between multiple actors. Additionally, procurement was done locally in these programs. If NL PRT was aware of these programs early, it could have joined in this procurement process. At the time of investigation the equipment had just been ordered. Having purchased the equipment, the CIS branch would train personnel of the district governors to use it. However, as all manuals were in Dutch and English, this would be a lengthy and difficult process. Although a warranty was included with the equipment, NL PRT would still be involved if the equipment had defects to return it to the Netherlands for maintenance.

The military police of NL PRT trained the highway and provincial police of Baghlan province. The commanders of both corps selected the candidates for the training courses. Approximately 50 policemen were selected, most of which came from PeK and Baghlan city. Two three week training courses were done by NL PRT focusing on arrest and self-defence techniques. Both courses were completed with a ceremony attended by the police commanders, the commander of NL PRT, and media. As agreed in the contract, the trainees were to hand in their metal truncheons after completion of the course. Out of the 50 trainees however, only one policeman actually handed in his truncheon, while the others did not. No actions were taken by NL PRT to enforce this, but all trainees received their certificates.

NL PRT carried out more than 100 H&M projects in the first 10 months of its operation from the reconstruction of wells, dams, bridges, and mosques to the provision of educational material, carpets, and fuel to the shelter of vulnerable women. The budgets for these projects varied from approximately €100 to €20,000. Local contractors or villagers

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[21] Communication and Information Systems Branch

were employed for most construction activities and the cimic branch of NL PRT regularly monitored the progress. To deal with conflicts during implementation, NL PRT normally paid local contractors and authorities in instalments. The first two payments included 25% of the contract sum. The remaining 50% was paid after completion.

Through several units of NL PRT, many goods (e.g., footballs, ISAF newspapers, frisbees, fuel) were distributed to the local population of Baghlan to influence the perception and facilitate the work of NL PRT. Many of these goods were resold however. After NL PRT had distributed toys and footballs to schoolchildren, they later saw the same items being sold at the local market. Moreover, it created envy between the beneficiaries, as there were no criteria as to who received the goods.

Through the minister many goods were directly distributed to the orphanage in PeK including cuddle toys, clothing, and educational material. Many were collected in the Netherlands by family members of NL PRT personnel and were sent to Baghlan. In July 2005 this included three pallets of old printer paper, to be used as drawing paper by children in the orphanage. NL PRT personnel strongly criticised this arguing that transportation costs were overlooked and far exceeded the costs of the distributed items. In addition, locally producing many of these goods (e.g., school desks) directly contributed to the local economy. Proponents stated that airplanes from the Netherlands to Afghanistan would fly anyway and filling up empty cargo spaces the military could transport for free.

IDEA began in June 2005 and focused its operations on the re-establishment of the economic structure of Baghlan province through the support of SMEs. The program manager searched randomly for SMEs who wanted assistance. Planned activities of IDEA included cost-price calculation workshops, facilitation in obtaining loans for SMEs, and a joint venture between a Dutch and Afghan company to export bicycle lamps to the Netherlands.

6.7 THE TRANSFER OF TASKS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

In activities regarding coordination and information sharing (cluster 1), the transfer of tasks and responsibilities was not regarded as important mainly because these activities were continuous and ongoing as long as NL PRT operated in the area. In most other activities (cluster 2 and 3) the transfer of tasks and responsibilities was seen as an important step in the cooperation process. Although several partnerships in cooperation with humanitarian organisations (e.g., AKF, DCA, CFA) had not progressed to this point, measures were often taken in the partnership design to ensure a smooth transfer. These included the involvement of and embeddedness in the community and the arrangement of future operations and maintenance as well as the definition of clear objectives including indicators that enabled the actors to exactly determine when the implementation of the activities was

completed and tasks and responsibilities were to be transferred. In the partnership with Halo Trust little attention was paid to the transfer because the local community was not directly involved and Halo Trust did not depend on the means and capabilities of NL PRT. Regarding cluster 3 (partnerships without involvement of humanitarian organisations), several partnerships had progressed until the transfer of tasks and responsibilities or were entirely completed. At the time of investigation three micro hydro power plants were completed and still to be checked by NL PRT. However, the obligations of the district governors (e.g., transformer house, electrical wires) were not at all fulfilled. They argued that the communities were not able to finance many of the obligations they agreed with. Second, upon completion of a power plant it was often not clear how the electricity was to be divided into the community. In the district of Banu the governor intended to divide the electricity into 5 sectors: his own office, the clinic, and the houses and streets of three local representatives (Provincial Reconstruction Team, 2005h). Third, future operations and maintenance were the responsibility of the district governors. The governor of Dehe-Salah reported that an electrical engineer of the community would do this. In the two other districts this remained unclear.

In the partnership on police training, trainees completed the courses in three weeks. After the course a trainee would continue his normal activities and start to work as an instructor for local policemen in the districts of Baghlan province (Provincial Reconstruction Team, 2005a). However, after two months nearly none of the trained instructors functioned as such for several reasons. Because the upcoming elections requested so much manpower, they did not have time to start working as instructors for the local policemen. Second, most trainees originated from the two main cities in Baghlan province (PeK and Baghlan city) and were direct assistants of the police commanders. As the main goal was to train the trainers and let them train other policemen in their districts, this would not have any result in most districts of Baghlan province. Third, the police instructors had no means (e.g. instruction materials) available to train the local policemen.

If in the future, the instructors would start training local policemen, NL PRT agreed to monitor the progress and intervene when necessary. NL PRT military police would also attend the exams to ensure that the right procedures were being followed. This would contribute to a long-term involvement of and dependency on NL PRT.

Because NL PRT had a budget of only €50,000 per rotation for H&M projects, many of these were small and did not require the transfer of many tasks and responsibilities to the local population (e.g., the provision of blankets to a police post, the donation of education material or the refurnishing of a school). If a project concerned the distribution of goods like fuel or clothes the beneficiaries became dependent and frequently requested more support. These activities were not a permanent solution to the local needs. In construction projects the remaining sum was usually paid to the contractor or community after completing the activities. Tasks and responsibilities regarding future maintenance and

operations were then transferred to the community. With local contractors no maintenance agreement or assurance was agreed to ensure the quality of their work. If the construction concerned a mosque or a well very few problems occurred after the handing over to the local representatives. If it concerned other constructions, problems occurred regularly. After the construction of the radio and television mast in PeK, it was put into use by the local television broadcasting company. However, because very limited maintenance was done the mast seriously malfunctioned six months later. Similarly, projects such as schools and clinics had several requirements to be fully operational, including sufficient equipment and personnel. This problem was increased by the fact that the international community, including NL PRT, paid its local employees at least fivefold compared to local wages. As a result many educated and notable people came to work for the humanitarian organisations and NL PRT (e.g., as an interpreter).

6.8 PARTNERSHIP EVALUATION

Most respondents stressed the importance of evaluation, but inadequate attention was paid to it in many partnerships. Internal meetings, like the daily debriefing meeting of NL PRT, often functioned as evaluation. In partnerships containing large financial contributions (e.g., DCA, AKF, CFA), arrangements were often made upfront to do an evaluation after completing the activities. If a logical framework analysis was used, verifiable indicators were often included to determine to what extent the objectives were met.

As part of most longer-term reconstruction projects an evaluation was planned. After the completion of the three micro hydro power plants, the project was to be evaluated. Based on the outcome, NL PRT would decide whether or not to proceed with the construction of an additional 15-20 power plants. It was unclear how this project was to be evaluated. As the project set long-term objectives (i.e., improvement of safety, development and SMEs) it was difficult to evaluate on short term to decide whether to continue or not. H&M projects, which involved construction activities, were completed through an on-site inspection. With regard to IDEA, an independent evaluation of the activities was planned. However, it remained unclear on what criteria and what consequences the outcomes would have when this was done. The police training courses were not formally evaluated, but several findings were included in a project proposal to extend the training courses (Dutch Ministry of Defence, 2005d).

Personnel of NL PRT often indicated that they were unaware what evaluation criteria they should use. The lack of clear objectives in many partnerships contributed to this.

6.9 PARTNERSHIP PERFORMANCE

Assessing the performance of the partnerships with the criteria set in figure 21, leads to the following findings.

Most partnerships contributed to some extent to the support of the force of NL PRT. The activities were often directly for the benefit of the community, generally reaching a large number of direct and indirect beneficiaries. A considerable number of activities were carried out in close proximity of the NL PRT compound. This was often referred to as the "6 mile rule", intending to positively influence the perception of those communities living within 6 miles of the compound. Activities in the districts greatly contributed to the situational awareness of NL PRT outside PeK. However, belligerent groups or key leaders were rarely taken into account.

Only a few activities directly contributed to a safe and secure environment. These included the removal of ammunition and explosives in cooperation with Halo Trust and the training courses for the provincial and highway police. The planned project to improve the local fire department of PeK could also contribute to this.

NL PRT put much effort into the visibility of its activities. Having completed a project, the transfer to the local community was often done with ceremonial activities. The psy-ops branch made pictures or video used as promotional material on television or newspapers. One of these was the ISAF-newspaper, which included many activities and results of ISAF. After the transfer, signboards were often put near the constructions to point out the contribution of NL PRT. One H&M project was the construction of a radio and television mast. In return NL PRT received some hours of broadcasting time each week, which it could use to communicate to the local population. At the ceremony of the police training courses, several media were present to report the success of the police reform in Baghlan.

With respect to the support of the civil environment, many partnerships filled a gap and addressed the needs of the local population. However, several activities were initiated without much involvement of the civilian actors (e.g., police training, micro hydro power plants). This sometimes resulted in a mismatch between the needs and the assistance activities. Based on the experiences of police training in Al Muthanna in Iraq the Ministry of Defence decided that running a comparable training course in Baghlan could benefit the SSR. However, due to minimal involvement of the local police the actual need was not made clear. This led to a mismatch between the objective of the course (train the trainers) and the execution (training of several illiterate policemen primarily coming from Pek and Baghlan city). In the same way, the construction of the micro hydro power plants contributed little to its objectives of the improvement of safety, development, and SMEs.

In several partnerships the activities directly addressed the needs of the humanitarian organisations, such as the establishment of a Disaster Response Committee. The

partnership with Halo Trust also directly addressed the needs of the organisation, since NL PRT assisted in the identification of ammunition through the mission teams and in advice through the EOD advisor. In other partnerships (e.g., AKF, CFA) NL PRT accommodated humanitarian organisations through funding. Through the partnerships with NL PRT the scale of most organisations was increased, contributing to their respective missions.

The sustainability of the activities greatly varied. Many H&M were sustainable because they did not require any follow-up. In partnerships with humanitarian organisations several measures were often taken to ensure sustainability (see step 5). Some activities lacked sustainability. A clear example was the river control in Karte Etefaq. Nearly 2 weeks after concluding the activities the floods totally destroyed the construction works, thereby wasting all the efforts of NL PRT and the local contractor. Partnerships in which a long-term involvement of NL PRT was required were also considered less sustainable. These included the police training courses and the provision of radio communication equipment. Nearly all partnerships made extensive use of local capacity. Many activities were contracted to local contractors and local communities were often employed.

Some NL PRT personnel (military police and cimic branch of third rotation) expressed their criticism of activities but despite the differences in the performance, most investigated partnerships were regarded as successful by both NL PRT and the civilian actors.

The costs of most partnerships were low. To execute construction activities local contractors were hired and local personnel employed. Information sharing and coordination were low cost activities, usually with high benefits (e.g., duplication of effort). The longer-term reconstruction activities were relatively expensive as several functional specialists were deployed to manage the projects. Although many of these only stayed in the area for a short period, they were relatively costly considering the €500,000 cost of these projects.

6.10 DISCUSSION

In the civil-military partnerships analysed in Baghlan province both military and civilian actors went through each of the six steps identified in the process-based partnership model either explicitly or implicitly. Insights into their decision processes were obtained based on internal and external analyses of the respective actors.

A common problem in this early stage of the cooperation process was the unclear perception civilian actors had of NL PRT. This was partly due to exaggerated expectations created by some NL PRT personnel. A letter from the NL PRT commander to several humanitarian organisations regarding the conditions on which security assistance could be

provided was an exception. The lack of unity between the different PRTs also contributed to the unclear perception of NL PRT. For example, when GE PRT was responsible for Baghlan province it focused on health improvement. Having taken over responsibility, NL PRT did not continue this focus. This example is related to the absence of one generic PRT. In different provinces of Afghanistan, various different PRT models have been implemented. In response to this, Lt. Gen. David W. Barno, the Commander of U.S. and Coalition forces in Afghanistan, stated in May 2004: "There's no cookie-cutter solution for PRTs…one size doesn't fit all" (Barno, 2004). In a country as diverse as Afghanistan: geographically, ethnically, economically, and politically, uniformity in PRT structure is impractical and each PRT must be tailored to meet local conditions (Sedra, 2004). This does not obviate the need to entrench a broad set of guidelines to guide PRT behaviour. The differences in the main PRT models can be attributed more to the approach and vision of the individual implementing countries and the interpretation of doctrine and operational guidelines by local military commanders (Save the children, 2004) than to a desire to customise the concept to meet local conditions (Sedra, 2004). In reaction to this a PRT Executive Steering Committee formulated joint terms of reference for all PRTs operating in Afghanistan to minimise the differences in operational styles between coalition and ISAF PRTs (Jakobsen, 2005).

A lack of resources was common to all PRTs. Some critics viewed the PRT plan as exemplifying the maxim that "something must be seen to be done but not much" (Stapleton, 2003). According to Barker and O'Brien of CARE International, "the PRTs have neither the resources nor the mandate to engage seriously in either reconstruction or security" and consequently has become "little more than a distraction from more serious discussions about countrywide security" (O'Brien and Barker, 2003).

There is broad consensus within the assistance community that PRTs should focus on areas in which they hold a comparative advantage (e.g., Sedra, 2004; Taylor, 2003; Hoshmand, 2005). This could make a significant contribution to the reconstruction process that would complement rather than conflict with the work of humanitarian organisations. Priority areas should include the rehabilitation of government infrastructure and capacity at the local level (e.g., the refurbishment and provision of equipment for offices and facilities), support for SSR (e.g., training and mentoring for the Afghan National Police), the reconstruction and provision of equipment to security and judicial facilities, and support for DDR (Sedra, 2004). Many of the activities of NL PRT were within these priority areas (e.g., police training, removal of explosives and ammunition, provision of radio communication equipment). Several other activities were less compatible with these priority areas and often included direct assistance activities intending to positively influence the perception of the local population (e.g., donation of goods to local population).

This is directly linked to the vague and non uniform notion of cimic. At ISAF HQ and in several PRTs (e.g., GE PRT) cimic was primarily considered as a force multiplier. Means

and capabilities were utilised primarily to support the military mission. In Kunduz province a large share of the effort went to support important lines of communication for GE PRT, such as the main connection between Kunduz and Feyzabad. This was clearly illustrated by the civilian head of GE PRT who stated: "We are 'Gutmenschen'. This means we are not only good people but we also have our interests". NL PRT regarded cimic more as aid multiplier and was less focused on directly maximising support to its own troops.

While assessing the civil environment (actors, needs) NL PRT made little use of national programs and policy. This conflicts with Afghanistan's National Priority Programs, which states that: "Development lessons to date have shown that projects will not be successful if they are not embedded in policy and program frameworks that ensure good management and accountability" (The Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan, 2004). With regard to US-led PRTs, Watkins (2004) adds to this that needs assessments were conducted by 'male personnel who never met with women and had little or no historical knowledge of the communities with which they were engaging' (O'Brien and Stapleton, 2003), and who were largely untrained in participatory assessments and development' (CARE, 2003). Save the Children (2004) addresses the lack of consultation by some PRTs of humanitarian organisations operating in the surrounding areas in advance of the arrival and deployment of the PRT. In its assessments NL PRT also consulted humanitarian organisations only to a limited extent.

Despite these barriers, civilian actors had several motives to initiate cooperation with NL PRT including financial means contributions, manpower, direct or indirect security, assessment capacity, and the capability of broadening the activities in the province by NL PRT's ability to move freely. However, there was considerable unease about the role PRTs play in providing assistance. It was feared that military-led interventions put humanitarian organisations at risk by blurring the line between military activities and neutral or impartial humanitarian action (Peace Operations Working Group of the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee, 2003).
Motives of NL PRT to cooperate with civilian actors included implementing capacity of humanitarian organisations, knowledge of and expertise, increase of local capacity, and facilitating the transfer of tasks and responsibilities. As personnel of NL PRT hardly participated in coordination meetings, coordination and information sharing was done in an unstructured manner increasing the duplication of effort and waste of resources.

Driven by the motives to cooperate, both NL PRT and the civilian actors searched for appropriate organisations to cooperate with. However, compared to Kabul and several provinces (e.g. Kunduz) few international humanitarian organisations operated in Baghlan province. Moreover, several PRTs were directly supported by a donor organisation. The British PRT was supported by the DFID, while the US PRTs received extensive support of

USAID. In Kunduz province, the AoR of the German PRT, four German ministries had representatives. In addition, several German governmental organisations operated in Kunduz province. This clearly facilitated cooperation in general and partner selection specifically. The limited number of international humanitarian organisations and the strong call for improvement of local representatives drove NL PRT into partnerships without the involvement of international humanitarian organisations.

Taylor (2003) argues that how to engage the government in the civil-military debate and get the local governments to take ownership of this issue is missing in the debate. Ambassador Brahimi, former head of UNAMA, wanted a light UN footprint and an "Afghan solution to an Afghan problem", emphasises the importance of this. In the design of most partnerships, without involvement of humanitarian organisations, NL PRT often considered local partners as a given. They were frequently not consulted or only to a limited extent which resulted in a lack of preparation of the termination. While in the partnership design NL PRT agreed to use Afghan standards, activities of GE PRT in cooperation with humanitarian organisations made often use of German standards. This was also likely to conflict with the sustainability of the activities (e.g., future maintenance).

Sedra (2004) argues that it is important to stress that in general the preferred style of implementation of the activities is to sub-contract them out to stimulate local economy and the sense of ownership by the local population. Preferably military personnel would only monitor the activities. However, in many cases NL PRT was involved in implementation. Sometimes this was because they had a clear comparative advantage (e.g., police training, removal of explosives and ammunition). In other cases this was to manage the implementation process (e.g., longer-term reconstruction projects). This required expertise and knowledge of involved military personnel. Most NL PRT personnel only received limited training. For example, cimic personnel often did not have much experience and were trained for only two weeks. During some periods only inexperienced personnel were deployed contrary to GE PRT. In each of its liaison and monitoring teams (LMTs) at least one experienced person was included. In addition most cimic personnel of GE PRT were derived from the German cimic battalion. These people were trained specifically for cimic. This improved the consistency of the German approach and the continuity of activities. This was also improved by rotation schemes of GE PRT. In each LMT, personnel rotated on different times, increasing the overlap period to at least 6 weeks.

Depending on the type of activities, tasks and responsibilities were transferred after completion. In assistance activities in particular, where the local population directly benefited, the transfer was seen as an important step in the cooperation process. Ensuring a proper follow-up of the activities contributed to sustainability and the long-term development of Afghanistan. Sedra (2004) recommends that PRTs must develop an exit

strategy. Although the duration of PRT engagement in Afghanistan is unclear, it is important that thought is given to the manner in which the PRT will withdraw and how it facilitates a transition of authority and transfer of assets to Afghan authorities.

Even though many respondents stressed the importance of an evaluation, formal evaluations were rarely seen. Jakobsen (2005) states that PRTs in general have received very mixed reviews. Humanitarian organisations generally regard the PRTs as a second-best solution, preferring a robust peace operation covering the entire country. According to the harshest critics in the humanitarian community, the PRTs have done more harm than good. In contrast with this view, NATO and the governments fielding the PRTs view them as a success story. In their view PRTs are an effective, flexible, low-cost instrument that can easily be adapted to other conflicts.

In many reports, critics make the point that NGOs and locals are a much cheaper alternative to reconstruction than bringing in the military. Borders (2004) states "absent any hard statistical data or activity-based costing metric to verify this claim, presumably critics are inferring that overhead costs are generally greater for the military than for aid organisations. This may be true, but without an equivalent comparison of all true associated costs, it is impossible to offer an objective argument to support this contention. Another related point that deserves mention is that PRTs also use local labour and they predominantly operate in areas where NGOs either will not, or cannot operate because of security concerns". In his report Jakobsen (2005) states "when USAID assessed the effectiveness of their quick impact projects in November 2003, it found that they had done little to enhance the popularity of the Americans and the central government for the simple reason that few of the Afghans interviewed were aware that the Americans and the government had funded these projects. This finding is likely to hold for all the quick impact projects conducted by international forces and NGOs, given the tendency of ordinary Afghans to regard them all as 'foreigners'".

6.11 CONCLUSION

The process model as it is presented is considered to be appropriate since it is able to describe and explain the cooperation process between military and civilian actors at the local level. It was established that civil-military partnerships go through six successive steps. First each actor decides whether or not cooperation should be pursued. Next, an appropriate partner is searched for. The third step contains upfront agreements. These include for example clear and realistic objectives, an implementation plan, and the definition of rights and duties. In the fourth step the partnership is implemented and actual activities are carried out. After completion of the activities step five deals with the transfer

of tasks and responsibilities. The final step determines the performance of the partnership through evaluation.

Applying the model to the cooperation between NL PRT and civilian actors in Baghlan province leads to the following conclusions:

- Most civil-military partnerships contributed to the missions of NL PRT and civilian actors.
- Local capacity was used to fulfil many of the assistance activities to a large extent, thereby stimulating the Afghan economy.
- NL PRT lacked situational awareness regarding the needs of the local population, actors operating in its AoR, and national programs being implemented. This resulted in a considerable duplication of effort, waste of scarce resources, and a lack of activity integration.
- Many NL PRT personnel lacked experience and knowledge about developing issues, military guidelines, and project-based activities including tendering procedures.
- There was no clear division of tasks and responsibilities within NL PRT, resulting in duplication of efforts and a lack of coordination with humanitarian organisations in Baghlan province.
- Minimal attention was paid in direct assistance activities to the partnership design and local communities were often not adequately involved by NL PRT. This resulted in decreased sustainability, a lack of embeddedness in the social structures, a lack of ownership, and mismatches between assistance activities and the actual needs.
- Most partnerships in which humanitarian organisations were involved were sustainable and embedded in local structures.
- NL PRT gathered and processed information in an unstructured manner making it very difficult for its own personnel and other actors to access and use the information.
- There were ambiguous and vague military guidelines for NL PRT, which resulted in unclear priority setting and demarcation of the activities.
- There is no common approach to cimic within NL PRT, between the ISAF PRTs or between ISAF HQ and the PRTs. This is mainly caused by different budgets, a lack of common training, different personnel capabilities, and a lack of direction by ISAF HQ.

CHAPTER 7: THE KOSOVO CASE

7.1 BACKGROUND OF THE CASE

Until 1989, the Kosovo region enjoyed a high degree of autonomy within the former Yugoslavia. Then Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic forcibly altered the status of region, removing its autonomy and bringing it under the direct control of the capital of Belgrade. Kosovo became a de facto Serbian colony with a population of 90 percent Albanian and 10 percent Serbs.

The Kosovar Albanians strenuously opposed the move and conducted a non-violent campaign to win their right to self-determination. The Serbian authorities however, did not permit this. A consequence was the emergence of the guerrilla movement, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) or *Ushtria Clirimtare E Kosoves* (UCK) in Albanian. In June 1996 the UCK appeared publicly for the first time and during 1998 open conflict between Serbian military and police forces and the UCK resulted in the deaths of over 1,500 Kosovar Albanians and forced 400,000 people from their homes (Wentz, 2002).

Diplomatic initiatives from NATO and the UN resulted in UNSCR 1199. The resolution expressed deep concern about excessive use of force and called for a cease-fire by both parties. In the spirit of UNSCR 1199, limits were set on the number of Serbian forces in Kosovo and the scope of their operations. It was also agreed that the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) would establish a Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) to observe compliance on the ground and the NATO would establish an aerial surveillance mission (UNSCR 1203).

Despite these steps, the situation in Kosovo flared up again at the beginning of 1999 following a number of acts of provocation on both sides and the use of excessive force by the Serbian Army and Special Police. Some incidents were defused through mediation efforts by the OSCE verifiers. In mid-January however, the situation deteriorated further after escalation of the Serbian offensive against Kosovar Albanians and the massacre of 45 ethnic Albanian civilians in Racak in particular (Dutch Ministry of Defence, 2004). Renewed international efforts were made to finding a peaceful solution and culminated in initial negotiations between the two sides (UCK representatives led by fragmented Albanian political parties and a Yugoslavian delegation, approved by its parliament) in Rambouillet near Paris in February and March 1999. At end of the second round of talks, the Kosovar Albanian delegation signed the proposed peace agreement, but the talks broke up without a signature from the Serbian delegation. Many felt the agreement itself was very advantageous to the Kosovars, calling for a protectorate that basically resulted in a restoration of the status quo of 1989 (Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal, 2000).

Immediately afterwards Serbian military and police forces stepped up the intensity of their operations against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo.

On 20 March, two days after the failure of the Rambouillet talks, the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission was withdrawn, having faced obstruction from Serbian forces to the extent that they could no longer continue to fulfil their tasks. A final attempt to persuade President Milosevic to stop attacks on the Kosovar Albanians was made. Milosevic refused and on 23 March the order was given to commence air strikes, known as Operation Allied Force.

During the course of the NATO air campaign, international organisations estimated that some 800,000 refugees fled Kosovo into neighbouring Albania and Macedonia. An estimated 590,000 were internally displaced. The influx of refugees into Macedonia overwhelmed the combined capacities of the government in Skopje, the UNHCR, and various relief agencies. At the request of UNHCR, NATO forces in Macedonia were put to work to build a number of refugee camps. In Albania the refugee challenge was even greater. NATO initiated Operation Allied Harbour initiated to help the civilian organisations and the Albanian government cope with the refugee situation.

On 10 June 1999 NATO Secretary General Javier Solana announced that he had instructed Supreme Allied Commander Europe General Wesley Clark to temporarily suspend NATO's air operations against Yugoslavia. This decision was made after consultations with the North Atlantic Council and confirmation from General Clark that the full withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from Kosovo had begun. The withdrawal was in accordance with a Military-Technical Agreement concluded between NATO and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the evening of 9 June. Following this agreement, Kosovo Force (KFOR) troops entered Kosovo from both Albania and Macedonia. In accordance with UNSCR 1244, the mission of KFOR was to:

- Establish and maintain a secure environment in Kosovo, including public safety and order.
- Monitor, verify, and enforce compliance with the conditions of the Military Technical Agreement and the UCK undertaking when necessary.
- Provide assistance to the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), including core civil functions until the transfer to UNMIK.

KFOR consisted of 50,000 men and women from over 30 countries. The contingents were grouped into five multinational brigades (MNBs) and a lead nation was designated for each MNB. The United States was responsible for MNB East, France for MNB North, Italy for MNB West, Germany for MNB South, and the British for MNB Central. Although the brigades were responsible for a specific area of operation, they fell under a single chain of command under the authority of the commander of KFOR. Figure 26 shows the areas of responsibilities (AoRs) of MNBs in Kosovo.

Figure 26: MNBs in Kosovo

UNSCR 1244 provided for the deployment in Kosovo of international civil and security presences under United Nations auspices (Wentz, 2002). The text of the resolution suggested four pillars for UNMIK:

Pillar I: Humanitarian affairs, under the direction of the UNHCR;

Pillar II: Civil administration, led by UNMIK;

Pillar III: Democratisation and reconstruction, under the auspices of the OSCE;

Pillar IV: Economic development, led by the European Union.

Only a small group of NGOs remained operational during the bombing period. Soon after the bombing many humanitarian organisations again moved into Kosovo. According to a NATO database, in September 2000, there were over 650 separate humanitarian organisations in Kosovo (Wentz, 2002) from large international organisations to small NGOs.

7.2 THE CASE STUDY DESIGN

This case study focuses on civil-military partnerships between civilian actors and the Dutch Engineering Relief Battalion (1 (NL) EngrreliefBn). As part of the Dutch contingent this battalion operated in the AoR of MNB South during two rotations of approximately six months (KFOR 1 and KFOR 2). To establish and maintain a secure environment in the AoR of MNB South six Task Forces (TF) were responsible for an area. 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn was operating in the AoRs of TF Prizren (German), TF Malisevo (Russia), and TF Orahovac (Dutch), while a German engineering battalion was responsible for the AoR of the other three TFs (Hollander, 1999). HQ MNB South commanded the two engineering battalions through the Humanitarian Relief Coordination Centre (HRCC). All

support requests went directly or indirectly through the cimic branches of the TFs to these two engineering relief battalions.

To test and validate the process-based partnership model, eight partnerships were selected:

1. The reconstruction of regional schools by 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn and the German Governmental Organisation (GO) Technisches HilfsWerk (THW) in Ostrozub;
2. The reconstruction of regional schools by 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn and the donor organisation USAID in Dragobilje;
3. The winterisation of several villages by 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn and Caritas Austria in the regions northwest of Orahovac and south of Malisevo;
4. The construction of emergency housing by 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn and the Dutch NGO Dorcas, in several villages (e.g., Gajrac, Retimlje, and Dukoj);
5. The purification of the water system by 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn and USAID in Ponorac;
6. The construction of a morgue for the International Crime Tribunal former Yugoslavia of the UN (UNICTY) by 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn in Orahovac;
7. The construction of a depot for the NGO World Vision by 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn in Toplicane;
8. The transport of firewood by 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn for International Organisation for Migration (IOM).

These eight partnerships were investigated in detail and recorded in case reports. Four other partnerships were also examined though these were studied in less detail due to a lack of data. These concern the partnerships between 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn and Danish People's Aid (DPA) (NGO; shelter construction activities), Macedonian Center for International Cooperation (MCIC) (NGO; reconstruction of houses), Caritas Switzerland (NGO; construction of dispatch centre) and International Refugee Committee (IRC) (GO, transport of shelter packages).

The selection of partnerships has been verified by means of interviews to ensure that it represents a valid overview of the civil-military partnerships in which 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn was involved.

Both methodological and data source triangulation were employed to increase the validity of the case study. A general literature study was executed. Semi-structured interviews were held with 30 key persons of 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn and the humanitarian organisations to obtain detailed information on the partnerships. Key persons of 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn included personnel of the cimic branch (branch 5), the operations branch (branch 3), the platoon commanders, and the commanders of the battalion. One employee of the HRCC of MNB South was also interviewed.

Based on the interviews with key military persons, civilian partners were identified and their key persons interviewed. In six of the eight analysed partnerships, at least one key person

of the civilian actors has been interviewed. It was not possible to interview the key persons of World Vision and IOM and the local representatives due to communication problems and tracking difficulties.

Several other sources were consulted in addition to the respondents. These included situation reports, personal dairies of involved persons, detailed project information, notes of the meetings, internal memoranda, memory books, evaluation reports, and many photos. One member of the cimic branch of 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn has commented on a draft version of the case study report to verify the findings of the case study.

7.3   THE DECISION TO COOPERATE

On 11 June 1999 the assignment to form and prepare an engineering battalion was issued by the staff of the Dutch first division. Reconnaissance, followed by an advance party, were deployed to Kosovo and tasked to investigate sites to build the three compounds of the Dutch contingent. The second task was to make an initial humanitarian assessment and contact MNB South, the humanitarian organisations already in place, and the local authorities and representatives (Hollander, 1999).

From 10 July the main Dutch force was deployed, consisting of 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn (approximately 900 people), 11 (NL) Artillery Battalion (approximately 600 people), which were going to operate as TF Orahovac and a Helicopter Detachment (approximately 90 people).

The mandate of 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn was formulated as: "To carry out humanitarian assistance in the Area of Responsibility of MNB South, carry out activities to set up the compounds of the Artillery Battalion, the Engineering Relief Battalion and the Helicopter Detachment and start planning the deployment of the Dutch contingent command KFOR to Kosovo" (Hollander, 1999).

Little attention was paid to the operationalisation of the mandate (e.g., priorities, time schedules). From the beginning this resulted in an unclear operational military assignment for 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn (Gijsbers, 2000). The commander decided to split his force in two, with half to set up the three compounds while the other half focused on humanitarian relief activities (Linsen, 1999).

To get an insight in the humanitarian needs in the AoR of 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn, the cimic branch extended the initial assessment of the reconnaissance and advance party. In cooperation with the HRCC and a German cimic company, a detailed assessment was made, predominantly on the shelter situation. It was decided to focus on priority areas in which humanitarian assistance was most needed. Three criteria were used to determine this (Linsen, 1999). First, the degree of destruction in the villages: a destruction of at least 70% of the houses implied high priority; small remote villages were top priority. The second criterion was the altitude of the priority areas. At an altitude of 500 metres or above the

winter normally began in October. Assistance was more urgent in these areas than in Metohija Polje the lowlands north of Prizren, where the winter started a month later. Third, the return of original inhabitants was taken into account. Villages in which many inhabitants had returned were priority areas.

The humanitarian assessments of KFOR troops were often criticised by humanitarian organisations. Although the UNHCR had formulated humanitarian standards for the shelter situation, assessments by 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn troops regularly applied western standards. In response to this one of the Dutch soldiers compared the standards of UNHCR with the accommodation of his pigs in the Netherlands. He argued that his pigs were far better accommodated than the UNHCR sheltered the local people. Apart from 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn other humanitarian organisations also did not always comply with the UNHCR standards (such as Caritas Austria).

This critique of humanitarian organisations was confirmed in the implicit and non-transparent decision making of 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn. Apart from the shelter-related criteria, it was often unclear to what criteria 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn prioritised its humanitarian activities. This was directly caused by the lack of a clear operationalisation of the mandate.

Both civilian and military actors made many support requests in addition to the needs resulting from the humanitarian assessments. These went directly or indirectly through the cimic branches of the TFs to the two engineering relief battalions. This was due to the lack of humanitarian coordination at brigade-level (in fact a malfunctioning of the HRCC tasked to take care of this coordination).

Simultaneously to these needs assessments, the cimic branch of 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn assessed which civilian actors were operating in its AoR. To get an overview of the humanitarian organisations, the cimic branch drove, sometimes at random, through the AoR and attended the section meetings of UNMIK, each chaired by a lead-agency. The HRCC held a meeting to inform humanitarian organisations on the role of KFOR and in later stages a meeting was organised by the cimic branch of 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn to inform and get acquainted with NGOs. Both meetings had low attendance of humanitarian organisations and were therefore not really successful (Houdijk, 2000).

It was determined that approximately 50 humanitarian organisations were operating in the AoR of 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn. These organisations varied from large international organisations like Caritas and Medicin Sans Frontières (MSF) to small local organisations like MCIC (1 (NL) EngrreliefBn, 1999a). However, 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn was frequently unaware of the capabilities, objectives, and activities of many of these organisations.

Few construction companies were operating in Kosovo. During the bombing period, most Serbian people who fulfilled the middle and higher functions fled, leaving the labour force depleted. This resulted in an environment in which local craftsmen were still working but lacked organisation and management. Both the assessments of the humanitarian situation and the overview of the civilian actors were constantly updated.

The main motives for 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn to cooperate with civilian actors are found in the internal analysis. The organisation structure of 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn (see figure 27) shows that the battalion had considerable transport capacity at its disposal. This consisted of approximately 50 trucks (both 4 and 10 ton trucks). Combined with the route proving capacity of the armoured engineering company, this made it possible to access all areas, including difficult mountainous ones. The engineering company provided manpower (approximately 150 persons), machines, and technical knowledge. A company of an additional 100 persons provided general assistance. Security was provided by the infantry company. The large planning and staffing capacity in the staff-staff support company and the mission experience of many of the officers were also important for mission success.

Figure 27: Organisation structure of 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn

Although personnel were intensively trained for combat activities, most lacked training in and preparation for humanitarian activities. As a result many personnel were unfamiliar with the basics of humanitarian assistance such as needs assessment and standards. One officer was transferred from the artillery battalion in Orahovac to 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn, directly after he arrived in Kosovo. Without training or specific mission preparation he was employed in the cimic branch. As an exception one cimic officer borrowed books on nation building in the communal library to enhance his own preparation before deployment.

1 (NL) EngrreliefBn had little financial means to carry out humanitarian activities. These mainly consisted of two funds of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (€454,000 during KFOR 1 and €334,000 during KFOR 2) (Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2000). The obvious motive for 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn to start cooperating with civilian actors was this fact. According to its mandate, 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn should largely be engaged in humanitarian assistance in the AoR of MNB South. The mixture of the available capacity of the battalion, in particular manpower, the lack of financial means, and the task to carry out humanitarian assistance forced 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn into cooperation. Since the battalion had only a small amount of construction materials at its disposal, no alternatives

to cooperation were feasible. This directly drove the battalion into a supply-based approach in which actual deployment of own personnel and equipment was very important. In response to this the commander of 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn observed that in future operations the local commander should be authorised to adjust his organisation to the operational environment (Gijsbers, 2000). With this authority the local commander should be able to deploy new troops and material for a short period or send back part of his troops and material back if they are of too little use.

The following arguments were, although less emphasised, also motives to cooperate:

- The civilian actors provided 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn with local knowledge and intelligence and increased its situational awareness as a means of force protection.

- Humanitarian organisations provided and facilitated contacts of 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn with representatives of the local population.

- Cooperation with civilian actors and media exposure was highly valued by Dutch politics to legitimise the deployment of 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn. The performance of the battalion was closely monitored by the media and several visits from politicians. This sometimes resulted in an atmosphere of being busy, rather than doing the good things the right way. For example, a visit of a Dutch minister prompted rebuilding a regional school in Ostrozub in cooperation with the German organisation THW in a rather unprepared manner.

- Humanitarian organisations provided 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn with knowledge of and expertise on the local situation, customs, and humanitarian assistance.

In accordance with the task-oriented command structure of the Dutch military, the actual decision of 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn to cooperate was made at a low level. Each staff member of the cimic branch was responsible for a certain area of expertise (e.g., contacts with humanitarian organisations, village assessments, operations) and was authorised to initiate activities. Permission of the head of the cimic branch or the battalion commander was required to carry out activities that would have a big impact on the battalion. The cimic branch then contacted the operations branch that divided and planned the work among the companies. In the partnership with UNICTY, permission was needed from the staff of the Dutch land forces. This setup was mainly due to experiences of the Dutch army with the UN in Screbrenica in Bosnia.

Most humanitarian organisations in the AoR of 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn had substantial financial means. Caritas Austria collected 3 million DM (€1,5 million) through a one-night television-show in Austria (1 (NL) EngrreliefBn, 2000a). In addition to these financial means, most humanitarian organisations had extensive local knowledge and experience partly due to the high share of employees recruited locally (e.g., THW, Caritas Austria). Although most local employees brought a huge social network with them, their ethnic background also threatened the impartiality of humanitarian organisations like Caritas

Austria. Normally few international employees were assigned to the staff of an organisation. Most humanitarian organisations lacked the transport capacity, security and logistics, and planning capacity (1 (NL) EngrreliefBn, 1999b).

From the civilian side, the capacity of 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn was often available at little or no expense and was the most important motive for organisations to initiate cooperation (e.g. Caritas Austria, USAID and Dorcas). Additionally, most organisations were dependent on local road repair, including the safety of the local roads provided by 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn. This was an important issue in particular for the transport activities. However, unlike 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn, several humanitarian organisations including Caritas Austria, saw threats to the cooperation. They believed their neutrality and impartiality was compromised by cooperation, or even just association with 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn. Some humanitarian organisations were also afraid that media attention would shift through its cooperating partners. For this reason some organisations refused cooperation with the battalion. However, despite these threats many organisations decided that cooperation with 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn was desirable.

In field-governed organisations like THW and World Vision, field personnel were responsible and authorised to make most decisions. However, in the case of HQ governed organisations like Dorcas, the permission of the head offices in the home countries was often needed. In particular if it concerned cooperation with a military actor like 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn, the HQs of the latter organisations were reluctant. Due to this fact many attempts by humanitarian organisation field employees to cooperate with 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn were not allowed to materialise further, and led to great frustration in the cimic branch of the battalion. An example of this is the partnership with Caritas Austria. Having cooperated for several months during KFOR 1, Caritas' head office urged the field workers to terminate the partnership with 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn. At that time the battalion had just rotated and planned for activities with Caritas. When Caritas made known that they wanted to leave the partnership, it was difficult to find an alternative. Additional examples are the school reconstruction with IRC and the emergency housing project with Dorcas (Houdijk, 2000).

The assessments indicated that in most villages 90% of the inhabitants had already returned. This implied an increase in the coping capacity of the local population, including local manpower, local contacts, local knowledge, and experience. However, there were still many needs. The most important were security, transport means, logistics and planning capacity, trained manpower, materials and equipment. The local population in the AoR of MNB South valued the assistance of 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn, which was of higher quality and of larger scale than the humanitarian assistance provided by other KFOR troops (Gijsbers, 2000).

Neither 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn nor the humanitarian organisations set clear targets or objectives of the cooperation. From interviews and documents the following targets of 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn were derived:

- Increase situational awareness through the gathering of local information.

- Increase deployment and morale of personnel.

- Provide humanitarian assistance in the AoR of MNB South with a special focus on shelter and public services in four priority areas (1 (NL) EngrreliefBn, 1999b).

- Increase the integration and acceptation of TF Rusbat (1 (NL) EngrreliefBn, 1999b); a Russian battalion (TF Rusbat) was operating near Malisevo. Due to their ethnic background the Russian troops were associated with the Serbs and were not accepted by the Kosovar Albanian majority of the population.

- Win the hearts and minds of the local population; being engaged in humanitarian assistance influenced the perception of the local population towards KFOR and provided it with means of protection (1 (NL) EngrreliefBn, 1999b).

Humanitarian and donor organisations mainly focussed on reaching their humanitarian targets. The focus of these varied from shelter (Caritas Austria), public services (USAID) to the bringing to justice of persons allegedly responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law (UNICTY). In addition, NGOs stressed the attraction of media attention (e.g., Caritas Austria, Dorcas). However, this target was not stressed by the humanitarian organisation itself, but by the partnering organisation or other organisations in the field. The targets of the local population and its representatives were mainly to obtain the best and most assistance possible.

A well-defined strategic plan in which these targets were outlined was absent on all sides. In later stages this made it impossible to measure to what extent targets had been reached and adjust policy based on that.

7.4 PARTNER SELECTION

Based on the identified civilian actors, 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn undertook several actions in its search for appropriate organisations to cooperate with. These involved (informal) talks of employees of the cimic branch with representatives of humanitarian organisations. The sector meetings of UNMIK proved important for liaison between 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn and humanitarian organisations. Several partners were found through informal contacts of platoon commanders working in the field. The intelligence branch of 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn and lead organisations of UNMIK (e.g., USAID) were often consulted for additional information concerning an organisation.

Early 2000, 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn competed for a tender on emergency housing of the Dutch NGO Dorcas. The battalion won the tender over a local construction company and an English-Albanian construction group (1 (NL) EngrreliefBn, 2000b). As a result, local coping capacity did not increase and many organisations viewed 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn as a competitor rather than a partner.

In general 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn intended to cooperate with every humanitarian organisation in its AoR. This was mainly the result of the over-capacity, which they had during a large part of the operation. Weather conditions made it difficult to carry out activities particularly during the period between January and March 2000. Hence, the most important criterion in the selection of an appropriate partner used by 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn, was the extent of means and capabilities of an organisation in particular finances (i.e., complementary resources). To consider whether an organisation was a suitable partner to work with, several criteria were implicitly used apart from its capabilities:

- Personal fit; personnel of 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn liked the local female employee of USAID and the field officers of Dorcas. The field officer of Caritas Austria and UNICTY were former military captains, which also strengthened the personal fit.

- Compatibility of both national and organisation cultures; the field officers of Dorcas were Dutch, while the organisation culture of the German THW was similar to 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn: very hierarchical and formal.

- Prior experiences with and reputation of the partner; well-known organisations like Caritas Austria and USAID were without a doubt considered good partners. Cooperation with less known Muslim organisations was not even considered. In addition, having finished a partnership, the partners often decided to initiate new activities together (e.g., partnerships with USAID and THW).

- Network of the partner organisation; lead organisations of UNMIK (e.g., USAID) had many contacts with other humanitarian organisations. Cooperation with these organisations was preferred since it provided easy access to other organisations.

- Compatible strategies and objectives; strategies and objectives between humanitarian organisations and the battalion were often compatible because the mandate of 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn primarily consisted of the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Exceptions included the time schedule (short-term focus of 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn versus long-term focus of humanitarian organisations) and humanitarian organisations focussed on projects outside the AoR of MNB South.

- Flexibility; humanitarian organisations perceived as flexible were favoured.

- Reliability; humanitarian organisations that did not comply with agreements or appointments were regarded as unsuitable.

In several partnerships 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn paid attention to the selection of the local actors. These included activities for the benefit of individuals (e.g., house construction with Caritas and Dorcas). During the selection and prioritisation of the beneficiaries for shelter 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn and Dorcas consulted the village elders. These could submit a list with the names of families who urgently needed a house. However, when the lists were checked it turned out that close friends and relatives of the village elders were put on the priority lists. As 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn and Dorcas favoured widows and people without family abroad, the lists were adjusted with new names. These people were then involved during the construction process.

In the partnership on wood distribution, IOM determined the beneficiaries of the activities. In activities for the benefit of a community (e.g., school reconstruction with THW and USAID, and water purification with USAID), few local stakeholders were identified or involved. Often only some local authorities (e.g., head of school, mayor) were consulted before the activities were initiated.

The presence and appearance of 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn made it easy for humanitarian organisations to identify the battalion as a potential partner. In several partnerships humanitarian organisations (e.g., UNICTY, World Vision) took the initiative to cooperate with 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn. This often concerned direct assistance to the humanitarian organisation. With respect to the construction of the ICTY morgue in Orahovac, the UN took the initiative to make a request to 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn. However, since the winter period hindered the battalion from other activities, continuation of the cooperation was preferred and 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn identified additional activities to upgrade the morgue.

The most important criterion used by the humanitarian organisations in the selection of an appropriate partner was the extent of means and capabilities of an organisation (i.e., complementary resources). Manpower, machines, and technical assistance were preferred. The following additional criteria were also used:

- Network of the partner organisation; since 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn was embedded in the KFOR structure, cooperation with this battalion provided easy access to the other KFOR entities.

- Flexibility; despite its hierarchic and formal structure, most humanitarian organisations perceived 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn as very flexible.

- Humanitarian principles; some humanitarian organisations considered their neutral and impartial relation to the local population compromised by cooperation with KFOR troops. However, most organisations preferred the resources of 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn to this compromise.

- Personal fit; personnel of the humanitarian and donor organisations very often liked the officers of the cimic branch of 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn (e.g., Caritas Austria, Dorcas, UNICTY, THW, USAID).

- Compatible cultures; the field officers of Dorcas were also Dutch, while the very hierarchical and formal organisation culture of the German organisation THW was similar to 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn.
- Prior experiences with and reputation of the partner; after finishing a partnership, the partners often decided to initiate new activities together (e.g., partnerships with USAID and THW).
- Compatible strategies and objectives; the strategies and objectives of 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn were often compatible with those of the humanitarian organisations. Organisations that noticed or believed that the activities of 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn were focussed on increasing situational awareness or winning the hearts and minds of the local population did not intend to cooperate with the battalion.
- Risk of partner becoming a competitor; since many NGOs were competitive in attracting media attention, a partnership with a military actor was more desirable than a partnership with another civil actor.
- Use of force; in contrast to the German Engineering battalion, personnel of 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn were allowed to do construction activities without constantly carrying their weapons. These were collected and guarded by a few soldiers. Several humanitarian organisations (e.g., THW) preferred this approach to the more military approach of the German battalion.

Apart from the partnerships in which a humanitarian organisation was directly assisted (e.g., construction of the depot of World Vision), the local population was often involved in the partnerships of 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn. In the selection of a partner, the local population did not use explicit criteria other than the amount and quality of the humanitarian assistance. Several Kosovar-Albanian families refused assistance of humanitarian organisations, since they hoped for the much better valued assistance of 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn.

7.5 PARTNERSHIP DESIGN

After selecting a partner, a verbal agreement was usually made between 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn and the humanitarian organisations. Often this agreement was based on trust. In several partnerships a written contract was made between 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn and a humanitarian organisation (NATO, 1999). These were partnerships in which 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn made a financial contribution and had to account for these to the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (e.g., partnership with Caritas Austria on emergency housing). An agreement, written or verbal, normally included the details of the implementation (e.g., initial planning). It also dealt with the activities of each actor in the partnership, for

example which actor would transport the construction materials. Often these agreements were only made between 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn and a humanitarian organisation and did not include the local population. Sometimes tri-partite agreements were made with the municipality and the beneficiaries (e.g., partnership with Dorcas). In others only verbal agreements were made (e.g., partnership with USAID in Ponorac). In the few cases that local companies were contracted, written contracts were also made.

Both humanitarian organisations and 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn mentioned several drawbacks to the prospect of having a written contract. First, the situation was often too uncertain to rely on a contract. Second, the military could not guarantee to be involved in humanitarian activities for a specified period. If the situation changed they could have been forced to focus on other activities. Third, the risk of legal claims was an important drawback (Houdijk, 2000).

To increase clarity and transparency, both military and civilian respondents indicated that a MoU or declaration of intent could address several issues that could otherwise lead to problems in later stages of the cooperation process. The first issue is the agreement on clear and realistic objectives. In the partnership on water purification in Ponorac, unclear objectives caused great dispute. To address the problem of the infected water in Ponorac, 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn and USAID wanted to install two water pumps to provide clean water. However, during the activities some political representatives of Ponorac demanded connections in many houses in the village to the water system. Formulated and clearly communicated objectives of the partnership could have facilitated this. It is easier for the military to explicitly determine whether the partnership objectives support the military mission. Being clear on objectives could prevent the cooperating organisations from behaving opportunistic in the implementation phase (i.e., preferring own objectives at the expense of the partnership objectives).

The second issue is to keep and protect core competencies. Military information was often classified and it was in the interest of the battalion to protect this. This issue was not stressed from the civilian side. Third, it proved necessary to clearly define the rights and duties of the actors. Humanitarian organisations highly valued a clear and upfront agreement on the use of force by 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn.

The fourth issue is the increase of coping capacity. The villagers often participated in the construction activities. However, normally no local construction companies were contracted to execute (part of) the activities. In the early phases of deployment there were simply very few construction companies. In case of the morgue construction for UNICTY this was due to the early finishing date, which made it impossible to tender the construction activities to local or foreign construction companies (Bos, 1999). In other cases (e.g., partnership with Dorcas) 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn was favoured over local companies to construct houses through a tender.

The fifth issue concerns the implementation plan. This included the setting of several milestones, construction drawings, and a Bill of Quantities in which all works and quantities were described.

Resources were the sixth issue. Sometimes resources were purchased in western countries (Boslooper, 1999). Purchase of goods on the local market stimulated the local economy, which increased the coping capacity of the local communities. On the other hand if large amounts of resources were purchased locally, prices would rise and the local population was unable to purchase them.

Next, the use of standards was stressed in the MoUs. During KFOR 1 the guideline for personnel of 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn was to use Dutch construction standards (NEN standards) as often as possible for several reasons. The first reason was to minimise the number of legal claims. If local standards were applied, the chance of accidents would rise. Another argument was the training of soldiers on the job. By applying local norms they were thought to dysfunction in future civilian jobs. However, several officers of 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn contradicted this last argument. During KFOR 2 usually local standards were applied. This facilitated the transfer to and the sustainable use of the constructions by the local villagers. Moreover, applying local standards avoided (the perception of) one ethnic group being favoured above another.

The final issue was the preparation of termination. Before activities started it was important to consider termination of the partnership. Including the requirements of the final users (local population and humanitarian organisations) in this phase of the partnership was very beneficial. These varied from paid teachers and interiors in the case of schools to a maintenance plan in the construction of waterworks.

Normally there was no specific organisation put into place to prepare the implementation of the partnership as in joint ventures between business organisations. The main reason was the independence that both 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn and the civilian partners wanted to keep. The short time frame of the partnerships, which varied from a few days to several months, also contributed to this. In the construction of emergency houses during KFOR 2, an internal project organisation was set up within 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn because a large part of the battalion was involved in this project (e.g., armoured engineering battalion, transport company, general assistance company). However, the civilian partner Dorcas did not participate in the project organisation.

7.6 PARTNERSHIP IMPLEMENTATION

The actors were involved in the actual implementation of the assistance activities in several ways. The first cluster of activities consisted of support by 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn to the direct needs of humanitarian organisations. This included the partnerships with UNICTY

and World Vision concerning respectively, the construction of a morgue and a depot. In the second cluster of activities the battalion cooperated with humanitarian and donor organisations to address the needs of the local population. These included partnerships with Dorcas, USAID, THW, IOM, and Caritas Austria. In both clusters these organisations were responsible for the purchase and finance of most resources. 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn transported the emergency goods and materials, carried out the construction activities, and/or gave technical assistance. In the partnership on house reconstruction, Caritas Austria misjudged the quantities of building materials needed for the rebuilding of all houses. 14,000 m^3 wood, 200,000 roof tiles and 800 window frames were required. Due to the scarcity of resources in the area, it was impossible to obtain these resources locally and they were purchased in Macedonia. Additional civilian trucks were needed thereby increasing the costs. These unexpected events forced 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn to spend funds of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

In the partnership with World Vision a large amount of geotextile was needed for the reconstruction of the depot. For World Vision it was difficult to purchase this material on the local market. However, as the material was available on depot of 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn, the geotextile was traded for cement, which the battalion needed to carry out additional reconstruction activities.

Local villagers were often involved in the activities of the second cluster. In the partnership with Caritas Austria, THW, and USAID they were employed to carry out construction activities. In cooperation with IOM local villagers were employed to load firewood from depots into the trucks. In the partnership with Dorcas on house construction the local population, in the persons of the village elders, was only involved in the selection of the beneficiaries. 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn was responsible for all construction activities. The battalion set up a production line to prefabricate the standardised emergency houses. During three months large units of 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn, supported by a Bulgarian platoon, were tasked to prefabricate the elements for the houses. Other units of the battalion prepared the sites, transported the prefabricated elements, and finally constructed these on site. After the set up of a production facility by 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn, Dorcas decided to finance 10 instead of 25 houses. However, they still wanted to be involved in selecting the locations of the houses. 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn finally agreed on this and paid for 54 of the total 64 houses constructed.

The third cluster consisted of direct assistance of 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn to the host nation without any interference of a humanitarian organisation. This cluster included security-related activities like proofing of routes and the demarcation and clearing of UXO and mines. It also included the reconstruction of general infrastructure like bridges and roads. 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn also carried out assistance activities for direct benefit of the local population (e.g., construction of wells, reconstruction of roofs). This so-called civic action was often criticised by civilian organisations, since they believed that the battalion was not

able to carry out impartial and neutral assistance to the local population. Second, 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn was considered a competitor of humanitarian organisations. However, by doing this the morale 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn personnel was greatly increased.

7.7 THE TRANSFER OF TASKS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

Normally the partnerships of 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn and its civilian partners ended as planned. However, in some cases the cooperation ended unexpectedly and abruptly. In the construction of the regional school in Ostrozub with THW this was due to the withdrawal of 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn (Boslooper, 1999). The platoons assigned to the partnership had to suddenly concentrate on cleaning activities on the compound of 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn due to asbestos problems. In the partnership with Caritas Austria, this organisation suddenly withdrew mainly due to interference of its head office (Houdijk, 2000). In order to safeguard its neutrality and impartiality Caritas' head office decided to terminate all cooperation with KFOR entities. In Ponorac the water purification activities in cooperation with USAID and the German Engineering Relief Battalion stopped unexpectedly due to disagreements on the objectives of the activities. The local representative claimed that many houses in Ponorac would get connected to the water system, while 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn and USAID only wanted to purify the stream to facilitate the provision of clean water.

To end a partnership, tasks and responsibilities were usually transferred to the civilian actors. In the partnerships concerning the direct assistance to humanitarian organisations (i.e., UNICTY and World Vision) constructions were transferred to these organisations. If assistance activities were for the direct benefit of the local population, normally all tasks and responsibilities were transferred to them. These often included the maintenance of houses and community centres. However, after regional schools were constructed in cooperation with THW and USAID, the local villages lacked the coping capacity to operate the schools. For several months these schools did not function as a school, but sheltered several local families or acted as a medical centre because the schools lacked paid teachers, finished interiors, writing material, and books.

In a few cases the military remained responsible after the partnership was ended. Having completed the Logistics Base and Morgue of UNICTY, KFOR troops remained responsible for de-mining graves and possible booby traps of remains, logistic support such as transport of the remains, and guarding the (opened) gravesites. The production facilities set up by 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn to prefabricate houses in the partnership with Dorcas were not easily transferred. Many civilian organisations were approached but no one was willing to take over the facilities mainly due to the enormous capacity and manpower the facilities

requested. No civilian organisation was capable of doing this. Finally, the German Engineering Battalion took over the production facilities.

Activities in which no humanitarian organisations were involved (cluster 3) did normally not require much follow-up partly due to the private ownership and responsibility of the houses and roofs, constructed by 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn. Partly this was due to the simple nature of these activities. Reconstructed roofs and houses required little maintenance or operations effort to function properly.

7.8 PARTNERSHIP EVALUATION

Having transferred the tasks and responsibilities, often little attention was paid to evaluation of the partnership. No joint evaluations were made but some organisations did make evaluations individually. However, this was mainly done through internal discussions and normally no notes were made.

Several evaluations were made at operational and strategic levels. The Dutch government evaluated the activities of the Dutch troops in Kosovo (Dutch Ministry of Defence, 2001). With respect to 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn the report noticed that cooperation with humanitarian organisations and MNB South was good but lacked an integral policy. From a humanitarian perspective, ALNAP (2001) published the outcomes of 20 separate evaluations of the international response to humanitarian needs in Kosovo. Regarding cooperation with military actors, these evaluations primarily focused on the extent to which the humanitarian principles were endangered.

7.9 PARTNERSHIP PERFORMANCE

Assessing the performance of the partnerships with the criteria set in figure 21, leads to the following findings.

The activities of 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn made several contributions to the military force of KFOR. Regarding the number of beneficiaries, the reconstruction of regional schools with THW and USAID reached many direct and indirect beneficiaries. 120 houses were reconstructed in the partnership with Caritas Austria, each providing shelter for approximately 40-50 people. In cooperation with Dorcas 64 new houses were constructed for approximately 6-8 people each. Far less people were reached in this partnership with a larger number of deployed personnel and machines of 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn.

1 (NL) EngrreliefBn only rarely took belligerent groups or key leaders into account. Some activities were carried out in the AoR of TF Rusbat (e.g., construction of houses with

Dorcas and several transport activities). These activities contributed to the integration of the Russian battalion, thereby providing it with means of protection.

Several activities contributed to a safe and secure environment. These included the proofing of routes, demarcation of mine fields, and the clearance of many objects like schools and hospitals from mines and UXOs. This contributed to the freedom of movement of humanitarian organisations and the local population. The morgue construction for UNICTY contributed to its primary objective, to bring to justice the persons allegedly responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law. This then contributed to a safer and more secure environment.

In most partnerships humanitarian organisations provided 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn with increased situational awareness. This included knowledge of and expertise on the local situation, customs, and humanitarian assistance.

With respect to the support to the civil environment, all partnerships contributed either to the host nation (e.g., construction of houses with Dorcas) or to the humanitarian organisations (e.g., depot construction for World Vision). Due to the fact that the capacity of 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn was often available at little or no expense, many activities were performed with the limited resources humanitarian organisations had which increased their scale and scope enormously. However, in the partnership with USAID concerning the purification of the water system in Ponorac, the waterworks were far from completion when the organisations withdrew from the project.

The outcome of many partnerships was sustainable because it required little maintenance or operations effort. However, the sustainability of the schools was frequently inadequate. Three out of four regional schools only functioned as such after several months, because at the beginning they lacked teachers and educational material. During these months the school buildings were used as medical centres or places for shelter, which did contribute to the overall objective of the cooperating organisations (i.e. providing humanitarian assistance).

In many of the analysed partnerships (e.g., school reconstruction with USAID and THW) military personnel carried out most of the construction activities, while few local constructors were employed. In the early phases of the deployment, very few local constructors operated in the area. However, in particular during KFOR 2, local contractors emerged and began to operate in a broad range of activities. During this period 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn still contracted out a few activities and the coping capacity only increased marginally. The most striking example was the construction activities in cooperation with Dorcas during KFOR 2. Because the battalion did not charge costs for its personnel it won the tender over local construction companies among others.

1 (NL) EngrreliefBn employed villagers in several partnerships. These included the partnerships with Caritas Austria in which villagers took part in the reconstruction activities

as well as the partnership with IOM in which villagers were charged with the loading and unloading of firewood from the trucks of 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn. These partnerships contributed to increase the coping capacity.

The extent of media attention mainly depended on the place of issue and the scope of the activities. Close to the main road from Prizren to Orahovac activities were accessible to the media and these projects attracted a lot of attention (e.g., the partnership with Dorcas in Velika Krusha). Activities in less accessible areas attracted less attention (e.g., partnership with Caritas Austria).

Most analysed partnerships with humanitarian organisations were considered successful by both 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn and the humanitarian organisations despite differences in performance. An exception was the partnership with USAID concerning the water purification activities in Ponorac. As the activities suddenly stopped due to disagreements with the local representatives, no improvement was made to the water situation and the partnership was perceived as unsuccessful.

The cost-effectiveness of the partnerships showed considerable differences. In some 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn had a clear comparative advantage and was the only actor who could carry out the activities. This included the distribution activities in cooperation with IOM, which required large transport capacity. In the partnership with UNICTY, the early finishing date made it impossible to tender the construction activities to local or foreign construction companies and gave 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn a comparative advantage. However, in several other partnerships the capacity of 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn was favoured over local contractors or local villagers when they could have fulfilled a large share of the activities. This was unfortunate concerning the overall response if one bears in mind that a local employee earns €1 per working day while the salary of a soldier during the Kosovo crisis was already approximately €60 per day apart from overhead costs. Additionally, employing local villagers and local construction companies would stimulate the local economy.

Minear, et al. (2000) argued that a number of obstacles inhibited reaching useful conclusions on the comparative cost-effectiveness of military and humanitarian activities in the humanitarian sphere including the lack of available data from the military on costs of their involvement and the lack of an accepted methodology for determining what costs should be included in such calculations.

7.10 DISCUSSION

In the civil-military partnerships analysed during the Kosovo crisis both military and civilian actors went through each of the six steps identified in the process-based

partnership model either explicitly or implicitly. Based on internal and external analyses of the respective actors, insights in their decision processes were obtained. Most actors, for different reasons, had no feasible alternative apart from cooperation. From a military perspective commanders frequently said that their job was to keep their units busy. This was accomplished by working with NGOs. From a humanitarian perspective the enormous resources of NATO troops were frequently stated as a main reason for cooperation. A manager of the World Food Program said, "It is almost impossible to respond to this kind of crisis unless humanitarian organisations have either a military-style response capacity or advance collaborative arrangements with the military" (Minear, et al., 2000). This same research quotes General Jackson on civil-military cooperation in Kosovo, a view held at all levels of KFOR: "We're all going down the same road," he said. "We are not rivals or competitors. There's one single mission, with military and humanitarian dimensions." The view that closer collaboration between military and humanitarian actors is warranted is shared on the civilian side as well. "I'm not for corralling the army into being humanitarian," said UNMIK head Bernard Kouchner, "yet victims never refuse the hand of someone helping them" (Minear, et al., 2000).

The local population was often included in the civil-military partnerships. However their coping capacity was frequently incorrectly assessed and not always increased in an optimal way. Sometimes this was due to the necessity of a quick response to the needs, thereby not allowing lengthy procedures and analyses. In other cases this was caused by unfamiliarity with humanitarian assistance or ambition of the armed forces. The evaluation of ALNAP (2001) states: "An agency complained that the population was fully employed in reconstruction until the international community intervened". In general Mockaitis (2004) argued, "Good relations with the local community, which often produces sound intelligence, are just as important to protecting soldiers as flack jackets and barbed wire".

Having decided cooperation was beneficial, each actor searched for potential partners. In addition to random visits, several mechanisms were in place to facilitate this search. These included the attendance of the numerous meetings held by UNMIK, consultation of lead organisations, and in the case of the armed forces, consultation of their intelligence branches. The actors often implicitly used several criteria to select a partner. All actors in civil-military partnerships regarded complementary resources as a very important criterion. In addition military forces and humanitarian organisations used several partner-related criteria to base their decisions. Of these criteria, personal fit was decisive.

The next step in the process was the design of the partnership, which included upfront agreements on how to carry out the activities. In some cases a verbal agreement was made between the military forces and the civilian actors, while in other cases a written agreement (MoU) was made. In their research Minear, et al. (2000) argue that safeguards like MoUs, "could be created to protect the specificities of the tasks of both sets of actors, with mechanisms established to ensure accountability. This more systematic approach would

address one of the weaknesses identified by humanitarian personnel in the largely ad hoc arrangements in the Kosovo crisis".

Several humanitarian organisations argued that cooperation with 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn was far more beneficial in comparison with other KFOR entities such as the German engineering battalion. Respondents indicated personal fit, flexibility, decentralised leadership, low extent of traditional force protection, and the wide interpretation of the domain as the main advantages of the battalion. This corresponds with the research of Mockaitis (2004), who studied the different approaches towards civil-military cooperation of several contingents in Kosovo. He states that several other entities, particularly the American and German contingents, operated extremely top-down, made use of traditional force protection to a large extent (e.g., travel in hardtop Humvees and wear their "battle-rattle") and used a very narrow interpretation of the domain (i.e., solely focussed on civil-military cooperation being a force multiplier rather than an aid multiplier). This resulted in great friction with regard to the cooperation with civilian actors.

7.11 CONCLUSION

The process model as it is presented is considered to be appropriate since it is able to describe and explain the cooperation process between military and civilian actors at the local level. It is concluded that civil-military partnerships go through six successive steps listed previously.

Applying the model to the cooperation between 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn and civilian actors in the Kosovo crisis leads to the following conclusions:

- The operationalisation of the mandate of 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn was not clear. This resulted in indistinct targets, priority settings, and end-states, and made it difficult to determine when the objectives of 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn were met and the redeployment could start.

- Cooperation at a local level was often supply-based instead of demand-driven. Activities were selected and prioritised based on the capacity of 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn and the humanitarian organisations, rather than the priorities and needs of the beneficiaries. Following this approach the local coping capacity was not fully addressed. Dutch construction standards were applied several times, whereas making use of local standards would have facilitated the transfer to and the sustainable use of the constructions by the local villagers. Moreover, applying local standards could also avoid (the perception of) one ethnic group being favoured above another.

- Little attention was paid to the function of constructions. Several regional schools functioned for a long time as a place for shelter for several local families due to the lack of attention paid to the function of the school rather than the construction of a school

building. In this case, paid teachers, finished interiors, writing material, and books had to be arranged to make the school function properly. Since a military force does not intend to make the local population dependent and wants to withdraw as soon as possible, it is crucial to transfer tasks and responsibilities to a civilian actor capable.

- The short-term perspective of the military towards humanitarian activities was not a problem as long as humanitarian organisations emphasised the long-term perspective, including sustainability.

The Kosovo case

CHAPTER 8: CROSS CASE ANALYSIS: UNDERSTANDING THE PERFORMANCE OF CIVIL-MILITARY PARTNERSHIPS

8.1 THE PERFORMANCE OF CIVIL-MILITARY PARTNERSHIPS

In the civil-military partnerships analysed in Kosovo, Kabul and Baghlan, both military and civilian actors paid very little attention in general to evaluation and more specifically, to performance assessment. For most actors it remained unclear whether and to what extent partnerships contributed to their mission. By way of exception, some humanitarian organisations (e.g., DCA, AKF) in the Baghlan case intended to assess the performance by making use of accountability mechanisms such as the LFA. These mechanisms included short, medium, and long-term objectives as well as verifiable indicators to which the performance would be assessed after completing the activities.

This chapter presents the performance of each partnership in the three cases and explains their differences and similarities by using the performance criteria identified for military actors, civilian actors of the assistance community, and the local population (see section 4.2.7). The performance criteria were applied to the partnerships in each case (see section 5.9, 6.9 and 7.9). Table 10 presents the values of the performance criteria for each of the 25 partnerships in the three cases. The measurement of these values was done by means of interviews with participants in the partnerships and/or complemented with documentation. In the Baghlan case, personal observation was also used. Both data triangulation (i.e., multiple data sources) and methodological triangulation (i.e., multiple methods) were used. A three-point scale was used to measure a specific criterion encompassing low, medium, and high values. A partnership was given a low value if it did not or hardly contribute to the performance of a criterion. A medium value was given if the partnership made a moderate contribution and a high value was given if the partnership extensively contributed to the performance of a criterion.

In table 10 the number of asterisks (*) corresponds to the contribution of a partnership for a performance criterion. For all criteria, except for the criterion *costs*, one asterisk refers to a low contribution, two asterisks to a medium, and three asterisks to a high contribution. For the criterion *costs*, one asterisk refers to high costs, while three asterisks refer to low costs. The number between brackets for each performance criterion in table 10 refers to the section in which the differences and similarities between the partnerships concerning a performance criterion are explained. Table 11 presents the partnerships corresponding to the numbers of the partnerships in table 10.

The subsequent sections of this chapter explain the differences and similarities of the partnerships in the three cases on each of the performance criteria. The final section discusses the extent to which the process-based partnership model is in line with the practice of civil-military cooperation in the three cases.

Cases		Kosovo								Kabul							Baghlan									
Performance criteria		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
Military actor																										
Support to the force (8.2) — Force protection (8.2.1) — Belligerents included		*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	**	*	*	*	*	*	nap	**	*	*	**	*	***	*	nap	nap
Number and location of beneficiaries		***	*	***	*	***	***	*	***	***	***	**	*	*	*	***	nap	***	***	**	***	*	***	**	nap	nap
Visibility		***	***	***	*	**	***	**	***	***	***	**	*	*	*	***	nap	***	***	***	***	**	***	**	nap	nap
Length of operation		***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	nap	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	nap	nap
Safe and secure environment (8.2.2)		*	*	*	*	***	*	*	*	***	*	*	*	*	*	**	nap	*	**	*	*	**	***	*	nap	nap
Situational awareness (8.2.3)		**	**	**	*	**	**	*	*	*	**	*	***	*	***	**	nap	**	*	*	*	*	***	*	*	nap
Support to the civil environment (8.3) — Needs (8.3.1 and 8.3.2)		*	***	***	***	***	***	*	***	**	**	**	***	***	***	***	nap	***	*	**	**	*	***	*	nap	nap
Sustainability (8.3.3)		*	*	***	***	***	*	*	**	*	*	**	***	***	***	***	nap	***	*	*	**	*	***	*	nap	nap
Local capacity (8.3.4)		*	*	**	*	*	*	*	*	***	*	*	*	***	*	*	nap	***	***	*	***	**	***	***	nap	nap
Perceived performance (8.4)		***	***	***	***	***	***	*	***	**	***	***	***	***	***	***	nap	***	*	***	***	**	***	*	nap	nap
Civilian actor assistance community																										
Needs (8.3.1)		***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	nap	nap	**	***	***	***	***	nap	nap	nap	nap	nap	nap	***	nap	nap	nap
Sustainability (8.3.3)		*	***	***	***	***	***	*	**	nap	nap	**	***	***	***	***	nap	nap	nap	nap	nap	nap	***	nap	nap	nap
Local capacity (8.3.4)		*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	nap	nap	*	*	***	*	*	nap	nap	nap	nap	nap	nap	***	nap	nap	nap
Visibility (8.3.5)		***	***	**	*	**	***	**	**	nap	nap	**	*	*	*	***	nap	nap	nap	nap	nap	nap	***	nap	nap	nap
Perceived performance (8.4)		***	***	***	***	***	***	*	***	nap	nap	**	***	***	***	***	nap	nap	nap	nap	nap	nap	***	nap	nap	nap
Host nation																										
Needs (8.3.2)		*	**	***	nap	nap	*	*	***	**	**	nap	nap	nap	nap	nap	nap	***	*	**	**	*	nap	*	nap	nap
Sustainability (8.3.3)		*	***	***	nap	nap	*	*	***	*	*	nap	nap	nap	nap	nap	nap	***	*	*	**	*	nap	*	nap	nap
Local capacity (8.3.4)		*	*	*	nap	nap	*	*	*	***	***	nap	nap	nap	nap	nap	nap	***	***	*	***	**	nap	***	nap	nap
Perceived performance (8.4)		nav	nav	nav	nap	nap	nav	nav	nav	**	**	nap	nap	nap	nap	nap	nap	***	***	***	***	**	nap	**	nap	nap
Partnership locus																										
Costs (8.5)		**	**	**	*	***	**	**	***	***	***	**	***	***	***	**	nap	***	***	***	***	**	***	**	nap	nap

Table 10: Values of the performance criteria of partnerships

Legend	
Nap	The performance criterion is not applicable to the actor or at the time of research the partnership was not yet completed.
Nav	No data were available to measure the value of the performance criterion for an actor.
(...)	Number referring to the section in which the differences and similarities between the partnerships concerning a performance criterion are explained.

Case	Partner-ship number	Activities	Actor		
			Military actor	Civilian actor assistance community	Actor host nation
Kosovo case study	1	School reconstruction	1 (NL) EngrreliefBn	THW	Village of Ostrozub
	2	House construction	1 (NL) EngrreliefBn	Dorcas	Several villages (e.g., Gajrac)
	3	Winterisation of villages	1 (NL) EngrreliefBn	Caritas Austria	Several villages (e.g., Naspale, Janciste)
	4	Depot construction	1 (NL) EngrreliefBn	World Vision	None
	5	Morgue construction	1 (NL) EngrreliefBn	UNICTY	None
	6	School reconstruction	1 (NL) EngrreliefBn	USAID	Village of Dragobilje
	7	Water purification	- 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn - German Engineering Battalion	USAID	Village of Ponorac
	8	Transportation of firewood	1 (NL) EngrreliefBn	IOM	Several villages northeast of Orahovac
Kabul case study	9	Fire station Pol-e-Charki	ISAF	None	- Ministry of Interior - Local contractor
	10	School construction in Zemma	ISAF	None	- Ministry of Education - Local contractor
	11	Medical activities	ISAF	Die Johanniter	None
	12	Information sharing and coordination	ISAF	ACBAR	None
	13	Information sharing and coordination	ISAF	ANCB	None
	14	Various activities, including coordination, driver training, and protection	ISAF	UNAMA	None
	15	Various activities, including back to school programme and de-mining of warehouse	ISAF	UNICEF	None
Baghlan case study	16	Poultry production	NL PRT	DCA	- Department of Agriculture - Farmers - Primary schools
	17	(Re-) construction of mosques and wells	NL PRT	None	- Local communities - Local contractor
	18	River correction in Karte Etefaq	NL PRT	None	- Quarter of Karte Etefaq - Local contractor
	19	Donation of goods	NL PRT	None	- Orphanage - Several villages
	20	Construction radio and television mast	NL PRT	None	- City of PeK - Local contractor
	21	Police training courses	NL PRT	None	Highway and provincial police corps of Baghlan province
	22	Removal of explosives and ammunition	NL PRT	Halo Trust	None
	23	Construction of micro hydro power plants	NL PRT	None	- Local authorities (district governors) - Local constructor
	24	- Literacy training - School, road and bridge construction	NL PRT	- AKF - CFA	- Ministry of education - Several villages
	25	Provision of radio communication equipment	NL PRT	None	Local authorities (district governors)

Table 11: Partnerships corresponding to numbers in table 10

8.2 MILITARY FORCE

8.2.1 Force protection

Belligerent groups or key leaders
Although most military respondents in the three cases stated that force protection was one of the main drivers of civil-military cooperation, few activities included belligerent groups or key leaders. In Kosovo some partnerships, such as the construction of houses with Dorcas and several transport activities, took place in the AoR of TF Rusbat, contributing to the integration of the Russian battalion. They did not deliberately include belligerent groups or key leaders however. In Kabul the construction of the school in Zemma was carried out to target belligerent groups in this northern quarter of Kabul. In Baghlan some attention was given during the reconstruction of several mosques and wells. The reconstruction of mosques positively influenced the perception of several religious leaders perceived as potentially belligerent by NL PRT. Cooperation with Halo Trust included the removal of weapons and ammunition of several (former) warlords. However, of the estimated amount of weapons and ammunition held by the warlords, they often only handed in a very small part, which was very old. This did not contribute much to force protection of NL PRT.

The lack of inclusion of belligerent groups or key leaders originates in the first two steps of the cooperation process and has three underlying reasons. First, military actors in each of the three cases used several parallel databases, one each for cimic, intel, and psy-ops. These were often not integrated and because of their personal nature they were often hardly accessible to others. Apart from the duplication of effort, this resulted in a lack of integration of information of the separate branches. Cimic personnel were regularly unaware of the intel or psy-ops branch information, and unable to use it to direct their activities.

Second, the military guidelines (e.g., AJP-09, concept of operations) were often either not useful at a tactical level or not exploited by the personnel. As a result great differences occurred between contingents at the provincial and national levels, between rotations of the same contingent, and between personnel within the same contingent.

Third, humanitarian organisations often included the task-related criterion "compatible strategies and objectives" while selecting a partner. Because humanitarian organisations and military units had essentially different mandates, strategies and objectives focussed on different target groups resulting in incompatibility. Humanitarian organisations did not specifically include belligerent groups or key leaders as their beneficiaries. They selected the beneficiaries on humanitarian grounds, such as utmost priority to the most urgent cases of distress.

Number and location of beneficiaries

The partnerships varied greatly regarding the number of direct and indirect beneficiaries. In the partnership of 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn with Dorcas in Kosovo, 64 new houses were constructed for approximately 6-8 people each. With less effort the reconstruction of regional schools with THW and USAID and the reconstruction of houses with Caritas, each providing shelter for approximately 40-50 people, reached far more beneficiaries. In Kabul the partnership of ISAF and UNICEF delivered materials in the back to school programme to approximately 160 schools, thereby reaching nearly 13,000 teachers and 230,000 students. On the contrary, medical activities in cooperation with Die Johanniter only reached a very limited number of people.

By increasing the number of beneficiaries, the number of persons positively influenced by the activities of a military actor increased. This then increased the amount of force protection. Community projects (e.g., mosques, wells, schools) were very beneficial as they generally reached many people.

Considering the location of the assistance activities, NL PRT carried out a considerable number of activities in close proximity to its compound, intending to positively influence the perception of these communities towards NL PRT. In Kunduz province a large share of the effort went to support important lines of communication for GE PRT, such as the main connection between Kunduz and Feyzabad. In Kosovo 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn did not pay specific attention to the main road between Orahovac and Prizren, but its focus was to provide shelter in areas at an altitude of 500 metres.

The lack of unity regarding the location of assistance activities originates from non-uniform (application of) military guidelines. In the cases of Kabul and Baghlan, military personnel often included the location of beneficiaries in their decisions with the aim to increase force protection. This led to great differences in the quantity and quality of assistance provided among the areas. In Kosovo only a few people paid attention to this and assistance was provided more equally.

Visibility

Partnerships in which military contingents directly supported humanitarian organisations in their own needs did not often contribute much to visibility. These activities included the depot construction of World Vision by 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn and the assistance of ISAF to UNAMA (e.g., driver training). Coordination and information sharing activities of ISAF with ACBAR and ANCB also contributed little to the visibility.

Activities for the direct benefit of the local population often contributed to the visibility. Transportation activities such as the partnership with IOM (wood distribution in Kosovo) and the activities of ISAF with UNICEF (back to school programme) openly showed the involvement of ISAF in assistance activities. Apart from these, most construction activities also contributed to visibility. The transfer of a construction project to the local

communities often included ceremonies, attracting publicity and the attention of the villagers. In all three cases pictures or video were made and used as promotional material on television or newspapers to increase support to the military force. After the transfer, signboards were often put near the constructions to point out the contribution of the military actor. One activity of NL PRT was the construction of a radio and television mast. NL PRT received some hours of broadcasting time each week in return, which it used to communicate with the local population.

To increase the visibility of the lead-nationship of Germany and the Netherlands during ISAF III, the lighthouse project (Darulaman clinic) was selected. However, after the refurbishment of the clinic it still lacked experienced and trained personnel and medical machines and supplies, leading to inadequate functioning of the clinic.

The extent to which visibility affects the local population should be considered with care. In his report Jakobsen (2005) stated that local populations in Afghanistan were frequently not aware that military units had funded or contributed otherwise to the assistance activities.

Length of operation

All three military operations started relatively recently. 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn was the first military force in the region, while the military operation started approximately one year before the deployment of NL PRT and ISAF III in both Baghlan and Kabul. The impact of the partnerships on the amount of force protection was therefore not much reduced through long-term military involvement.

8.2.2   Safe and secure environment

Several of the analysed partnerships contributed directly or indirectly to a safe and secure environment. In Kosovo the morgue construction by 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn in Kosovo contributed to the primary objective of UNICTY to bring to justice persons allegedly responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law. In Kabul the construction of the Pol-e-Charki fire station directly contributed to the operation of the fire forces in northern Kabul. In cooperation with AGEF, ISAF supported the employment of demobilised soldiers as part of the number of unskilled labourers usually hired by the contractor. These soldiers were trained at construction sites supervised by ISAF, which directly contributed to the reintegration phase of the DDR process. Coordination and information sharing activities related to security contributed to the operations of humanitarian organisations in Afghanistan and Kosovo. In the partnerships with UNAMA and UNICEF extra patrolling and direct protection by ISAF troops facilitated their activities. In Kabul and Baghlan committees were developed to respond to disasters. These included national disasters such as earthquakes, but also evacuation of humanitarian organisations in case of serious decrease of the safety level. In Baghlan cooperation with Halo Trust focused on ammunition and explosives removal, directly contributing to a safe

and secure environment. This partnership also contributed to the DDR process as it focused on the collection of weapons and ammunitions of warlords in Baghlan province. The training courses of NL PRT for the highway and provincial police of Baghlan province contributed to the SSR Program (police reform) and intended to remove the metal truncheons of the policemen. Activities of NL PRT to reduce the flooding (e.g., construction of water works in Karte Etefaq) could have contributed to a safe and secure environment. However, these were not successful due to a lack of sustainability (see section 8.3.3).

The largest share of activities in the three cases did not contribute to a safe and secure environment. As military missions of ISAF and NL PRT were to create a safe and secure environment these activities distracted them from their missions and led to *mission creep*[22]. The mission of 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn in Kosovo included the delivery of assistance activities and strictly speaking this unit could not suffer from *mission creep* by performing assistance activities. However, most humanitarian organisations stressed the importance of military units focusing on security-related activities, as they clearly had a comparative advantage in this field. A clear division of tasks and responsibilities prevented the blurring of their roles. Although being stressed in all analysed cases, this became particularly true when the safety situation degenerated.

8.2.3   Situational awareness

To analyse the external environment and increase situational awareness, both ISAF and NL PRT had large capacities at their disposal. In Kabul this consisted of the TSTs and in Baghlan of the mission teams. Cimic personnel of 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn did this in Kosovo. In all three cases assessment of the civil environment was unstructured. Although the AoRs were divided to prevent overlap, the units used different assessment methods and techniques. Few standard formats were used and generally little attention was paid to the inclusion of women in the assessment capacity. In an Islamic culture this made it very difficult if not impossible, to get a clear overview of the women's needs. During ISAF IV, a female liaison officer was deployed. Through her intervention, ISAF was able to cooperate with several women organisations and allowed to the coordination meetings of ACBAR. An exception to the unstructured assessments was the shelter assessment of 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn. Having set clear priorities, a structured database was developed in cooperation with the HRCC and the German cimic company on the housing situation in the AoR of MNB South.

ISAF, NL PRT, and 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn regularly had little insight in the civilian actors operating in their AoRs. These included local authorities, humanitarian organisations, and

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[22] Mission creep is the military term to indicate that a unit attempts to do more than is allowed in the current mandate and mission or that a unit receives shifting guidance or a change in mission for which the unit is not properly configured or resourced (United States Department of Defence, 2003).

local companies. Personnel made several different lists, but most did not include capacities, points of contacts, objectives, activities, and focus areas of the actors. In all cases the proliferation of humanitarian organisations made it difficult to get an overview of the actors in the AoR of the military organisation. In Kabul and Baghlan this problem was more prominent as many constructors were registered as NGOs. Due to this lack of awareness great effort was made time and again to search for an appropriate civilian actor to cooperate with. This led to duplication and contributed to the unfamiliarity of military personnel with larger frameworks and projects on international, national, and provincial levels.

If partnerships were entered, humanitarian organisations often provided the military with knowledge and expertise about the local situation, customs, and humanitarian assistance. In particular information sharing and coordination increased the situational awareness of the military actor. However, NL PRT was absent in most coordination structures and did not have liaison personnel. This resulted in the unfamiliarity of NL PRT with activities of humanitarian organisations in Baghlan province and with organisations on a national level. In Kosovo and Kabul coordination and information sharing took place frequently. In particular in Kabul personnel of the CCC were very connected to the liaison function. However, due to a lack of continuity between the different rotations, personnel frequently had to start all over again. A MoU partly prevented this by formalising the person-bonded contacts into formal ones.

Apart from gathering information, processing was regularly unstructured. In the Baghlan and Kosovo cases this resulted in great difficulties to access the information. In Kabul the CCC made use of the ARRC Cimic Tracking and Reporting System. Although this system structured the information in an orderly way, its content was disputable (see Kabul case study). The LFA was a useful tool to present local needs. It was used by some NL PRT personnel but rarely by the CCC in Kabul. As humanitarian organisations frequently used this method it improved communication and coordination on needs.

In the selection of a partner organisation, its network was important. Organisations like USAID in Kosovo and ACBAR, ANCB, UNAMA, and UNICEF in Kabul were preferred as they had many contacts with other humanitarian organisations. Cooperation with these organisations provided easy access to others.

8.3   CIVIL ENVIRONMENT

8.3.1   The needs of the civilian actors of the assistance community

Most partnerships in which humanitarian organisations were involved, addressed the needs of these organisations. Through their complementary resources ISAF, NL PRT, and 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn filled many gaps in the needs of World Vision, UNICTY, UNAMA,

UNICEF, and Halo Trust among others. The first complementary resource was manpower. In particular 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn had many military available, which were often deployed at little or no expenses to support humanitarian organisations in their activities. This support fulfilled either direct needs of the humanitarian organisation (e.g., depot construction of World Vision) or indirect needs (e.g., winterisation of villages with Caritas Austria). ISAF and NL PRT also supported humanitarian organisations with manpower. Although no charges were made for assistance, this support was limited as many organisations attached great value to the humanitarian imperative and did not want to be associated with a military force. Several partnerships were initiated based on the supply of the military unit, rather than the need of a humanitarian organisation. Due to its overcapacity 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn cooperated with almost every humanitarian organisation in its AoR and the partnership with Die Johanniter was based on the overcapacity of doctors within ISAF.

Second, as humanitarian organisations were often dependent on local road repair and security, military transport capacity was often complementary to their own resources. ISAF and 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn supported humanitarian organisations (e.g., UNICEF and IOM) in the transport of goods. NL PRT supported Halo Trust in the transport of mines, ammunition, and explosives.

Technical knowledge of military personnel was often complementary to the resources of humanitarian organisations. Examples were the engineering knowledge of 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn, the EOD knowledge of NL PRT in cooperation with Halo Trust, and the knowledge of the cimic functional specialist of NL PRT in the partnership with DCA on poultry production.

In all three cases military troops provided direct and indirect security to humanitarian organisations. This included de-mining a UNICEF warehouse, protection of UNAMA personnel, and the development of disaster response committees in Baghlan and Kabul.

Coordination and information sharing between military units and humanitarian organisations was very beneficial as this prevented duplication of humanitarian effort and avoided *doing harm* to the local population by the cimic activities. However, often coordination and information sharing were ad-hoc and no permanent liaison relationships were put into place. During long periods NL PRT did not even have liaison personnel, which resulted in a constant lack of situational awareness regarding which actors were operating in what areas.

In some partnerships military units fulfilled the needs of humanitarian organisations through funding. NL PRT funded the activities of AKF, CFA, and DCA primarily due to the allocation of €4.5 million of the Dutch government to NL PRT. As many humanitarian organisations possessed far more money than military units to carry out assistance activities, military support often only increased the scale and scope of humanitarian organisations to a small extent.

Although most military units put a lot of effort into the execution of civil assessments, the results were often not completely or only partly used by humanitarian organisations for several reasons. First, most humanitarian organisations were occupied with their own projects and did not need the military assessment capacity. Second, many organisations believed that military information was biased. Questioning people about their needs while carrying weapons led to biased answers. Third, military units often used western standards in their assessments, rather than the widely accepted Sphere standards[23]. This made them less helpful for many humanitarian organisations. Fourth, if humanitarian organisations requested information this was often not accessible because of the lack of structure in the assessments, the classification of many reports, or the use of Dutch as the main language. Because of this, great potential to increase the scale and scope of the assistance activities was lost. One of the few exceptions was Halo Trust. In Baghlan this organisation made frequent use of the information on ammunition and explosives inquired by the mission teams of NL PRT.

The extent to which military units fulfilled the needs of humanitarian organisations was influenced by the compatibility of strategies and objectives. Although having essentially different mandates, humanitarian organisations contributed to the development of an area and were complementary to the mandate of a military force through the execution of assistance activities. Non-compatible strategies and objectives between military units and humanitarian organisations included the time schedule (short-term versus long term focus) and target groups (with regard to cimic the target groups were sometimes belligerent groups). In particular an agreement (e.g., MoU) addressed these issues as it clarified partnership objectives and rights and duties of each participating actor. As personnel, in particular the military, frequently changed and did not (properly) transfer tasks and responsibilities to their successors, MoUs also contributed to formalising a partnership rather than being it person-bonded.

8.3.2 The needs of the Host Nation

The extent to which the partnerships addressed the needs of the local population varied greatly. In all three cases several partnerships did not or only partly addressed the needs of the local population (e.g., police training in Baghlan, water purification in Kosovo, and fire station construction in Kabul) for several reasons. As the broad mandates of the military units were only operationalised to a limited extent, personnel at tactical level had to decide which areas to focus their activities on. To confront the extreme colds of the Kosovo winter in 1999-2000, 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn primarily focused on providing basic shelter. In cooperation with the HRCC and the German cimic company a detailed shelter assessment was made. Several areas were indicated as priority areas based on the degree of destruction

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[23] In response to concerns about the quality and impact of humanitarian assistance, international humanitarian organisations have developed a set of minimum standards, known as the Sphere standards.

in the villages, the altitude of the areas and the number of original inhabitants who returned to their villages. However, due to the available capacity of the battalion, the lack of financial means, and the task to carry out humanitarian assistance, 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn was forced into a supply-based approach. Apart from its primary focus (i.e., the provision of emergency housing), 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn engaged in many other activities including the construction of regional schools in cooperation with THW and USAID and the construction of new houses in cooperation with Dorcas.

NL PRT and ISAF held assessments on a broad range of issues (e.g., education, water and sanitation, housing). In Baghlan these were frequently unstructured, poorly prepared, and lacking a clear format. Rather than a thorough insight into the needs of the local population and its priorities, the outputs of many assessments were detailed lists of potential projects. In Kabul, ISAF made use of the ARRC Cimic Tracking and Reporting System to map needs, yet it was unclear which measures ISAF used to indicate the priority (i.e., colour of the traffic light). No objective measures were used, resulting in subjective and arbitrary judgment of the assessments.

Large databases were developed in Baghlan and Kabul to store the assessment information. However, because of their individual development, most were inaccessible to other people. In addition, as priorities were often unclear or very general and lacked continuity, the approach was often ad-hoc and based on the resources of the military units, rather than the needs of the local population. As these resources often greatly differed within the military units (e.g., some contingents of ISAF had far more finances than others) there was great inequality in the amount and extent to which needs of the host nation were addressed. This negatively influenced the perception of the local population towards the military actor, thereby decreasing the level of its force protection.

Many activities were not embedded in civil and military programs. Although the cimic priorities of ISAF were reportedly derived from the National Development Framework as established by the ATA, there was little overlap. In Kosovo and Baghlan it was unclear how activities fitted into the overall situation both civil and military. As a result many activities were performed in isolation from civilian actors such as UNHCR and UNAMA. This created inequality in Kosovo when several Kosovar-Albanian families refused help from humanitarian organisations, hoping instead for the better valued assistance of 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn. In some partnerships LFAs were used, contributing to the positioning of the activities in a larger framework.

In several partnerships local actors' lack of involvement contributed to insufficiently addressing the needs of the local population. Authorities were often consulted in the first phases of the cooperation process. However, they were often considered as a given part, rather than being selected. It proved necessary to be aware beforehand whether local authorities were able and willing to take over the tasks and responsibilities. In several partnerships this was not the case, resulting in a low performance of the partnerships (e.g.,

construction of micro power plants in Baghlan and school reconstruction in Kosovo). Partner selection of local authorities thus proved to be of great importance for the performance of the partnership.

Local actors other than the authorities or local construction companies were rarely included. In several partnerships this resulted in mismatches between the needs of local actors and the output of assistance activities. It also led to a lack of ownership by the local population needed to ensure sustainability. Direct involvement of the local population in the design phase could positively contribute to the participation of women and other vulnerable segments of the population. Moreover, involving a mayor or other leading person in the assistance activities empowered local leadership.

Due to the lack of involvement of local actors, several partnership designs did not include the input of these actors, resulting in a lack of correspondence between the needs of local actors and the objectives of the assistance activities. In Baghlan the training of the highway and provincial police did not reach its objectives as half of the trainees appeared to be illiterate and originated from PeK and Baghlan city. Having involved and consulted the local police in the partnership design could have prevented this.

The output of the partnership design varied from verbal agreements to detailed contracts. Many local actors did not value written contracts, instead attaching more value to verbal agreements made with military personnel. In several partnerships NL PRT obliged local communities to contribute through finances or manpower (e.g., construction of mosques and wells). This improved the correspondence of the needs of the host nation and the needs as perceived by NL PRT. It also increased the sense of ownership by the local communities. However, it was very difficult to enforce the contributions of the local actors. Although local authorities signed contracts for construction of the Pol-e-Charki fire station in Kabul and the micro hydro power plants in Baghlan, they failed to fulfil their obligations (namely electricity and water connection in the case of the fire station and a transformer house and cabling network in the case of the micro hydro power plants).

During activity implementation the use of standards was often subject of debate. During long periods 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn used Dutch construction standards and German units of ISAF (e.g., German cimic platoon and GE PRT) often used German standards. NL PRT and the CCC of ISAF used local standards as much as possible. This facilitated the transfer to and the sustainable use of the constructions by the local villagers. However, to indiscriminately apply local standards was not appropriate, as Afghanistan and Kosovo did not have quality regulations ensuring a minimum level of quality. In Afghanistan in particular some buildings were likely to be hazardous in case of earthquakes.

In several partnerships difficulties occurred in the transfer of tasks and responsibilities. In Kabul and Kosovo schools and clinics did not function as such for some time, instead functioning as shelter for several local families. This was due to the lack of attention paid to the function rather than the construction. In the partnership design no attention was paid

to the salaries of employees, interiors, or other materials and machines enabling proper school or clinic function.

8.3.3 Sustainability

Partnership outcomes varied greatly with respect to their sustainability for several reasons. Partnerships not requiring follow-up such as maintenance or operations efforts were generally sustainable. These included (1) partnerships of ISAF with ACBAR and ANCB focusing on coordination and information sharing, (2) most partnerships supporting the direct needs of either a military or humanitarian organisation (e.g., de-mining a warehouse location of UNICEF in Kabul and the removal of mines and explosives with Halo Trust in Baghlan) and (3) many construction activities of NL PRT and ISAF in cooperation with local constructors (e.g., construction of wells, painting of mosques).

In contrast, partnerships requiring follow-up were less sustainable. The first reason was the extent of maintenance required after completion of construction. In Kosovo, 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn carried out most construction activities. If construction was for the benefit of a humanitarian organisation (e.g., depot construction for World Vision), this organisation took care of maintenance after completion with few problems. In the partnership of 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn and Dorcas, beneficiaries received paint and an instruction manual to maintain the installation of their houses. If construction was for the benefit of a community (e.g., school construction) no arrangements were made in regard to maintenance. Due to the short period (i.e. one year) of deployment, 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn did not face many problems relating to maintenance. In Kabul, ISAF contracted out most construction activities. Warranties were included guaranteeing maintenance for 12 months in many contracts with local construction companies. Because ISAF operated for several years in Kabul, warranties like this proved to be beneficial as they decreased long-term dependency upon ISAF. In Baghlan province, NL PRT did not include future maintenance in activities it contracted out. When some partnerships required maintenance (e.g., construction of the radio and television mast in PeK), no one felt responsible and maintenance was not done. This resulted in serious malfunctioning of several constructions.

The second reason for the differences in sustainability was the effort required for the outcome to become and remain fully operational. In the case of schools this implied paid teachers, education material, and school interiors. After completion of many activities however, few actors were able or willing to take over the tasks and responsibilities. The schools of Zemma in Kabul, and Dragobilje and Ostrozub in Kosovo malfunctioned due to this problem. Similarly clinics, kindergartens, fire stations, and power plants required much effort. In each of the three cases a great lack of educated people was a complicating factor. As many institutions needed educated personnel to be and remain operational, skilled labour was moved from one area to another, creating a gap in the former.

The third reason was the extent of involvement of humanitarian organisations. Through a long-term focus and experience and knowledge on development issues, involvement of humanitarian organisations contributed to the sustainability of outcomes of many partnerships. Without consulting a humanitarian organisation, NL PRT contracted out the construction of the river works in Karte Etefaq. Nearly two weeks after completion floods totally destroyed the construction works, cancelling out all the efforts of NL PRT and the local constructor. Upfront coordination with humanitarian organisations specialised on water management could have prevented these activities from being carried out. The involvement of humanitarian organisations was however, not a guarantee for success as was proven in the construction of the regional schools in Ostrozub and Dragobilje. Despite the involvement of USAID and THW the schools did not function as such for several months.

In addition to its importance of fulfilling the needs of the host nation, involvement of the local population was also important for sustainability. In the design of the partnership many arrangements were made influencing the future use of the outcome of the partnership. These included future maintenance, operations effort, legal possession of the land, and the use of standards. Involving local authorities and communities, this step of the partnership was a direct influence to problems after completion of the partnership. In several instances for example, the outcome of a community project was claimed by the legitimate owner of the land after completion. In Kabul the police claimed to be the legitimate owner of land at which wells were recently built for a community. Soon the police started to collect money from local villagers for the use of the wells.

In the implementation of the partnership, a contribution of the local population whether financial or through labour, increased their sense of ownership as part of their own resources was invested in the activities. This resulted in more sustainability. In particular NL PRT applied this in many construction activities (e.g., mosques, wells).

Related to involvement of the local population, the next reason for sustainability was the extent to which the activities were needs driven. If activities were based on the supply by an international actor, it often did not address the needs of the local population to the fullest extent, resulting in a lack of responsibility and sense of ownership (e.g., construction of micro hydro power plants in the Baghlan case).

The last reason for the differences in sustainability was the long-term dependency on outside (e.g., military) resources. Partnerships in which a long-term involvement of the military actor was required were often not sustainable as the military suddenly had to withdraw or focus on other activities. The donation of goods was not sustainable as it led to a constant and durable dependency of the host nation on these outside resources. Having received goods like fuel or clothes, beneficiaries became dependent and frequently requested more support. These activities were no permanent solution to the local needs.

Other activities, which required long-term dependency on military resources, included the police training courses and the provision of radio communication equipment in Baghlan and the morgue construction for UNICTY in Kosovo.

8.3.4   Local capacity

Contributions partnerships made to increase local capacity showed great differences for several reasons. Many of the partnerships in which 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn participated, did not contribute to the increase of local capacity, because military engineers rather than local constructors did the implementation. In the case of the morgue construction for UNICTY, the early finishing date made it impossible to tender the construction activities to local or foreign construction companies. This gave 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn a great comparative advantage and made it the preferred organisation. In the emergency housing of Dorcas, 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn won a tender over a local construction company and an English-Albanian construction group. As a result local coping capacity did not increase. Unfamiliarity with assistance activities and the ambition of the commanders of 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn to distinguish themselves also contributed to this. Another reason was the lack of construction companies in Kosovo. During the bombing period, most Serbian people who fulfilled the middle and higher functions fled, leaving the labour force behind. However, during the deployment of 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn several local construction companies started to operate in the area, increasing the opportunities to contribute to the local capacity.

Both ISAF and NL PRT did not have the capacity to execute many assistance activities. They contracted out most of them and monitored the progress, which increased local capacity and stimulated the local economy. The main difference between ISAF and NL PRT was that the former included approximately 25 companies in the tendering process, while the latter included only two. ISAF's approach resulted in lower prices through increased competition. Moreover, involving more contractors encouraged them to work more efficiently and spread the benefits among the population.

In the selection of partner organisations ISAF and NL PRT often deliberately included the criterion "nationality", preferring Afghan organisations to foreign ones. In addition to increasing the local capacity, cooperation with Afghan organisations also empowered local leadership. It was, however, very difficult to get insight in the capacities and capabilities of national organisations. This was complicated by the fact that many local constructors claimed to be an NGO to avoid paying tax.

As the missions of NL PRT and ISAF were to assist the Afghan government until they were able to function effectively without COMISAF's support, increasing the capacity of the administrative machinery was of great importance. Involving the Afghan authorities in the assistance activities contributed to this and empowered their leadership. The training of policemen in Baghlan did not contribute as much as expected to the capacity of the police corps. Although activities focused on training the trainers, very little follow-up was given to

this after completion of the courses. As a result the trained policemen did not start to function as instructors but remained in their former jobs.

The final explanation for the differences in contribution to the local capacity consists of the resources used in the partnerships. In all three cases resources were usually acquired on the spot. Purchase of goods on the local market stimulated the local economy, which increased the coping capacity of the local communities. However, because the international community purchased large amounts of resources locally, in particular in Kabul prices rose and the local population had difficulties. Sometimes resources were purchased in western countries. These included the radio communication equipment for the district governors in Baghlan and school furniture in Kabul. The costs of these resources were often considerably higher than if purchased locally and the expenditures did not contribute to the local economy. A benefit however was that these purchases did not use the scarce local resources.

8.3.5 Visibility concerning civilian actors of assistance community

Several partnerships had positive impacts on visibility, through the attraction of media attention. This mainly depended on the place of issue and the scope of the activities. In Kosovo, close to the main road from Prizren to Orahovac, activities were accessible to the media and attracted much attention (e.g., partnerships of 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn with Dorcas, USAID and THW). Activities in less accessible areas attracted less attention (e.g., partnership of 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn with Caritas Austria).

Partnerships focusing on coordination and information sharing (e.g., partnerships of ISAF with ACBAR and ANCB) attracted little media attention, as these activities were not directly visible. Activities directly supporting the needs of one actor, either military or humanitarian organisation, also did not contribute much to visibility. In contrast, the international media followed the back to school programme of UNICEF closely, thereby increasing the visibility of this organisation. In Baghlan few international media were present and activities attracted little attention.

Many humanitarian organisations considered visibility of cooperation or association with the military as a serious threat. They argued that if military personnel worked in close physical proximity, communities could no longer distinguish between military- and civilian-implemented assistance. The blurring roles could have a significant negative impact on the relationship of humanitarian organisations with the communities they served. It could also pose security risks if civilian humanitarians were perceived as collaborating with an unwanted military force and channelling intelligence to it. Despite these strong considerations, no evidence was found for this. Many respondents argued that assaults on humanitarian employees were often not directly related to their association with military forces. Dispelling humanitarian organisations from a country or region would destabilise the area and thwart the military mission. However, to reduce visibility some humanitarian organisations in Kabul and Baghlan were very reluctant toward monitoring activities by

military personnel or the joint execution of activities. Humanitarian organisations in Kosovo often preferred a more pragmatic approach to a principled one, thereby allowing the visibility of humanitarian and military personnel together.

8.4 DESCRIPTIVE VERSUS NORMATIVE PERFORMANCE

Despite the fact that the partnerships varied considerably on descriptive performance criteria, all actors were in general very positive in a normative way about the performance of the partnerships. Exceptions to this were partnerships of which the outcome was clearly negative (e.g., partnership on water purification in Ponorac, Kosovo; dam construction in PeK). This is in accordance with research on business alliances in which there often is no consistency between subjective and objective measures of performance (Geringer and Hebert, 1991). Several underlying reasons were derived for these differences. Due to the hierarchical structure, military were reluctant to express their critiques. Many officers were promoted after their deployment and thought that expressing criticism could be explained as a personal failure. "Selling" the activities as a success was therefore more beneficial than pointing out the negative aspects or missed opportunities. In some cases military personnel did express criticism. These included the military police and cimic branch of third rotation of NL PRT.

Second, civilian actors and their military counterparts look favourably on cooperation as long as they expect cooperation to serve their best interest. This is in accordance with the "altruistic self-interest principle" of Seiple (1996), who views civil-military cooperation as a pragmatic strategy whenever partners consider themselves interdependent to reach their objectives. Third, as few evaluations were made and personnel were often rotated, they were frequently not confronted with the outcomes of the activities. As the personal bond between the partners was often good, this dominated the overall feeling of the partnership and influenced the perception of the performance. Fourth, most personnel had a very good time during their deployment. Negative feelings on certain outcomes were replaced by the sweet memories as personnel remembered the good accomplishments rather than the negative ones. Fifth, local populations were often satisfied with whatever assistance they got. If they expressed criticism they thought to be left out for further assistance. Finally, respondents of humanitarian organisations were reluctant to express criticism about their activities due to their dependence on private funding sources.

8.5 THE COSTS OF THE PARTNERSHIPS

In many reports, critics make the point that NGOs and locals are a much cheaper alternative to assistance activities than bringing in the military. Based on an extensive data

set Durch (2003) calculated that the yearly costs of a US soldier in Afghanistan, when both direct and indirect expenses are included, is approximately US$215,000. ACBAR (2002) stated that humanitarians usually cost a tenth of this, largely because the vast majority of humanitarians are Afghans, not expatriates. While the costs of the latter can be as high as the yearly price of a US soldier, the costs of the former are generally much lower. Both in Kosovo and Afghanistan the yearly wages of local employees of humanitarian organisations were often between US$2,000 and US$25,000. In both countries local labourers earned approximately US$700 to US$1,500 annually.

In general it was more cost-effective if local organisations or humanitarian organisations carried out the activities. This not only reduced total costs but also resulted in a spin-off for the local economy through employment creation and capacity building. In addition, military forces could then focus on military objectives. This rule did not apply to all circumstances for two reasons. First, in some partnerships a military unit had a clear comparative advantage to humanitarian organisations or local companies. This was composed of (1) the ability of military organisations to operate in unsafe areas, where other organisations either would not, or could not operate, (2) the time-period in which activities were to be completed, and (3) the lack of actors other than a military that had the capacity to fulfil the activities.

Second, a military unit was deployed for a specified period in a specified area. Due to political commitments it was generally unable to redeploy sooner if circumstances permitted so. Within some military units this resulted in overcapacity, which was used for assistance activities with low marginal costs.

In Kosovo 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn carried out many activities itself. In several partnerships this was due to a clear comparative advantage. During the first rotation of 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn there were very few construction companies. This applied to the partnerships with Caritas Austria (winterisation of villages), USAID (school construction), and THW (school construction). In the entire region of Kosovo there was a great lack of transport capacity. 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn had a great comparative advantage in the transport activities in the partnership with IOM. In the case of the morgue construction for UNICTY, the required early finishing date made it impossible to tender the construction activities to local or foreign construction companies and gave 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn a comparative advantage. In the partnership on water purification the engineering knowledge of 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn and the German engineering battalion led to comparative advantage. However, in most partnerships 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn made use of the local coping capacity only to a very limited extent. In the partnerships during the second rotation of 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn (e.g., Dorcas and World Vision) local construction companies operated in the area. However, as 1 (NL) EngrreliefBn had overcapacity and did not charge personnel costs to humanitarian organisations, it was preferred over the construction companies.

In Kabul and Baghlan the costs of most partnerships were relatively low. In case of construction activities (e.g., school construction in Zemma, fire station construction in Pol-e-Charki, reconstruction of mosques and wells in Baghlan) local contractors were hired and local personnel employed. Information sharing and coordination were low cost activities with usually high benefits (e.g., avoiding duplication of effort). In the partnerships in which ISAF supported the direct needs of humanitarian organisations, ISAF had a clear comparative advantage (e.g., transport capacity in partnership with UNICEF and provision of security to UNAMA). For NL PRT this applied to the partnership with Halo Trust in which it provided expertise of the EOD advisor and assessment capacity of the mission teams. The activities in which large capacity of ISAF was involved (e.g., German cimic platoon), were expensive because they substituted local contractors and personnel. The activities in cooperation with Die Johanniter were due to the overcapacity of medical personnel within ISAF. However, this capacity did not substitute for humanitarian organisations or local companies.

To manage the longer-term reconstruction activities of NL PRT (e.g., construction of micro hydro power plants) several functional specialists were deployed. However, they were deployed for a fixed rather than a flexible period. Although this period often did not exceed two months, they were sometimes short of work, increasing the costs unnecessarily.

In many partnerships military actors had a clear comparative advantage or had an overcapacity which justified their involvement in the assistance activities. However, in several partnerships this was not the case, thereby lowering the cost-effectiveness.

8.6 DISCUSSION

The three case studies demonstrate that all steps of the process-based partnership model occur in practice. The extent to which actors go through these steps explicitly and deliberately however, differed. In the first step (the decision to cooperate) a few actors carried out an internal analysis, based on which they gained insight into the strengths and weaknesses of their organisation. Personnel implicitly knew what strengths and weaknesses their organisation had and felt no need to do this explicitly. This greatly reduced the transparency and accuracy of the decision-making process leading to sub-optimal decisions. Most actors made external analyses. Military actors in particular gathered much information on their external environment. However, they often lacked an adequate mechanism to process this information, which resulted in duplication of effort within military organisations and limited insight into actors in the area.

Field personnel, both military and civilian, decided which activities were to be performed and whether or not cooperation was pursued. However, as they had few useful guidelines they developed own methods and criteria to make these decisions. Few strategic plans were

made by the involved actors, which resulted in unclear objectives and conditions for cooperation.

During the second step of the model (partner selection), actors made use of several mechanisms. These included liaison personnel, coordination meetings, and personal networks. Some partners met coincidentally. In the selection of the partner task-related criteria were most decisive. Complementary resources, added value, and compatible strategies and objectives were of great importance. However, for most actors, partner-related criteria such as personal fit, prior experiences, and compatible cultures influenced the selection to a large extent.

Having selected a partner, the partnership was then designed. No partnership structures were developed due to the independence all actors wanted to keep. Either verbal or written agreements were made. The level of detail of these agreements greatly varied. Some included implementation plans and precise definitions of rights and duties, while others were very loose. Agreement on clear objectives enabled the actors to exactly determine when the implementation of the activities was completed and tasks and responsibilities were to be transferred. This prevented the military from *mission creep*. Written agreements had the advantage over verbal agreements to improve accountability and address the largely ad hoc arrangements in most partnerships. Additionally, they increased transparency and the clarity of each actor's role in the implementation step and the transfer of tasks and responsibilities, helping prevent opportunistic behaviour of one of the actors. When military and humanitarian actors operated for long periods in the same area, a written agreement contributed to institutionalisation of the cooperation rather than it being person-bonded (CGN, 2004b). However no agreement, written or verbal, could guarantee a successful course of the subsequent steps in the cooperation process. An example of this is the construction of micro hydro power plants in Baghlan. During the implementation of these activities several commitments were impossible to enforce.

In partnership implementation, four clusters of activities are identified: (1) coordination between military and humanitarian organisations, (2) information sharing between military and humanitarian organisations, (3) activities to support the direct needs of either the military or humanitarian organisation, and (4) activities to address the needs of the local population. Activities in the first, second and third cluster were generally approved by all actors. Military involvement in activities of the fourth cluster was regularly disapproved by humanitarian organisations as this blurred the military and humanitarian roles.

For activities in cluster one and two, the transfer of tasks and responsibilities was regularly not a comprehensive step in the cooperation process and generated few problems. In cluster three tasks and responsibilities were transferred to the recipient actor, whether military or civilian. This also generated few problems. In cluster four tasks and responsibilities were often transferred to the local population directly, which resulted in many problems elaborated in the previous sections on partnership performance.

While most actors agreed that evaluation was an important last step, they paid limited attention to it. Most often evaluations took place through internal meetings or chats. As a result actors had little insight into the contribution of the partnerships to their missions. The partnership performance framework (see section 4.2.7 and sections 8.1-8.5) enables actors to gain such insight.

The lack of evaluations also contributed to limited organisational learning. Most civilian and military personnel changed functions every few years. Once somebody had built up experience related to civil-military cooperation in a peace support operation he or she was often transferred to a different function or organisation. Lacking written evaluations then leads to the loss of much knowledge.

To increase validity of the process-based partnership model, the measures mentioned in section 1.7 have been applied. To ensure a valid description of reality three measures have been taken (see section 1.7.3). First, data and method triangulation have been applied in the cases. Second, a case study protocol was made (see section 4.3). Third, key informants verified the cases on Kosovo and Baghlan. The Kabul case was not verified due to limited availability of appropriate key informants.

With respect to the number of cases, the model has been confronted with 25 partnerships in three different settings. Although the partnerships showed considerable differences, the model proved a valid representation in all partnerships. Based on this observation it is expected that also for other civil-military partnership settings this is a useful construct.

CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSIONS, REFLECTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

9.1 CONCLUSIONS

The conclusions of this research are threefold. First, the conclusions regarding the process model are presented. Second, conclusions regarding the practice of civil-military cooperation are drawn. Finally, the contribution of this research to the body of knowledge on civil-military cooperation is addressed.

9.1.1 Process model of civil-military cooperation

This section answers the central research question "What process model is appropriate to support the execution of civil-military cooperation at a local level in peace support operations in response to a complex emergency". It is structured along the lines of the three sub research questions:

1. What are the phases in the process of civil-military cooperation?
2. What factors influence the process of civil-military cooperation and can enhance the understanding of the phases in this process?
3. What constitutes the outcome of civil-military cooperation?

Phases in the process of civil-military cooperation

Based on the process-based partnership model and confirmed by the three cases studies the research concludes that civil-military partnerships go through three successive phases: formation phase, operation phase and evolution phase. Each of these phases consists of one or more steps. This is illustrated in figure 28.

The case studies showed the strong relationship between the steps of the cooperation process. Decisions and problems in one step often affect subsequent steps and final performance. Addressing the evaluation in each partnership increased understanding of civil-military partnerships and institutional learning of the different actors. As such the process model explained that an outcome is likely (but not certain) under some conditions and unlikely under others.

The extent to which the steps of the process-based partnership model are addressed strongly relate to the taxonomy of civil actors. Size, mandate, capacity and levels of professionalism all affect their efforts. In addition there are great differences between local, national, and international organisations. For civil-military relations at a local level a tailor-made approach is needed or as Stockton (2002) formulates it: "a 'one size fits all' approach to NGO coordination either fills up rooms with agency representatives deploying no significant strategic assets, or excludes some of the largest, best informed and most

influential assistance actors completely". The developed model reflects such a tailor-made approach as it leaves space for an actor to fill in the separate steps of the partnership. Depending on the type of partner an actor can make different decisions, deploy different resources, or address (potential) problems in a different way.

Figure 28: Phases and steps in the process of civil-military cooperation

Factors in the process of civil-military cooperation

The process-based partnership model identified numerous factors that could influence the performance of civil-military partnerships, in each step of the partnership process. These proved to be very useful to analyse the partnerships in the case studies because they enlarged the understanding of the separate steps and contributed to the explanation of the performance. This research was unable to determine which factors were necessary conditions for a civil-military partnership to succeed. Each of the factors has to be studied in more detail to determine this. However, as the partnerships showed many differences and were assessed to a variety of performance criteria, it is highly questionable whether it is possible to draw a general list of necessary conditions applicable to each civil-military partnership. Nevertheless, there were many similarities between the analysed partnerships in the three cases. A key observation is that most factors influencing the performance of the partnerships in the case studies are internal rather than external. Despite the complex nature of the operational environment, the extent to which the internal factors are controlled heavily influenced the performance of civil-military partnerships.

A few factors have been identified in the case study that did not occur in the process-based partnership model. These are the selection criteria "nationality" and "level of English" in the partner selection and the "use of standards" in the implementation. The involvement

and participation of the local population should be stressed more throughout the entire process. A limited number of factors in the model were found to be of minor importance to the process of civil-military partnerships. These were "balanced development" and "termination only on approval by all partners", both in step 5.

The research identified two antecedent conditions without which the cooperation process does not take off. The first condition is based on the humanitarian principles. There are several approaches that humanitarian organisations can adopt towards cooperation with a military actor. These all deal with the level of engagement of humanitarian organisations in civil-military relations. Studer (2001) defines these as: isolationism, proselytism, and ecumenism. Save the Children (2004) suggests four different approaches: (1) principled non-engagement, (2) arm's-length interaction, (3) proactive, pragmatic, principled engagement, and (4) active, direct engagement and cooperation.

The process-based partnership model presupposes there is a level of cooperation between military and civilian organisations. In terms of Studer, the approach of humanitarian organisations is then ecumenistic and in terms of Save the Children the approach is either the proactive, pragmatic, principled engagement or the active, direct engagement and cooperation. If humanitarian organisations take the view of an arm's length interaction, cooperation takes place through UN agencies. The model is therefore not fully applicable towards these relationships as this assumes a mediation function of a UN or other large organisation.

If humanitarian organisations take the view of isolationism or proselytism in terms of Studer or a principled non-engagement in terms of Save the Children, the process-based partnership model is not viable since no cooperation takes place.

The second condition is the compatibility of strategies and objectives. Currey (2003) groups relationships between military and humanitarian organisations into four categories: reliance, assistance, autonomous or adversarial. The reliance relationship is one in which a humanitarian organisation depends on military support. Without it, it is incapable of accomplishing its mission. Consequently the organisation is supportive of military recovery efforts and wants military support in large measures to accomplish its part in the humanitarian effort. The assistance relationship is similar to reliance, but far more limited in scale of assistance. Here the humanitarian organisation can accomplish its mission, but needs some military assistance to initiate or sustain operations efficiently. In both relationships the process-based partnership model is fully applicable. The autonomous relationship is one in which a humanitarian organisation requires no military support to accomplish its mission. It is able to operate independently in the operational area, but the military will still need to know their location and efforts. In this relationship the process-based partnership model is primarily applicable to activities such as information sharing and coordination. However, based on the consent of both military and humanitarian

organisations, other activities can also qualify for cooperation. The final relationship is adversarial. In this mode a humanitarian organisation is working at cross-purposes of the military. A humanitarian organisation may avoid the military, despise it, or even offer assistance to hostile elements. The process-based partnership model is not applicable to this relationship as there is no cooperation.

Outcome of civil-military cooperation

Literature on civil-military cooperation did not pay much attention to the evaluation of civil-military cooperation and criteria that constitute the outcome of the process. From the review it remained unclear how the outcome of the process of civil-military cooperation can be determined. Because military and civilian actors do frequently lack clear objectives in civil-military partnerships, commonly used concepts to objectively measure performance such as effectiveness and efficiency do not result in an adequate assessment of the performance since they are directly linked to these objectives.

Theories on strategic alliances identified two distinctions which are important to determine the outcome of a cooperation process. The first consists of the partnership locus (performance is viewed as the aggregated result for the partner organisations) versus the partner locus (performance is viewed as the result of the separate partners). The second distinction consists of descriptive (objective) versus normative (subjective) criteria.

These distinctions are used to identify the performance criteria. The partner locus identifies the performance for three actor groups: military actor, civilian actor of the assistance community (i.e. humanitarian organisation and donor organisation) and the host nation. For each of these groups it includes the perceived performance of the partnership (normative) and defines several descriptive criteria to objectively measure the performance. A determination of the relative costs of the assistance activities measures the performance of the partnership as a whole (partnership locus). Figure 29 presents the identified performance criteria.

Figure 29: Performance criteria civil-military cooperation

9.1.2 The practice of civil-military cooperation

Within military organisations civil-military cooperation is a very confusing subject. There are numerous different interpretations of the concept. Some military view it as the execution of as many projects as possible to win the hearts and minds of the local population. As a result these military never have enough money. Others view civil-military cooperation as a way to minimise the negative effects of the operational environment on a military force or as the gathering of information through constant liaison with humanitarian organisations and the execution of assessments.

This section addresses the practice of civil-military cooperation. The following conclusions are drawn based on the analysis of 25 partnerships in the three cases.

Performance evaluation

Few actors, military or civilian, carry out formal evaluations after completing activities. The performance assessment shows that there are great differences between normative and descriptive performance of civil-military partnerships. Despite the largely positive feelings by participants about the performance, most civil-military partnerships did not contribute to a large extent to many of the performance criteria. With regard to force protection, military actors sometimes incorporated the number and location of the beneficiaries. However, few partnerships included belligerent groups or key leaders as direct beneficiaries of their assistance activities. To support the military mission, some partnerships contributed to a safe and secure environment or an increase of situational awareness. The former set of activities included the removal of mines and explosives, the construction of fire departments and police stations and the training of policemen. The latter included information sharing and coordination activities with humanitarian organisations.

Support to the civil environment differed considerably among the analysed partnerships. If humanitarian organisations were involved, their direct needs were often met. Being pragmatic many resources, varying from personnel, machines or funds were used to fulfil the needs of many humanitarian organisations. Support to the needs of the local population, whether directly through the military or in cooperation with a humanitarian organisation, often proved less successful. Many activities did not address the needs of the local population, were not sustainable, or did not increase local capacity.

Three main causes underlying the differences in performance of the partnerships have been discerned:

Military institutions

There is a lack of unambiguous and useful military guidelines regarding civil-military cooperation. At strategic and operational levels there was often no clear priority setting, demarcation of the activities and formulation of end-states, making it difficult to determine when the objectives of the military force were met and redeployment could begin. The

NATO cimic doctrine (AJP-09) is unsuitable if facilitation of rehabilitation is one of the main tasks of a multinational force, as this doctrine primarily focuses on cimic as a force multiplier. As a result, military officers at the tactical level were responsible for the shaping and execution of civil-military cooperation. Many military personnel, involved in civil-military cooperation, had little experience with and training in the subject. They lacked knowledge and expertise regarding development issues, military guidelines and project-based activities, including tendering procedures. Since few formal evaluations were done and rotations frequently lacked sufficient overlap, a great deal of knowledge vanished when personnel withdrew. When redeployed, military personnel frequently changed functions within their organisation, thereby taking with them a majority of the gained knowledge and experience on civil-military cooperation. As a result there has been little institutional learning over the years.

Therefore the execution of civil-military cooperation often depended on the personal capabilities and common sense of deployed personnel. Since officers lacked similar training, had different personal capabilities and their contingents had different budgets there was no common approach to civil-military cooperation within and between military contingents, operations and countries. The absence of a common approach is not necessarily a problem as it may increase flexibility and creativity in finding solutions. However, in these three cases the lack of one common approach created inequality in addressing the needs of the local population in a small area, both quantitatively and qualitatively. It created an atmosphere of non-transparency in which humanitarian organisations did not know what to and what not to expect of a military force. In consecutive contingents a shift in approach led to little follow-up of initiated activities, thereby cancelling out initial efforts.

The ad-hoc character of partnerships
The second reason for differences in performance of the partnerships is their ad-hoc character. Being deployed in an area, military and humanitarian organisations each began to analyse their respective external environments. Although military forces often put large effort into this, they remained unaware of other actors operating in the area and of civil programmes of main actors such as UN organisations. In several cases this was because military forces did not participate in coordination meetings; did not adequately transfer contacts with civilian actors to subsequent rotations; were unable to make the information accessible or simply were not interested in civil programmes. In their quest for situational awareness, some military forces wanted to collect information on a broad range of issues. Due to the limited capacity, the lack of up-front structuring and experience with and knowledge of assessments it was often not possible to get a clear overview of the needs of the external environment. As a result the approach towards civil-military cooperation often became ad-hoc giving undue weight to the most recent information. This led to duplication of effort as many different people ran into the same problems and questions time and time

again. Organisations were selected based on personal views and few partnerships between military and civilian organisations were formalised. In partnerships between military forces and humanitarian organisations, the frequent rotation of persons contributed to duplication of effort as partnerships were recreated. In several instances the design was not given adequate attention and activities were directly implemented. As a result few preparations for terminating activities were made and tasks and responsibilities of the respective actors were unclear. If few resources were allocated upfront and there was a good strategic fit between the actors this often did not generate many problems. However, as military and civilian actors frequently had several non-compatible objectives and cooperation was initiated from altruistic self-interest, adequately addressing the partnership design proved to be very important.

The involvement of the local population and humanitarian organisations
The third main reason underlying differences in performance is the involvement of civilian actors in the assistance activities. Cooperation at the local level was frequently supply-based rather than demand-driven. Activities were selected and prioritised based on the capacity of a military force or humanitarian organisation, rather than the needs of the local beneficiaries. Of these, partnerships in which humanitarian organisations were involved often led to better performance due to their expertise and knowledge, and long-term focus. The approach of many humanitarian organisations was process-oriented in these partnerships, while the military approach was often result-oriented. However, at local level personnel were often able to cope with these differences.

In many partnerships little attention was paid to the involvement of the local population which resulted in decreased sustainability, a lack of cohesion with social structures, a lack of ownership and mismatches between the assistance activities and the actual needs. Following this approach, the local coping capacity was often not fully addressed and western standards were applied in several cases. Making use of local standards facilitated the transfer to and the sustainable use of the constructions by the local villagers.

In cases where the local population was involved in a partnership this was often through the local authorities. However, these authorities were frequently focused on self-enrichment rather than the interests of the population. Occasionally mechanisms (e.g., stakeholder analyses or LFAs) were applied to link the authorities to the people. If these were applied, activities obtained more support of the local population, which contributed to the sense of ownership and to sustainability.

9.1.3 Contribution to the body of knowledge
This research contributes to the body of knowledge of civil-military cooperation in various ways. The first contribution of the research consists of detailed insights in the cooperation processes between military and civilian actors at a local level. Previous research primarily did not fully address the process and focussed on single factors, identified in chapter two.

This research structures many of these single factors through the process-based partnership model. The three cases provide detailed insights in the cooperation processes and demonstrate that the steps have significant influence on the final performance for each actor. In particular the considerations of an actor to select a partner (i.e., step 2: partner selection), the value of up-front design and agreements (i.e., step 3: partnership design) and the evaluation of the partnership (i.e., step 6) were underexposed in previous research.

The second contribution is the performance assessment framework. The research unravels criteria to assess the performance of civil-military partnerships. These include the differences between normative and descriptive criteria and the differences between the partnership and partner locus. With regard to the latter it identifies separate criteria for three actor groups involved in a partnership. Depending on the situation certain criteria can be emphasised. In humanitarian operations the emphasis for military units is particularly on "support to the civil environment". In peace enforcement operations, in which the situation is often more hostile, their focus shifts to "support to the force".

Where many researches analyse the cooperation from two sides (i.e., military and the civilian actors of the assistance community) this research incorporates the view of the local population. As they are the beneficiaries of most activities, failing to include them will often lead to failure of the assistance activities and will contribute to extended stay of both military and civilian actors.

Finally, the process-based partnership model provides a detailed framework for further analysis and offers a basis for further research (see section 9.3.2).

9.2 REFLECTIONS

The research applied an actor perspective to uncover the dynamics of civil-military cooperation, approaching the cooperation from the perspectives of the different actors. It was relatively easy to perceive the cooperation from a military perspective because the researcher had the opportunity to interview many involved military personnel and participate in several courses on civil-military cooperation provided by military units. In preparation for the fieldwork in Baghlan, the researcher went through a seven-day basic military skills training. During the Baghlan case the researcher was deployed as a military officer, which enabled him to integrate with other military personnel. Due to all these activities the researcher was exposed to many aspects regarding civil-military cooperation from a military perspective.

Perceiving civil-military cooperation from the perspective of humanitarian organisations was sometimes difficult. As with the military, humanitarian organisations perceive civil-military cooperation in a variety of ways. During the early phases of the research, the researcher interviewed representatives of humanitarian organisations, participated in a course on development and humanitarian aid and studied many different literature sources,

representing the different views of humanitarian organisations. Obtaining a clear view of this perspective was facilitated by the fact that the researcher had some experience working for development agencies though these agencies did not operate in complex emergencies but focused on sustainable development. In the case studies the operations of the Dutch military were taken as a starting point. Military respondents were interviewed regarding their approaches to civil-military cooperation during their deployment. Names and details were obtained of their civilian partners based on these interviews. To avoid relapsing into general normative opinions on civil-military cooperation, it was important to approach these people specifically. This enabled the researcher to derive their approaches and views towards the same civil-military partnership. However, it resulted in a long and time-consuming quest to find the often non-Dutch, representatives of humanitarian organisations. In one instance this search went, by telephone, through five different countries before the respondent was found in his country house in England. Due to communication problems and tracking difficulties some participants could not be reached (see section 5.2, 6.2 and 7.2). In most instances the representatives were traced, contacted and interviewed.

Integrating the perspective of the local population in the research was difficult. The perspective of and problems with the local population were derived to some extent through interviews with military and civilian personnel. In the Kosovo and Kabul cases however, it was not possible to visit the area to interview local representatives. Triangulation of data was the only way to obtain valid information of the local perspective. In the Baghlan case it was possible to visit the area and interview many local representatives, construction companies, and villagers. This clearly increased the researcher's view on the local perspective of civil-military cooperation. However, as interpreters were used, information is lost. In addition, because the researcher wore military dress it should be questioned to what extent their responses were influenced. Through triangulation of sources, methods and theories these considerations were dealt with.

The literature on modelling provided the distinction between process and variance models. This research developed a process-based model based on the characteristics of civil-military cooperation in response to a complex emergency. As a result a holistic approach to civil-military partnerships was applied rather than an embedded one, which is more likely in a variance-based model. This provided the researcher with a bird's eye view of civil-military partnerships. It enabled him to uncover the interaction of different steps in the cooperation process. Applying a variance model could not have attained these results, as this would imply the isolation of one or a limited number of single elements to determine the causal relationship with the partnership outcome.

A literature review was done in various research areas as input to the process-based partnership model. Literature on civil-military cooperation (see chapter two) did not reveal

a subdivision of the process in phases nor did it pay much attention to the evaluation of civil-military cooperation and criteria that constitute the outcome of the process. The review did provide broad insights into the factors influencing the performance of civil-military cooperation. Many different sources were consulted, which converged to the factors as presented in chapter two.

Theories on cooperative arrangements provided many new perspectives on cooperation processes. Literature on strategic alliances identified the phases in a cooperation process, several factors influencing the performance of cooperative arrangements and provided insight on the outcome of a cooperation process. There are three major differences between strategic alliances and civil-military partnerships, which may have affected the applicability of theories on strategic alliances. The first is the duration of the partnership. Strategic alliances are often long-term relationships whereas many analysed civil-military partnerships were short- or medium-term. This leads to a certain emphasis on the evolution of the partnership in theories on strategic alliances, whereas civil-military partnerships emphasise the completion of the partnership and transfer of tasks and responsibilities as soon as possible. The second difference is the level at which the cooperation takes place. In strategic alliances the strategic level of an organisation is often involved in many decisions (e.g., partner selection, partnership agreement). From a military perspective civil-military partnerships take place almost entirely at a tactical and operational level without the involvement of the strategic level. In humanitarian organisations the decisions often take place at operational or strategic levels. The level in which local actors are involved differs considerably. In several partnerships, ministries (i.e., operational and strategic level) were involved. In other partnerships village elders (i.e., tactical level) were involved. It seems that the higher the management level involved the more emphasis is put on strategic fit and the more time-consuming and explicit decisions are made. At lower levels people tend to be more pragmatic.

Literature on networks and PPPs resulted in confirming the findings and applying these to cooperation between multiple actors (i.e., networks) being both private and public (i.e., PPPs). Both research areas contributed considerably to the foundation laid by the literature on strategic alliances. As this research took the partnership as a unit of analysis in the case studies, theories on networks were not applied to the full extent. Viewing civil-military cooperation entirely through a network perspective, characterised by loose and flexible arrangements, fits very well with the pragmatic and ad-hoc approach towards civil-military cooperation.

The research developed an evaluation framework providing criteria to assess the performance of civil-military partnerships based on literature and interviews. As the partnerships differed considerably in duration, input, and content it was not possible to compare them along an absolute scale. The scores of the partnerships on the performance criteria were obtained in a qualitative and relative manner. Chapter eight analysed the

scores of the 25 partnerships by explaining their negative and positive aspects on each of the performance criteria. However, in many partnerships only a small number of involved people participated and/or were interviewed. There might be a difference between their real perception and the one communicated to the researcher. Through triangulation methods (e.g., personal observation, multiple sources, multiple interviews) it was attempted to eliminate these misperceptions. One can further question whether these criteria are applicable to every organisation. Because of the large differences between organisations they should be treated with extreme care. However, the evaluation framework presents an overview of the performance on several commonly agreed upon criteria. Whether organisations have hidden agendas to which they want to contribute could not be included in this research. Additionally, the evaluation framework does not address the private commercial sector as a distinct actor. The performance criteria of organisations in this sector will mostly be focused on continuity and maximising profit.

9.3 RECOMMENDATIONS

9.3.1 Actors involved in civil-military cooperation

Performance evaluation
Evaluation was perceived as important, but in practice rarely realised. Actors should evaluate civil-military partnerships at several stages. During the partnership implementation monitoring should be done to keep implementation on schedule, to provide for budget control and to reduce problems. Having transferred tasks and responsibilities it is important to assess the performance of the partnership. This increases accountability and institutional learning of the actors. The evaluations need to be standardised for clear comparisons. To do this clear formats have to be made with which the results of the activities can be assessed. To promote independency and objectivity of the results people from outside the own organisation can participate in carrying out the evaluations. A joint evaluation by the partners can contribute to increased understanding between military and civilian actors.

The determination of the evaluation criteria is important to all involved actors. The evaluation framework applied in this research, presents a broad view of criteria for military actors, civilian organisations of the assistance community, and the host nation. However, the emphasis on the criteria will differ in time, between operations, and between organisations. To determine what criteria should be emphasised it is very important to set objectives and targets. This enables field personnel to embed their activities in the longer-term objectives of their organisation. It also enables them to determine when the implementation is finished and tasks and responsibilities should be transferred and facilitates the fine-tuning of goals between different units of the same organisation (e.g.,

consecutive military units in an area). At the local level plans can benefit the agreement on objectives for a specific activity and facilitate the evaluation process.

Military institutions

Military institutions should improve the knowledge and expertise of military involved in civil-military cooperation. This applies to military officers in general and dedicated cimic personnel (i.e., cimic staff and functional specialists). To train the former, increased attention should be paid to civil-military cooperation in the general education of the Netherlands Defence Academy (a merger of the Royal Netherlands Military Academy, the Institute Defence Studies and the Royal Netherlands Naval College). The training of the latter should be unified and more substantial, including liaison, project-based activities (including tendering procedures), development issues, and military guidelines. Prior to their training careful selection of cimic personnel can contribute to the creation of a skilled pool of people. Required selection criteria include communication skills, general education level, gender, and age.

While in the field, continuity of activities should be ensured. In general a sufficient overlap between personnel of the subsequent rotations can contribute to this. To lengthen rotations and give soldiers the option to stay longer is another solution. This, however, is strongly resisted by the military, as multiple and lengthy deployments have historically taken their toll on morale and the personal lives of soldiers (Peabody, 2005). Rotation of personnel on different times might contribute to continuity though it can also have negative side-effects such as planning problems in the preparation of military units or reduced open-mindedness of newcomers since all procedures are easily copied.

To deal with the changing circumstances the tactical commander should be authorised to adjust his organisation to the environment. With this authority the commander should be able to deploy new troops and material for a short period or send back part of his troops and material if they are of too little use. This includes the flexible deployment of functional specialists and people concerned with assistance activities.

To increase its impact and to decrease duplication of effort, civil-military cooperation should be integrated in the overall mission. This implies fine-tuning of the activities of the cimic branch, the psy-ops, and intel branch. All three branches can benefit from the information and activities of the other. Second, civil-military cooperation should be an integral part of the operations and planning of the military unit in the field. All units should be aware of the consequences of their actions on the civil environment, or as some researchers have termed it "Cimic is every soldier's job". Integration in the overall mission also implies a clear embeddedness of assistance activities in the larger civil programs. Too often military units carry out activities isolated from the civilian programs, limiting their impact and sustainability.

To make maximum use of its comparative advantage a military unit should primarily focus on security-related activities. Based on a needs-driven approach, a military unit should support humanitarian organisations. In carrying out civic action military actors should avoid activities without ensuring sustainability. In practice, this implies the execution of activities that require little "after-sales service". If such service is required, close cooperation with humanitarian organisations or local actors is necessary.

The ad-hoc character of partnerships

Five measures are proposed to decrease the ad-hoc character of many partnerships. The first is structuring of information gathering and processing. This concerns both the information on the actors who operate in the area, and information on the needs of the local population. With respect to the former it is of great importance to have a clear overview of the actors in the area. This should include points of contacts, capabilities, focus areas, and current and planned activities. Coordination meetings facilitate this overview, as frequently many organisations are present. Organisations with large networks (e.g., umbrella organisations and large UN agencies) are able to contribute to an increased awareness of the actors in the area. As many organisations can benefit from such an overview a lead organisation (e.g., UN agency) should be tasked to provide and update such a register of operating organisations.

With respect to gathering information on needs it is important that actors use the same standards and methods as much as possible. In general, the development of one standard outline for assessments and a standard categorisation of the functional areas can increase the transferability of information between military and civilian organisations. This can also contribute to a unified and integrated approach, which prevents the local actors from assessment fatigue. It is therefore of great importance that assessments are not classified and are documented in English. Involving the local actors to a large extent, even employing them to carry out assessments can contribute to a representative overview of their needs.

Having gathered the information it is important that the data become and remain orderly and accessible. For the military the development of a single information management system in which all branches can store their information can help to increase the transparency and accuracy. This does require sufficient capacity of both software and qualified personnel.

The second measure to decrease the ad-hoc character of many civil-military partnerships is the realisation of agreements between all participating actors. These can be made verbally or written through MoUs or tri-partite agreements. Although trust and flexibility can fulfil the function of an agreement between military actors and humanitarian organisations to a large extent, written agreements increase clarity and transparency on the objectives and the contribution of each of the actors. Written agreements also formalise cooperation rather than it being person-bonded. This also facilitates the transfer of contacts between consecutive rotations.

The third measure is increased attention to partnership design. Before activities start it is important to review the termination of the partnership. Including the requirements of the final users (local population and humanitarian organisations) in this phase of the partnership is highly recommended.

Fourth, military actors should develop an integral policy towards civil-military cooperation. At the moment military guidelines regarding civil-military cooperation are ambiguous. As a result there is no clear priority setting, demarcation of the activities, or formulation of end-states. As a result military officers at the tactical level are tasked with all decisions on civil-military partnerships, resulting in an ad-hoc approach. This integral policy should be clearly communicated with civilian actors in the area so they are aware when and what and under which circumstances they can expect assistance of the military unit.

The final measure is to increase pre-deployment contact and agreement between military and civilian organisations. Large civilian organisations are likely to be involved in the response to future complex emergencies. Initiating pre-deployment interaction can improve understanding and mutual respect, facilitating cooperation in the field.

The involvement of the local population and humanitarian organisations

The term civil-military cooperation presumes both civil and military actors to participate in the cooperation. However, the civil part is often not included and assistance activities are executed at the discretion of military personnel. This stimulates a supply-based approach, in which the deployment of military resources is the primary motive. When executing assistance activities a military unit should involve both the local population and humanitarian organisations throughout the entire process. Involvement of humanitarian organisations should be done to provide expertise and knowledge on the assistance activities. Their involvement also facilitates the transfer of tasks and responsibilities after completing implementation and can contribute to a sustainable outcome. A demand-driven approach of the military stimulates humanitarian organisations to cooperate with a military unit.

Measures should be taken to involve local actors. In the formation phase of the partnership local employees should participate in assessments. They are often far more able to discover the needs of the local population than foreigners. This prevents international actors from mismatches between real needs and the needs which are addressed. If authorities bring up the needs of a community, village, or town it is important to crosscheck this with other prominent figures and direct beneficiaries. Stakeholder analyses are helpful tools to determine whether the needs, indicated by local authorities, are in accordance with the needs of the local population. By consulting the beneficiaries in an early stage they become more involved and feel more responsible in later stages.

In the operation phase local capacity (e.g., construction companies) should be used as much as possible. This employs local people, contributes to the local economy, and involves them in the reconstruction process enhancing ownership and continuity.

Local standards should be used as much as possible to avoid inequalities and promote sustainability. In this respect the Sphere standards form a good starting point. To indiscriminately apply local standards is not appropriate however, as some environments (e.g., due to the risk of earthquakes) require higher-level standards.

Finally, women should be included in higher rank positions, as this enables an organisation to communicate and cooperate with the female population in many cultures. Based on the case studies the fact that military women are often not considered equal to male authorities is not valid. Besides, it does not imply that they are not employed in higher positions at all.

9.3.2   Recommendations for further research

Content of the process-based partnership-model

The model seems to be effective in describing and explaining civil-military partnerships at a local level. The model was applied in three case studies, which all showed similar results. It is not expected that major differences would arise in other case studies in peace support operations. As such the model is able to predict only that the outcome of civil-military partnerships is likely (but not certain) under some conditions and unlikely under others. Nevertheless, a lot of work still needs to be done to increase the degree of understanding.

Now that the major steps and factors have been identified, it is possible to develop a deeper understanding of these by looking at specialised literature on these topics (that might be unrelated to civil-military cooperation). Increased understanding is also needed on the evaluation of civil-military cooperation. It is important to develop more objective measures to assess the performance of civil-military cooperation. The criteria as presented in the evaluation framework provide a good basis for this. Finally, the differences between the approaches of civilian actors should be researched more in-depth.

Generalisability of the process-based partnership model

Recently, large international commercial companies have become active in the response to a complex emergency. As these organisations, especially private military firms, can substitute for military organisations in several activities, it is important to determine whether the model remains valid if activities are outsourced.

The case studies focused on complex emergencies rather than natural disasters. Recent events such as the tsunami in South East Asia and the earthquake in Pakistan show the relevance of upfront thinking on an effective response. It is important to investigate whether the model can also be applied to cases of natural disasters.

Third, the case studies primarily focused on the Dutch military. In all three case studies the approach of other national militaries was included to a limited extent and investigated partnerships in the Kabul case included international military personnel. To ensure generalisability of the model in other national armed forces it is necessary to apply the

model to their partnerships with civilian actors. Perhaps, in future multinational operations, civil-military cooperation can then develop into *just another drill*. Due to its complex nature, it will remain a drill that contains many pitfalls.

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ANNEX 1: DATA COLLECTION PROTOCOL

A1.1 OVERVIEW OF THE CASE STUDY

The Royal Netherlands Military Academy and the University of Twente are involved in a joint research on civil-military co-operation. Having done some joint projects on this subject it was agreed in April 2002 to set up a joint PhD-research project, entitled "Civil-military cooperation in response to a complex emergency: Just another drill?"

The rationale to initiate this research is that in most peace support operations, the approach to civil-military cooperation was essentially improvisational, pragmatic and ad-hoc (Currey, 2003; Gordon, 2001; Gourlay, 2000). Meeting on the ground personnel worked out solutions overcoming differences for the common good. As such cooperation evolved over time in response to specific needs on the ground. The efforts were person-dependent and many differences occurred within and between rotations and contingents. Lessons learned regarding civil-military cooperation were happening on an individual or rotational level, but not at an institutional level and many persons involved in civil-military cooperation claim they *reinvented the wheel*, as little communication and knowledge transfer took place.

Although there is no single solution to improve civil-military cooperation at the local level, the logic of structured cooperation should lead to efficiency gains and greater respect for the comparative advantages of civilian and military actors. A promising way forward is to adopt models for cooperation between the military and the civilian actors (Currey, 2003; Gourlay, 2000). These models can synthesise what has been accomplished in previous operations and can foster a theatre specific *modus vivendi* between military formations and the variety of civilian actors. For actors and their leaders models can contribute to the development of checklists, an increased understanding of (potential) conflicts in the process of cooperation, and elements for procedures to increase the performance of the cooperation. Models can provide guidance about how partners may foster and manage relationships that will achieve favourable outcomes (Tuten and Urban, 2001). They also offer researchers a framework for future empirical studies to confirm or disconfirm the legitimacy of the model.

Based on the characteristics of civil-military cooperation in response to a complex emergency at a local level a process approach is used in this research. The central question of this research is:

"What process model is appropriate to support the execution of civil-military cooperation at a local level in peace support operations in response to a complex emergency?"

To guide the researcher to answer the central research question, three sub research questions are formulated:

1. *What are the phases in the process of civil-military cooperation?*
2. *What factors influence the process of civil-military cooperation and can enhance the understanding of the phases in this process?*
3. *What constitutes the outcome of civil-military cooperation?*

The selected research strategy to answer these questions consists of literature study and case study research, while ethnography is applied only in the Baghlan case. The first stage of this research is composed of a literature review to the process of civil-military cooperation. This review included both literature on civil-military cooperation and cooperative arrangements. The literature review on civil-military cooperation includes literature from a military perspective (e.g., military doctrines), from a civilian perspective (e.g., reports of ICRC), and from a neutral perspective (e.g., independent researchers). The results are presented in a working paper, entitled "Civil Military Co-operation in complex emergencies: a literature survey of the important factors for future co-operation" (Rietjens, 2002).

A preliminary literature study revealed "by no means does civil-military cooperation constitute an exception with regard to other interorganisational alliances" (Bollen and Beeres, 2002). As a result of structural fundamental differences between the military and their civilian counterparts however, alliances are bound to be fragile. Taken on their own, interdependencies generate too few safeguards to shield collaborators from hidden agendas, self-interest, or their partners' opportunistic behaviour (Bollen and Beeres, 2002). Interorganisational alliances, mostly referred to as cooperative arrangements, have been studied in great detail (e.g., Hoffmann and Schlosser, 2001; Das and Teng, 2003; Gulati, 1998). It is therefore most likely that theories on cooperative arrangements can contribute to answering the research questions. A Working paper entitled "Co-operative arrangements for civil-military co-operation" (Rietjens, 2003) addressed the literature study on cooperative arrangements and included theories on strategic alliances, networks and public private partnerships.

The second stage of the research approach consists of the development of the process model. In this stage the phases and factors derived from the literature review are structured into a model. The outcome of the model is presented by means of a performance assessment framework, which constitutes the criteria that determine the outcome of civil-military cooperation. The criteria are based on the literature review and verified by means of interview with both military and civilian personnel.

The third stage of the research applies the process model to multiple holistic case study. Three cases are included, which focus on the cooperation between the Dutch military entities and civilian actors in peace support operations:

1. The International Security Assistance Force in Kabul, Afghanistan, from February 2003 until January 2004;
2. The Dutch Provincial Reconstruction Team as part of the International Security Assistance Force in Baghlan, Afghanistan, from August 2004 until July 2005;
3. The Dutch Engineering Relief Battalion as part of the Kosovo force in Kosovo from June 1999 until June 2000.

In each case the process model is applied to the cooperation between military and civilian actors at a local level.

After analysing the separate cases, a cross case analysis is carried out. This analysis compares the three cases on the identified performance criteria. The differences and similarities between the cases are then explained through the process of civil-military cooperation. Finally, conclusions are drawn with respect to the need to redefine concepts of the process model (phases, factors, outcome), the contribution to the body of knowledge and the contribution to an increased understanding of civil-military cooperation. Recommendations are made based on these conclusions.

A1.2 FIELD PROCEDURES

The field procedures address gaining access to the organisations, the resources in the field, the schedule of data collection and unanticipated events.

A1.2.1 Gaining access to organisations

Military side:
The research is partly funded by the Royal Netherlands Military Academy. Due to their contacts, gaining access to the military actors is relatively easy. The case studies refer to the specific actors, which have been interviewed.

Civilian side:
If a visit to the case study area is possible, involved civilian actors are directly interviewed. Additional or missing information is obtained afterwards by email or telephone interview.
If a visit to the case study area is not possible, civilian actors are selected, based on the information, which is derived from the military side. This is done by asking military personnel for names, phone numbers and other details. Thereafter they are contacted and interviewed. Civilian actors, who are based in or nearby the Netherlands, are visited and

interviewed. If a civilian actor cannot be visited an interview by telephone or by email is done. Additional information is to be obtained by documents and second-hand interviews As many respondents of both military and civilian side preferred to remain anonymous their information is confidential. The names of the respondents are not referred to in the case studies.

A1.2.2 Schedule of data collection

The duration of each case study is approximately 4 months. If no visit to the case study area is possible the following schedule is applied:

When	What
Week 1-2	Research on nature and characteristics of peace support operation and complex emergency of case study
Week 3-6	Research on military actors: phases, factors and outcomes of partnerships
Week 7-11	Research on civilian actors: phases, factors and outcomes of partnerships
Week 12-14	Writing the case description
Week 15-16	Feedback of the results to the actors, checking the description results, lessons learned

If it is possible to visit the case study area, the following schedule is applied:

When	What
Week 1-2	Research on nature and characteristics of peace support operation and complex emergency of case study
Week 3	Preparation of field research
Week 4-7	Visiting case study area: phases, factors and outcomes of partnerships
Week 8-10	Processing results of field research
Week 11	Interviews to gain additional or missing information
Week 12-14	Writing the case description
Week 15-16	Feedback of the results to the actors, checking the description results, lessons learned

A1.2.3 Unanticipated events

- Availability of interviewees, both from military and civilian actors
- Timing of visit(s) to case study area(s)

A1.3 CASE STUDY QUESTIONS

Section A1.3.1 deals with the actual questions, while section A1.3.2 presents the table shells in which the results are presented.

A1.3.1 Questions

General questions
1. Which actor are/were you co-operating with?

2. What was the starting-date of the partnership?

3. Has the partnership already ended? If yes, when?

4. On which projects or activities are/were you co-operating?

Step 1: Decision to cooperate
5. What is/was the main objective of your organisation, while present in the operational area?

6. What are the strengths and weaknesses of your organisation?

7. To what extent did these influence your decision to cooperate?

8. To what extent did you make an assessment to study the opportunities and threats of the external environment related to co-operation?

9. If yes, what did you assess (actors, needs)? If not, why not?

10. What were your key motivations to cooperate?

11. How was the decision to cooperate realised and who made the actual decision?

12. What targets and objectives were set out for the future partnership?

13. Were there any alternatives instead of co-operation to achieve these targets and objectives?

14. What factors were important in the decision to cooperate?

15. What problems occurred in the decision to cooperate and why did these problems occur?

16. How did you overcome these problems?

Step 2: Partner selection

17. Which actor took the initiative to cooperate?

18. How did you select your partner and what factors were important in the partner selection?

19. What criteria would you use next time?

20. What problems occurred in the partner selection and why did these problems occur?

21. How did you overcome these problems?

Step 3: Partnership design

22. To what extent was a contract or agreement made before the actual co-operation started?

23. If yes, what was included and what would you change next time?

24. If no contract or agreement was signed, how were tasks and responsibilities divided before the partnership started?

25. What structure was chosen for the partnership?

26. What factors were important in the partnership design?

27. What problems occurred in the partnership design and why did these problems occur?

28. How did you overcome these problems?

Step 4: Partnership implementation

29. Who performed each activity (number of people and their function)?

30. What factors were important in the partnership implementation?

31. What problems occurred in the partnership implementation and why did these problems occur?

32. How did you overcome these problems?

Step 5: Transfer of tasks and responsibilities

33. If the partnership ended, why did it?

34. To what extent did the partnership end as planned?

35. What tasks and responsibilities did you transfer after the partnership ended?

36. What factors were important in the transfer of tasks and responsibilities?

37. What problems occurred in the transfer of tasks and responsibilities and why did these problems occur?

38. How did you overcome these problems?

39. Do you still have contact with your partnering organisation?

Step 6: Partnership evaluation

40. To what extent did you evaluate the performance of the partnership?

41. What factors were important in the partnership evaluation?

42. If no evaluation was made, which criteria would you use next time?

43. What problems occurred in the partnership evaluation and why did these problems occur?

44. How did you overcome these problems?

45. To what extent did the partnership outcomes contribute to the performance criteria, as stated in figure 21?

A1.3.2 Table shells

For the entire process the following tables should be completed. The numbers in the tables correspond with the questions.

Step 1: Decision to cooperate			
	Actor 1	**Actor 2**	**Actor n**
Main objective (5)			
Strengths (6,7)			
Weaknesses (6,7)			
Opportunities (8,9)			
Threats (8,9)			
Motives (10)			
Decision realisation (11)			
Targets and objectives (12)			
Factors and problems (13,14,15,16)			

Table 12: Step 1: Decision to cooperate

Step 2: Partner selection			
	Actor 1	**Actor 2**	**Actor n**
Initiative (17)			
Factors and problems (18,19, 20, 21)			

Table 13: Step 2: Partner selection

Step 3: Partnership design	
Agreement (22,23,24)	
Structure (25)	
Factors and problems (26,27,28)	

Table 14: Step 3: Partnership design

Step 4: Partnership implementation	
Activities (4,29)	
Factors and problems (30,31,32)	

Table 15: Step 4: Partnership implementation

Step 5: Transfer of tasks and responsibilities	
Ending (33,34)	
Transfer (35)	
Factors and problems (36,37,38,39)	

Table 16: Step 5: Transfer of tasks and responsibilities

Step 6: Partnership evaluation	
Evaluation (40)	
Evaluation criteria (41,42,43,44,45,45)	

Table 17: Step 6: Partnership evaluation

A1.4 CASE STUDY REPORT

Each case study is reported according to the following outline:

Abstract
Table of contents
Section 1: Introduction
        1.1 Civil-military co-operation
        1.2 Objective, problem definition and research questions
        1.3 Developing the process-based partnership model
        1.4 Applying the process-based partnership model in practice
        1.5 Structure of the report
Section 2: Background case
Section 3: Case study design
Section 4: Decision to cooperate
        4.1 Case description
        4.2 Confrontation with theoretical model
        4.3 Conclusion
Section 5: Partner selection
        5.1 Case description
        5.2 Confrontation with theoretical model
        5.3 Conclusion
Section 6: Partnership design
        6.1 Case description
        6.2 Confrontation with theoretical model
        6.3 Conclusion
Section 7: Partnership implementation
        7.1 Case description
        7.2 Confrontation with theoretical model
        7.3 Conclusion
Section 8: Transfer of tasks and responsibilities
        8.1 Case description
        8.2 Confrontation with theoretical model
        8.3 Conclusion
Section 9: Partnership evaluation
        9.1 Case description
        9.2 Confrontation with theoretical model
        9.3 Conclusion
Section 10: Partnership performance

10.1 Partnership performance military actor

10.2 Partnership performance civilian actor of the assistance community

10.3 Partnership performance host nation

10.4 Costs

Section 11: Closure

11.1 Discussion

11.2 Conclusions

Abbreviations and acronyms

Chain of evidence

Documents

Interviews

Annex A: Important factors step 1

Annex B: Important factors step 2

Annex C: Important factors step 3

Annex D: Important factors step 4

Annex E: Important factors step 5

Annex F: Important factors step 6

Annex G: Partnership 1

Annex H: Partnership 2

…..

Annex X: Partnership n

Annex X+1: Case study questions

Each section deals with a major step in the partnership process. The description and explanation of each step includes:

Phases

- The sub-phases (activities, the how and why)

- The sequence

- The people (functions) who were involved

Factors

- The importance (strength)

- The direction

- The position of the factor (internal/external)

Problems (critical factors?)

- The causes

- The suggested solutions

The final section includes a discussion and draws conclusions.

ANNEX 2: PARTNERSHIP ISAF AND UNICEF

Background actors

ISAF:

ISAF is a UN-mandated operation under UNSCR's 1386 and later 1413 and 1444. The mission of ISAF is to assist the Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA) in maintaining security within the area of greater Kabul so that the ATA as well as the personnel of the UN can operate in a secure environment.

UNICEF:

Being a UN organisation, United Nation's Children Fund (UNICEF) aims at the well being of children. In Afghanistan, the organisation particularly focuses on immunisation of children against measles and polio, provision of clean water and sanitation facilities and the improvement of prenatal, natal and post-natal care coverage.

Step 1: Decision to cooperate		
	International Security and Assistance Force	United Nation's Children Fund (UNICEF)
Main objective	Mission ISAF: To assist the Afghan Transitional Authority in maintaining security. Cimic mission: Conduct cimic activities in order to assist ISAF in strengthening the overall security situation in Kabul and surroundings (ISAF's AoR), by assisting/supporting the civil bodies in the improvement of quality of life for the population. Thus promoting the overall stabilisation process in Afghanistan and increasing the authority of the TA necessary to conduct the constitutional Loya Jirga in Dec 2003.	The main objective of UNICEF 's Country Programme in Afghanistan includes inter alia to: • Eradicate polio, immunising 5 million children in 2003; • Provide 4 million primary school children with access to high-quality education, especially for girls and hard-to-reach children. Provide basic training to at least 40,000 primary school teachers, including mine risk education skills; • Immunise 6 million children against measles; • Provide clean water and sanitation facilities for about 2 million people, including installing a safe water point in every primary school in the country.
Strengths	• Large assessment capacity in TSTs; • Short reaction times; • Accessibility of all areas by military transport; • Diversity of means and knowledge (i.e. transport, manpower, machines, technical knowledge and security).	• Strong commitment; • Possession of most materials and goods; • Knowledge of local situation and customs; • Financial means; • Large staff capacity (approximately 150 people in the Greater Kabul area.

Weaknesses	• Command and control: The CCC was not able to task military assets (e.g. TSTs; cimic platoon) to cimic activities; • Lack of financial means at CCC; • Lack of training and expertise of cimic personnel; • No common approach to cimic: many nations carried out different strategies towards cimic; • No clear liaison structure: CCC had 2-3 liaison officers at tactical/operational level. J9 at HQ did not have any specific cimic liaison. The pool of liaison officers of J6 also took care of cimic liaison; • No clear division of tasks and responsibilities between J9 HQ and CCC; • Financial means were unequally divided and earmarked.	• Dependent on security, in particular with regard to mines; • Means for quick repatriation.
Opportunities	• Financial means in organisations; • Knowledge and expertise of local situation, customs and humanitarian assistance within humanitarian organisations; • Access to local population through humanitarian organisations; • Many different needs of local population, IOs and NGOs in the AoR of ISAF; • Prevent duplication of humanitarian effort.	• Manpower, logistics, information and security in ISAF troops; • Many different needs of the local population; • Financial means in ISAF.
Threats	• Perception of local population towards ISAF troops; • Mission creep: carrying out cimic activities could distract ISAF from its main military mission and objectives, resulting in a longer stay.	• Compromise of the humanitarian imperative.

Motives	• Increase the morale of the ISAF troops; • Risk reduction: UNICEF could provide ISAF with local knowledge and intelligence and thus increase its situational awareness as a means of force protection; • Fast access to the local authorities and IOs/NGOs: UNICEF could bring ISAF in contact with representatives of the local authorities and IOs/NGOs; • Legitimisation of deployment: co-operation with UNICEF and the visibility of it was highly valued by politics.	• Risk reduction: ISAF could reduce the risks of UNICEF through inter alia extra patrolling, direct protection and de-mining; • Economies of scale: Since UNICEF did have a limited amount of equipment and transport cooperation could increase their scale enormously; • Transaction costs: ISAF troops tended not to charge IOs and NGOs for their assistance.
Decision realisation	Decisions related to cimic activities were made either through the CCC or through the TCNs. Since the CCC did not have command and control over the cimic-related assets, TCNs could make their own decision.	In order to make decisions the project coordinator of UNICEF did not have to ask permission of the head office.

| Targets and objectives | Cimic end state: The cimic end state will be reached when the Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA) or official government authorities, supported by UNAMA and other IOs/GO/NGOs, are able to function effectively without COMISAF's support, and regional stability is restored.

Cimic Centres of Gravity:
• Close and robust liaison to all key civil actors in the AoR;
• Support the process of economic and nation recovery in close coordination with UNAMA;
• Close liaison with CJCMOTF;
• Force protection.

The cimic priorities are:
• Water;
• Health;
• Education;
• Support to returnees;
• Support to policy and security;
• Development of emergency service.

At the level of the partnership no targets or objectives were set. | In the partnerships UNICEF's objectives varied from the delivery of materials for primary education (i.e. back to school programme), the distribution of donations or the de-mining of an area. |

Factors	• Mandate: through its mandate ISAF was obliged to assist/support the civil bodies in the improvement of quality of life for the population; ISAF's mandate only included the Greater Kabul Area, while the mandate of many IOs/NGOs existed of entire Afghanistan; • Strategic options: No cooperation with IOs/NGOs would most likely lead to great duplication of activities; • Domain: There were no clear guidelines on the activities ISAF carried out within the framework of cimic. This resulted in an unclear demarcation and priority setting of activities to be performed or supported by ISAF; • Proliferation of civilian actors: Due to the great number of humanitarian organisations in the AoR, it was very important to get an overview of them, including their capabilities; • Operational environment: A detailed overview and insight of the operational environment is essential for mission success. Although ISAF did have several TSTs to make assessments, the information they gathered was not processed in a structured way. This caused a rather bad overview of the operational environment.	• Mission: through its mission UNICEF was obliged to fulfil humanitarian assistance (see objective); • Strategic options: No cooperation with ISAF would lead to great duplication of activities and likely to harm the local population; • Unity of Approach: entities of ISAF troops had different approaches to the delivery or support of humanitarian assistance. This made it difficult for UNICEF to have clear expectations; • Operational environment: As part of its Corporate Core Commitment UNICEF carried out rapid assessments and situational analyses to get an overview of the needs.

Step 2: Partner selection	
Initiative	In the various activities both ISAF and UNICEF took the initiative to cooperate and approached one another.
Factors	- Operational environment: Very time-consuming to have reliable and up-dated information on potential partner organisations; - Proliferation of civilian actors: Many different international and national organisations were operating in the area of Greater Kabul. Task-related selection criteria: - Complementary resources: The knowledge and expertise of UNICEF; - Compatible strategies and objectives: ISAF operated under UN-mandate and thus could support UNICEF; - Added value for the partners: to prevent duplication of humanitarian activities. Partner-related selection criteria: - Personal fit: The emergency officer of UNICEF was very well trusted by ISAF personnel; - Network: UNICEF has an extensive network of organisations and Afghan authorities; - Prior experiences with and reputation of partner: ISAF cooperated often in different partnerships with UNICEF. Its undisputed reputation was very important.	- Operational environment: Very time-consuming to have reliable and up-dated information on potential partner organisations; - Unity of Approach: Different approaches to deliver or support humanitarian assistance by entities of ISAF troops. Task-related selection criteria: - Complementary resources; - Added value for the partners: to prevent duplication of humanitarian activities; - Compatible strategies and objectives: Provision of humanitarian assistance in Greater Kabul area. Partner-related selection criteria: - Personal fit: The liaison officers of the CCC of ISAF were extremely nice according to the emergency officer of UNICEF; - Compatible cultures: Corresponding national cultures (including language) of personnel of ISAF and UNICEF played an important role in the selection; - Prior experiences with and reputation of partner; - Network of partners: The CCC was embedded in the ISAF structure; - Humanitarian principles: All activities of UNICEF were to be carried out according to the humanitarian principles; - Flexibility: ISAF was perceived by UNICEF as very flexible; - Force protection: personnel of ISAF in general and the CCC in particular did not use a high degree of force protection.

Step 3: Partnership design	
Agreement	Before the activities started normally a gentleman's agreement was made between the involved persons of ISAF and UNICEF. No written agreements were made.
Structure	No specific partnership structure was put into place. This was mainly due to the independence, which both organisations wanted to keep.
Factors	• Trust: The emergency officer of UNICEF was very well trusted by the liaison officers of the CCC and vice versa. • Strategic fit: In the partnerships both ISAF and UNICEF had compatible goals. ISAF's goal of force protection did not contradict with the provision of humanitarian assistance like the Back to school programme or the donation of goods; • Flexibility: flexibility was regarded as very important in the process of making an agreement; • Agreement of clear and realistic objectives; • Definition of rights and duties: it was normally very clear and transparent what each rights and duties were.

Step 4: Partnership implementation			
Activities	The activities in the partnerships were allocated as follows:		
	Back to school programme: 1. Initial assessment on basic information about the schools in Greater Kabul (e.g. location, number of pupils): UNICEF. 2. Complementary assessment on basic information about the schools in Greater Kabul: ISAF. 3. Delivery of materials from UNICEF storage to dropping points in districts: UNICEF (workers) and ISAF (transportation means). 4. Transportation from the dropping points to the schools: local population. 5. Storage of materials until the beginning of the school season: local population.	Distribution of donations: 1. Purchase of donations (e.g. clothes, toys, pencils): ISAF. 2. Advice on selection of NGO with up-to-date information on particular local needs: UNICEF. 3. Selection of target population: NGO. 4. Delivery of goods: ISAF.	De-mining location warehouse: 1. Assessment on location warehouse: UNICEF. 2. De-mining of construction area warehouse: Greek battalion of ISAF. 3. Construction warehouse: UNICEF.
Factors	• Use of force: In meetings with UNICEF personnel of ISAF were obliged to leave their weapons outside the buildings. This was not perceived as problematic; • Communication and coordination: In the several partnerships between ISAF and UNICEF communication and coordination were done through different people. After having contacted the liaison officers of the CCC of ISAF the emergency officers of UNICEF often did business directly with the implementing entities of ISAF (back to school programme and de-mining of areas); • Humanitarian principles: All activities were to be carried out according the humanitarian principles; • Strategic fit: UNICEF preferred a minimal involvement of ISAF in assistance activities, whereas ISAF intended to be visibly involved to increase force protection; • Resources: Resources were to a maximum extent purchased locally; • Reciprocity: If one of the partners put extra effort into the partnership, the other was likely to follow; • Information dissemination: The emergency officers of UNICEF did not have any problems with the classification procedure of ISAF. All information needed like maps were shared generously by ISAF. ISAF troops were sometimes irritated by the preferred use of UNICEF's own outdated information above the more up-to-date information of the TSTs of ISAF; • Flexibility: Due to the changing situation flexibility in the planning and the operational arrangements was essential; • Trust: The liaison officers of the CCC of ISAF were very well trusted by the emergency officers of UNICEF; • Relation principal and other actors: In order to make decisions the emergency officers of UNICEF did not have to ask permission of the head office. This facilitated the implementation; • Organisation cultures: Different norms and values of personnel of ISAF and UNICEF were clearly visible in activities; • Operational environment: Continuing insecurity in several parts of the area, the difficulty to travel by road and complicated logistics made activities difficult.		

Step 5: Transfer of tasks and responsibilities	
Ending	Most activities ended simply because the job was done. That means goods were distributed or an area was cleared of mines.
Transfer	Due to the rather simple nature of activities, the transfer of tasks and responsibilities was not an issue. However, in particular the emergency officers of UNICEF stressed that if the local population is more heavily involved in the co-operation process, a quick transfer of tasks and responsibilities is essential in order to achieve a sustainable situation.
Factors	• Prepared termination: Due to the simple nature of the activities prepared termination was not very extensive; • Partner bonding mechanisms: Although they were not observed frequently, mechanisms to increase the bonding of both ISAF and UNICEF were stressed frequently; • Termination only on approval by all partners: The partnership was terminated at approval of both UNICEF and ISAF.

Step 6: Partnership evaluation		
	ISAF	UNICEF
Evaluation	No evaluation was made	No evaluation was made
Factors	• Partnership related criteria; • Partner related criteria; • Descriptive criteria; • Normative criteria.	• Partnership related criteria; • Partner related criteria; • Descriptive criteria; • Normative criteria.

Step 6: Partnership evaluation: ISAF and UNICEF

Performance

Performance military actor

Descriptive criteria

Support to the force — Force protection:
Criterion	Rating
Belligerent groups or key leaders are direct beneficiaries of assistance activities.	low
Total number of direct and indirect beneficiaries of assistance activities.	high
Visibility of the assistance activities.	high
Length of the military operation.	medium

Support to the force — Safe and secure environment:
Criterion	Rating
The outcome directly contributes to a safe and secure environment.	medium

Support to the force — Situational awareness:
Criterion	Rating
Situational awareness is increased.	medium

Support to the civil environment:
Criterion		Rating
Needs	Needs of the civil environment have been addressed.	high
Sustainability	The outcome of the assistance activities is sustainable.	high
Local capacity	Local capacity is increased through assistance activities.	low

Normative criteria
Criterion	Rating
The performance of the assistance activities is perceived as a success by military actor.	high

Performance civilian actor of assistance community

Descriptive criteria
Criterion		Rating
Needs	Needs of the civilian actor have been addressed.	high
Sustainability	The outcome of the assistance activities is sustainable.	high
Local capacity	Local capacity is increased through assistance activities.	low
Visibility	Visibility of the assistance activities.	high

Normative criteria
Criterion	Rating
The performance of the assistance activities is perceived as a success by civilian actor of assistance community.	high

Performance local population

Descriptive criteria
Criterion		Rating
Needs	Needs of the local population have been addressed.	not applicable
Sustainability	The outcome of the assistance activities is sustainable.	not applicable
Local capacity	Local capacity is increased through assistance activities.	not applicable

Normative criteria
Criterion	Rating
The performance of the assistance activities is perceived as a success by local population.	not applicable

Costs
Criterion	Rating
The relative costs of assistance activities.	medium